THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

EXPLAINING MORAL JUDGMENTS: A SYNTHESIS OF COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL AND SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONIST PREMISES

by

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled Explaining Moral Judgments: A Synthesis of Cognitive Developmental and Symbolic Interactionist Premises submitted by Charles Levine in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

The theoretical rationale of the present study proposes that the quality of moral judgments made by respondents can be expected to vary depending upon: (a) the identity of the "other" implicated in the moral dilemma, and (b) the nature of the moral dilemma presented. In order to substantiate these two expectations, it is argued that role-taking can be seen as the cognitive process mediating moral judgments. When it is realized that different types of role-taking are elicited by different types of standpoints (i.e., the objects of the role-taking process) then one can assume, similarly, that different types of moral reasoning processes are elicited by both different types of "others" and moral dilemmas.

The subjects who took part in the investigation were enrolled in introductory sociology classes at The University of Alberta. Each subject answered one of three forms of a moral judgment questionnaire (i.e., a "stranger treatment" (T_1), a "best-friend treatment" (T_2), or a "mother treatment" (T_3), with each questionnaire consisting of four moral dilemmas.

The three major hypotheses advanced predicted: (a) that stage 3 moral reasoning (as measured by the Kohlberg instrument) would be used to a greater extent in treatments 2 and 3; (b) that stage 4 moral reasoning would be used to a lesser extent in treatments 2 and 3; and (c) that variation in moral dilemma would have a significant effect on response rate coded at all reasoning stages of Kohlberg's typology.

With the exception of pre-conventional moral reasoning, results of analysis of variance indicated support for the above hypotheses. On the basis of these findings it is concluded that the process of moral reasoning may be reasonably conceptualized within the theoretical context of the "on-going social act." A discussion of several implications which follow from this research is found in the concluding chapter of the work. This discussion is concerned with the following topics: (a) the "stability-specificity" debate; (b) the adequacy of a bifurcation model of moral development; and (c) the definition of a "mature" moral judgment.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The task of investigating the development of moral judgment has been undertaken almost exclusively by theorists who adhere to the cognitive-developmental perspective. Though such a perspective does not rely upon a rejection of the role which social experience plays when one makes a moral judgment, it certainly has not incorporated the implications of this variable into research.

There are, accordingly, grounds for suspecting that the cognitive-developmental perspective is inadequate to the extent that it has ignored the role which social experience can be expected to play. This assertion is made for several reasons. It seems plausible that variation in moral judgment styles may be produced when the exigencies of the situations in which judgments are made are varied. Also, the identity of those involved in the moral dilemma that one is judging would appear to be a relevant factor. Thus, an explicit orientation to "the definition of the situation," as the judger interprets it, as well as taking into account variations in role-taking styles and degrees of affective involvement with the "others" who are being judged, should be factors investigated.

Another characteristic of the moral judgment phenomenon should also be mentioned. Several studies report variations in respondents' levels of judgments across both test situations and response areas.[1] For a theory of moral judgment to be comprehensive, it must successfully

integrate this reported variation at the conceptual level. Integrating the many situationally-specific results into a coherent body of knowledge poses a problem for the theorist who posits the importance of the concepts of "personality," "attitude," and/or "consistent cognitive style." In such a case one becomes predisposed to search for stability and continuity as the defining aspects of moral judgment. Theorists in this tradition speak about "modal" categories of judgmental responses[2] or conditioned attitudes of responsibility, altruism, and respect.[3] However, as has just been mentioned, the research done in this area reports <u>both</u> stability and variation in the moral judgment phenomenon.

In light of the above, another assumption about the nature of moral judgments would seem to be just as tenable as the one traditionally accepted by developmental psychologists. Specifically, it may be the case that moral judgments, in terms of both the cognitive structures and processes on which they are based as well as their specific contents are, by nature, variable. Another way in which to state this point would be to suggest that the problem is not to account for variation but rather stability.

The perspective of the cognitive-developmental theorist has led to other deficiencies. On the one hand, many empirical findings have been passed over briefly because integrating them into theories now in vogue would be either extremely difficult or, in some cases, threatening to the integrity of these conceptual schemes.[4] On the other hand, the methodologies employed to obtain those results which are thought to substantiate the theories now held as tenable (i.e., those findings which suggest that moral judgment styles are stable) are not critically explored in their entirety. The point is that the stability

of certain findings may be more a function of the measuring devices used to observe them rather than of "states of habit" residing in the individual.[5]

Thus, there exists an interesting problem challenging those who wish to explain the phenomenon of moral judgment. The developmental approach has been quite successful in pointing out that one can justifiably refer to a stage-sequence of moral development in reference to middle and late childhood and early adolescence. It has been the success of the findings substantiating this sequence which has led to the rather procrustean search for stability at all age levels. However, as one studies older age groups certain disconcerting findings seem to emerge. In the most general sense, the consistency of findings substantiating the stability hypothesis for younger samples has not emerged.[6] It would appear, then, that what we require is a theory which is capable of predicting both stability and variability as characteristics of moral judgment. In the chapters to follow it will be argued that such a task can be accomplished through the synthesis of cognitive-developmental premises with those of symbolic interaction, along with specific reference to the variables of role-taking, affect (as measured along a secondary-primary relationship continuum), and the "definition of the situation."

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this thesis is to examine, on a theoretical and empirical level, the relationship between role-taking, primary relations, and moral judgment. Emphasis is placed upon the concept of role-taking because it will be seen that role-taking is the cognitive

process responsible for mediating moral judgments. The unique feature of role-taking lies in the fact that it can be seen as the process underlying both the continuity and the variability of moral judgments. It is reasonable to suspect that "who" a respondent judges and which expectations he is centering on at any particular moment, elicits a specific type of role-taking which in turn dictates the quality of the moral judgment made.

The developmental product of role-taking ability is not a "modal" role-taking type but rather several types of role-taking as defined by various "types of others" (i.e., standpoints). That is to say that one can role-take from the standpoint of collective expectations; particular-other expectations; from an imagined projected state of the self; or from a simultaneous synthesis of all these types.

It follows that an assertion of a modal moral judgment response style emerging in the late teen years or early twenties may be questionable. It is suggested that this possibility has been overlooked by researchers in the area because they have failed to realize that role-taking is a phenomenon which is simultaneously "cognitive process" and "cognitive process assimilating experiential content." One does not simply role-take. On the contrary, one role-takes "others" or the "expectations of others."

Role-taking is a cognitive process which enables the actor to assimilate aspects of the environment in which he is acting. Given this perspective, one must realize that the nature of both the present situation and the value of the objects in that situation, as interpreted by the actor, can be considered variables influencing the

manner in which he will derive meaning from the social act. In this sense, the research proposed here conceptualizes the process of moral judgment as an ongoing social act. The role of past experience, conceptualized by others as "habit," "attitude," or "personality trait" will not be ignored in the present work; however, past experience is not to be interpreted as the unique constraint upon the moral judgment process. Rather, it is seen as one factor among several influencing the outcome of the judgment process.

To demonstrate the utility of this symbolic-interactionist perspective, it is necessary to demonstrate that certain "valued" objects which are properties of "global" moral dilemma situations will, when varied, produce variation in the moral judgment made. In the present study, the "other" to be judged has been varied in terms of three roles: a stranger; a best friend; and one's mother. The "global" moral dilemma situations have also been varied in terms of three substantive issues: euthanasia, theft and deceit, and the breaking of a contract. Specific hypotheses concerning the nature of the variation to be produced by these experimental treatments and moral dilemmas will be found in the fourth chapter.

II. IMPLICATIONS AND PREVIEW

The implications of the present study are twofold. First of all, it is felt that the successful derivation of the theoretical synthesis proposed above will be a sufficient contribution in and of itself. Secondly, a reformulation of what a "mature" moral judgment is will be offered. It will be suggested that such a reformulation should be

defined only in terms of cognitive process, not in terms of the content of the judgment made.

This dissertation is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 presents a review of the theoretical and empirical work which has thus far directed inquiry into the nature of moral judgment. The work of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg is emphasized and critically evaluated. Along with this discussion a specification of the stability-specificity problem is presented. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical orientation of the dissertation. The discussion includes reference to the concept of development and its applicability as an organizing principle for the moral judgment process. The relevance of the variables of role-taking and affect is suggested along with specific reference to the work of G.H. Mead, Jean Piaget, and Milton Rokeach. The propositions derived from this theoretical orientation are also presented in this portion of the dissertation. Chapter 4 describes the data collection procedures, discusses the measurement instruments used, and offers a statement of the hypotheses which were tested. The data are presented and analyzed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes the work with reference to its theoretical implications and its import for defining the nature of a mature moral judgment.

FOOTNOTES

[1]See, for example, the work of Johnson (1962), Medinnas (1957), and Durkin (1959b, 1961).

[2]A critical discussion of Kohlberg's use of this term will be given in Chapter 3.

[3]See, for example, the work of W. Kay (1970).

[4]Reference is being made to the manner in which Kohlberg (1963) interpreted an unexpected lack of variation in his category, stage 3. This will be noted in Chapter 2.

[5]The work of E. Durkheim (1961) and W. Kay (1970) offers an "attitude" definition of moral character. This type of definition will be challenged vis a vis its relevance to moral judgment making in Chapter 6.

[6]See, for example, Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) and Hampden-Turner and Whitten (1971).

CHAPTER 2

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter presents a review and critical evaluation of the work done in the area of moral judgment. Emphasis will be placed on the efforts of Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg (1958), for the major cognitive-developmental contributions to the understanding of moral judgment stem from their endeavors. Upon completion of this review, a specification of the stability-specificity issue will be offered and an alternative approach to conceptualizing the significance of this issue will be suggested. This will lead to a theoretical reformulation of the nature of moral judgment making, which will be outlined in the following chapter. Before commencing the discussion, a few comments concerning the field of moral development are in order.

I. MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Inquiry into the nature of moral development has involved reference to variables in addition to the judgmental one with which this thesis is primarily concerned. Specifically, a great deal of research and theoretical speculation has dealt with "moral behavior" and "moral emotion." The former has been operationalized as "resistance to temptation" and the latter as "post-transgressional responses of guilt." There are several reasons, over and above those of personal preference, which have led to a restriction of the scope of this work to the field

of moral judgment per se. It is argued here that the study of moral development is better served by focusing primarily on the judgmental variable rather than on behavioral or emotional variables.[1]

"Resistance to temptation" and "post-transgressional responses of guilt" are variables suggested by Freud's concept of the superego. The major implication of this concept is that once it is formed through the resolution of the Oedipal crisis, the child is left with an internalized constellation of parental and cultural directives which allow him to curtail any anti-social impulses (resistance to temptation). If this internalization of the "do-nots" occasionally fails in its purpose, the child is re-oriented to them through feelings of remorse, anxiety, and/or shame (post-transgressional responses of guilt). Thus, though the occasional transgression occurs, the ensuing feelings of guilt not only redirect the child to focus on the norm transgressed, but tend to strengthen the proscriptive nature of that norm because of the aversive quality of the guilt itself.

The important property of the superego is its hypothesized generalizability. That is, it has been conceptualized in theoretical discussions as a mental faculty which is responsible for consistency in both behavior and self-punitive tendencies, regardless of the situation in which social action occurs. Also, given that its origin stems from the resolution of the Oedipal crisis, the formation of the superego is thought to occur relatively early in the life of the child (between the ages of five and seven). The research inspired by this tradition has not resulted in the confirmation of this formulation; rather, the results reported seem to indicate the necessity of a more or less total regeneration of the theoretical rationale.

The concept of "moral character" inspired the classical research efforts of Hartshorne and May (1930). Moral character, a concept closely akin to the superego, suggests an internalized constellation of attitudes or habits which predispose people to behave in ways congruent with the normative expectations of any particular social milieu. Primarily interested in the ability of the child to resist the temptation to deviate from normative expectations in situations which were apparently free from detection and punishment, Hartshorne and May concluded that the tendency to resist temptation was more a function of situational factors than of a stable, fixed moral character. They suggest that:

> No one is honest or dishonest by 'nature.' Where conflict arises between a child and his environment, deception is a natural mode of adjustment, having in itself no 'moral' significance. ... (Also, there is a) ... large place occupied by the 'situation' in the suggestion and control of conduct, not only in its larger aspects, such as the example of other pupils, the personality of the teacher, etc., but also in its more subtle aspects, such as the nature of the opportunity to deceive, the kind of material or test on which it is possible, the relation of the child to this material, and so on ... (Hartshorne and May, 1930: 412-413).

Thus, the hypothesized tendency to resist temptation, conceived of as a more or less stable behavioral pattern resulting from the internalization of proscriptions, has not been confirmed. Kohlberg (1968) notes that the work of Hartshorne and May indicated that cheating in one situation did not predict cheating in another; that the tendency to cheat was more a function of the degree of risk of being detected; that noncheaters, therefore, acted more on the basis of caution than "honesty"; and, that moral conduct had little relationship with verbal tests of moral knowledge.[3]

Attempting to salvage the concept of moral character, Burton (1963) re-analyzed the data obtained by Hartshorne and May. He concluded that there was some evidence in their information which indicated an underlying trait of honesty but that a great deal of variation among tests of honesty was to be accounted for by situational factors. In reference to Burton's findings Kohlberg (1968) argues that:

> ... there is some personal consistency in honest behavior by general personality traits. These traits, however, seem not to be traits of moral conscience but rather a set of ego abilities corresponding to common-sense notions of prudence and will (1968: 485).

Given the discussion thus far, there is reason to question both the assumed generality of moral behavior and the utility of postulating a single theoretical construct thought to be responsible for it. However, research interests have also been turned toward the investigation of the parental antecedents of guilt. In this effort the findings have been more supportive of the general proposition that types of early socialization experience are associated with the occurrence of reactions of guilt. Results suggest that though moral behavior may be to a large extent situationally specific, there is, nevertheless, an internalization of moral directives having their basis in early childhood and mediated by their association with guilt (Hoffman, 1963: 49).

Wiesbroth (1970) reports that identification with parents (as measured by means of the semantic differential) correlates positively with mature moral judgment (as measured by the Kohlberg instrument).[4] Identification of the male subjects with both parents was found to be significantly related to mature judgment while identification with the father was significantly related to mature judgment in females.

Weisbroth cautions, however, that while the reported correlations are significant "they are not large, indicating that other factors besides parental identification are also to be considered" (1970: 401).

In terms of types of parental discipline both Hoffman and Salzstein (1967) and Aronfreed (1961) report that "induction" as opposed to "sensitization" techniques foster a high degree of internally motivated moral responses.[5] Hoffman and Salzstein defined three styles of parent disciplinary techniques:

> Power assertion, in which the parent capitalizes on his power and authority over the child; love withdrawal, i.e., direct but non-physical expressions of anger, disapproval, etc.; and induction, consisting of the parents' focusing on the consequences of the child's action for others (1967: 45).

These authors concluded from their study that:

> ... advanced development along various moral dimensions was associated with infrequent use of power assertion and frequent use of induction ... Love withdrawal, on the other hand, related infrequently to moral development (1967: 45).

The above findings deserve careful consideration. Hoffman and Salzstein suggest in their conclusion that power assertion techniques tend to inhibit the internalization of prohibitions because they elicit hostility in the child, leaving him less sensitive to the needs of others, and promote in him a concern for the dictates of authorities. The result is an externally oriented morality. Induction practices, on the other hand, lead to an internalized moral orientation. This is accomplished not through a semi- or unconscious acquisition of something approximating the superego but rather through the stimulation to:

> ... motivate the child to focus his attention on the harm done others ... and thus to help integrate his capacity for empathy with the knowledge of the human consequences

> of his own behavior. ....Induction in sum should be the most facilitative form of discipline for building long-term controls which are independent of external sanctions (Hoffman and Salzstein, 1967: 55).

Hoffman and Salzstein's view of the role played by induction suggests that the child accomplishes moral learning through an active and conscious adjustment to the environment. The implication of this process is that the psychoanalytic perspective, emphasizing the notion of "identification with the aggressor" as the foundation of moral growth, is challenged. Corroborating this assertion from another viewpoint, it can be noted that Hoffman and Salzstein found that threats of love withdrawal had little relationship with the formation of an internalized moral orientation.[6]

What is being suggested is that the psychological process responsible for the acquisition of an internalized moral orientation is most probably a conscious one in which the child "actively adapts" rather than "passively accepts." Aronfreed (1961) is a proponent of this view. His explanation for the relationship between induction practices and the acquisition of an internalized morality is based on the notion that induction should be seen as "utilizing a verbal and cognitive medium of exchange that can provide the child with his own resources for evaluating his behavior" (Aronfreed, 1961: 226).

Thus, much of the literature concerning internal states such as guilt does suggest a more stable relationship between child-rearing techniques and the acquisition of a more or less unitary internal agent of self-punitive tendencies. However, the point which must be stressed is that this relationship does not appear to be explained by reference to the concept of superego strength but rather by reference to certain

ego strengths.[7]

The assertion that the acquisition of moral standards involves more of a reliance on ego characteristics than has previously been thought has derived empirical support from a variety of studies. This research, reviewed in Kohlberg (1964), has investigated the role of ego-strength by various operationalizations of the concept. All the interpretations of ego strength (i.e., as intelligence quotient; the ability to anticipate future events and to delay gratification; self-esteem; and the ability to maintain a stable, focused attention span) have been shown to correlate positively with various moral character typologies (e.g., Peck and Havighurst, 1960) and experimental tests of resistance to temptation (e.g., Mischel, 1963).

Another line of attack supporting the present argument consists of illustrating that moral development is not stabilized by the age period during which the Oedipal crisis is resolved. Kohlberg (1958) was successful in demonstrating that moral development was far from complete at this time in the child's life. On the contrary, he was able to show that there were distinct moral stages extending into the late teen years.[8]

Stephenson (1966), in his book The Development of Conscience, defined the concept of conscience in the following three ways. In line with the essentially negative connotations of conscience as utilized by the psychoanalytic school, Stephenson designated one aspect of conscience as "intro-punitive guilt" (i.e., self-punitive responses following transgression). A second aspect was labelled "other-directed anxiety" and was defined as the individual's susceptibility to external sanctions

as reflected in tendencies to anticipate and avoid disapproval. The last aspect, "conscience motive" was defined as the "positive aspect of conscience" and was detected in individuals' active concern for others.[9] In terms of the present discussion, it is important to note that Stephenson found that with increase in age the aspect of "intro-punitive guilt" became less salient while "conscience motive" and "other-directed anxiety" became more influential. This finding along with Stephenson's statement that cognitive development is associated with a decline in the importance of intro-punitive guilt reactions[10] would appear to support the contention that moral development may be better understood as a function of ego-strength factors.

There is other evidence supporting the hypothesis that the development of ego abilities underlies moral development. On the level of theory, a formal conception of role-taking has been suggested as the process enabling the child to develop reactions of what Stephenson calls "conscience motive" and "other-directed anxiety" (Kohlberg, 1963), (Maccoby, 1968). Studies carried out by Stuart (1967), Costanzo et al. (1973), Crowley (1968), and Hogan (1973) also support the suggestion that the ability to role-take and decenter perspective enhance the development of an internalized moral orientation.

Thus, it can be concluded that early childhood experiences may foster the acquisition of an internalized moral orientation but that the process responsible for this acquisition is not likely to be understood very fully by sole reference to the concept of identification.[11] Graham (1972) argues that the emphasis on the punitive and emotive aspects of moral development, based on the psychoanalytic investment in the concept of guilt, has blinded us to the more rational role played by ego

factors (273).

The discussion thus far has emphasized the point that an understanding of moral development may be better served by reference to the learning organism as an actively accommodating entity rather than as being a reactive agent responding to directives which have been "stamped in" and have remained stable influences on its behavior. Other approaches to the study of moral development, emphasizing the variables of "resistance to temptation" and "post-transgressional responses of guilt" have yielded very little in the way of consistent information on the subject.

> The assessment of moral values through these techniques is predicated on a series of propositions which, though consistent with psychoanalytic theory, are questionable on empirical grounds. A number of studies have shown low correlations, no relationship, or even negative relationships between values and resistance to temptation, guilt and resistance to temptation, and no studies have demonstrated that the strength of moral values, resistance to temptation, and proneness to give projective guilt responses all covary (Pittel and Mendelsohn, 1966: 32).

Not only do these variables fail to covary, but in and of themselves their influence tends to be inconsistent across situations.[12]

Concentration on the role played by ego-strength factors would seem to be a more beneficial avenue to take.[13] This approach is suggested on the basis that while reference to the concepts of superego or "moral character" are incapable of explaining the lack of consistency in response just reported, reference to the more cognitively oriented model of the organism can.[14,15]

Attention will now be turned to a critical review of that work which has carried out the ego-strength approach to understanding moral development. The major interests within this area of inquiry are

cognitive ones. These interests concern the investigation of the manner in which decisions are made in "moral dilemmas" and whether or not it is feasible to speak of cognitive-developmental stages of moral judgment or simply of discontinuous moral judgments. As one author puts it:

> Is there a specific and identifiable aspect of human ability which can be termed 'moral judgment'? Or should we speak of moral judgments, i.e., about separate and identifiable critical judgments which are all related to a moral topic? (Kay, 1970: 144).

II. PIAGET

In the Moral Judgment of the Child Piaget suggests that the nature of moral judgment can be traced through a developmental sequence by distinguishing two qualitatively distinct periods. The first is called the "morality of constraint" and the second, the "morality of cooperation."

"All morality," writes Piaget, "consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules" (1965: 1). Piaget proceeded to investigate this topic by studying the child's "practice" and "consciousness" of rules in reference to the game of marbles. The practice of the rules was discovered to develop through four stages. The motor stage was simply the time during which "the child handles the marbles at the dictation of his desires and motor habits" (Piaget, 1965: 26). He plays in complete solitude. From the ages of two to five the child is said to be egocentric. He receives a system of codified rules which he attempts to play by, but does not succeed in establishing any co-operative effort with others. The stage of "incipient co-operation"

follows next, during which children achieve the ability to play together but, when questioned, show many discrepancies in their conceptions of what, in fact, the proper rules are. At the final stage (11-12 years), called the "codification of rules," "not only is every detail of procedure in the game fixed, but the actual code of rules to be observed is known to the whole society" (Piaget, 1965: 27).

Perhaps of greater interest is Piaget's description of three stages in the development of the consciousness of the rules. The first stage is, in a sense, a null stage: "rules are simply not part of the child's life space" (Flavell, 1963: 292). In stage two:

> The child regards the rules of the game as eternal and unchangeable, stemming from parental or divine authority; suggested changes in the rules are usually resisted; and new rules 'are not fair,' even if others agree to abide by them (Flavell, 1963: 292).

By stage three, a relativistic view of the rules has emerged, a view which condones their change as long as it is achieved through mutual consent and which no longer espouses the belief in a "divine" and "authoritarian" source investing them with an aura of sacredness.

These three stages correspond with the four stages in the practice of rules. The second begins during the last half of the egocentric stage and is observed to decrease toward the end of the stage of incipient cooperation. It is succeeded by the third stage which becomes more and more predominant during the evolution of the codification of rules. In reference to this relationship, Piaget states that:

> The correlation between the three stages in the development of the consciousness of rules and the four stages relating to their practical observance is of course only a statistical correlation and therefore very crude. But

> broadly speaking the relation seems to us indisputable. The collective rule is at first something external to the individual and consequently sacred to him; then, as he gradually makes it his own it comes to that extent to be felt as the free product of mutual agreement and an autonomous conscience. And with regard to practical use, it is only natural that a mystical respect for laws should be accompanied by a rudimentary knowledge and application of their contents, while a rational and well-founded respect is accompanied by an effective application of each rule in detail (Piaget, 1965: 28-29).

Piaget then goes on to investigate the attitudes of children toward certain moral dilemmas with the goal of tapping the underlying decision making qualities which produce their responses. Attitudes toward lying, clumsiness, justice, and punishment are investigated. All this work is described by him with reference to the two broad developmental categories mentioned above (i.e., the "morality of constraint" and the "morality of cooperation").

Heteronomous conduct and the morality of constraint are labels employed to describe the first stage of moral development. This stage is based upon unilateral respect for authority and engenders the attitudes of objective responsibility, expiatory punishment, a belief in imminent justice, and a blind acceptance of any dictate eminating from persons occupying a position of authority.

The influence of the emerging properties of operational thought and peer group interaction lead the child from moral constraint to the morality of cooperation. At this time the belief in imminent justice has waned and the nature of distributive justice has evolved from a belief in whatever reward or punishment the authority figure prescribed as being "fair," to a well-entrenched egalitarian expectation. Social contacts with peers are founded upon mutual respect; actions are no longer judged by their objective consequences only, but also by the

intentions of the actor responsible for them; and punishments are now restitutive, deemed appropriate on the basis of reciprocity rather than upon an arbitrary and expiatory nature as during the heteronomous era.

Thus, for Piaget there exist two moralities: the first, the morality of constraint, leads to heteronomy and moral realism while the second, that of cooperation, leads to autonomy. Between these two phases of development Piaget notes an intermediate stage during which rules and commands become interiorized and generalized (Piaget, 1965: 195).

Though the morality of cooperation eventually succeeds in dominating the morality of constraint, it never achieves a total domination. As Piaget argues, these two moralities can co-exist in the mind of both the child and the adult.

> With children as with adults, there exist two psychological types of social equilibrium - a type based on the constraint of age, which excludes both equality and 'organic solidarity,' but which canalizes individual egocentrism without excluding it, and a type based on cooperation and resting on equality and solidarity (Piaget, 1965: 320).

When viewing Piaget's work from a more general perspective, it becomes possible to detect three primary themes underlying his efforts. He continually emphasizes the influence of adult constraint, social cooperation, and intellectual development as the core variables determining the evolution of moral judgment. The importance of these three variables should be noted, for they represent the well known dialectic of organism-environment interchange which is the fundamental premise of most of Piaget's work.

In summary, Piaget's work is an excellent example of a cognitive-developmental theory taking into account the role of social experience.

As a matter of fact, Piaget himself refuses to treat seriously any question concerning the nature-nurture controversy. In one sense, the moral development of the child depends upon the erosion of egocentricity; yet this erosion cannot be considered as being either the cause or the effect of mutual respect and cooperation. The social forms of unilateral and mutual respect along with the variable of intelligence are considered to be equally relevant. This point should be kept in mind for it gives one the opportunity to make the assertion, which is logically consistent with Piaget's work, that there may exist in the minds of all of us several systems of moral judgment which will be utilized depending upon our perception of their applicability to different situations. In Piaget's words:

> The ethics of authority, which is that of duty and obedience, leads, in the domain of justice, to the confusion of what is just with the content of established law and to the acceptance of expiatory punishment. The ethic of mutual respect, which is that of good (as opposed to duty), and of autonomy, leads, in the domain of justice, to the development of equality, which is the idea at the bottom of distributive justice and of reciprocity (Piaget, 1965: 324).

The underscored portion of the above statement is extremely relevant. For Piaget it implies the properties of the child's perspective which develop throughout the phase of the morality of cooperation. "What is just," as manifested in the various attitudes of the cooperative era, involves and depends upon the development of responsibility, rationality, altruism, and autonomy in the child. The relationship between responsibility and autonomy suggests the child's awareness that though rules have been divorced from their mystical origins, they still serve a useful social function and should be obeyed

for the sake of the "spirit of the game." Rationality and altruism emerge with the erosion of egocentrism and the enlargement of social relations beyond those of unilateral respect. Through the ability to role-take the affective states of others, the child is now capable of understanding the necessity of treating them as he himself would like to be treated. It is through the merger of these components of altruism and rationality that the child is pushed beyond the "dogmatism of equality" (as expressed in the demand for reciprocity regardless of the situation) to what Piaget calls the stage of "equity." This is the stage at which "justice itself is extended along a purely autonomous line of development into a higher form of reciprocity" which is manifested in judgments based not on mere equality, but on the exigencies of situations in which individuals find themselves (Piaget, 1965: 282).

It should be noted that equity can stand in sharp contrast not only with the attitudes engendered by unilateral respect but also with those expressed by egalitarian expectations. In reference to a story concerning the child's response to parental requests for extra work, Piaget tells the reader that:

> In this particular case, if strict justice is opposed to obedience, equity requires that the special relations of affection existing between parent and child should be taken into account. Thus a tedious job, even if it is unjust from the point of view of equality, becomes legitimate as a free manifestation of friendliness (Piaget, 1965: 283).

A. Discussion

Several criticisms have been addressed to Piaget's work. Before evaluating these criticisms certain themes in his book should be

emphasized.

The first point has to do with the fact that there exist at least three qualitatively distinct types of moral orientation. One orientation is based upon the social form of unilateral respect, another is based upon the social form of mutual respect, and the third utilizes a perspective which Piaget calls "equity." These orientations develop in the order just presented and all three remain as viable alternatives for moral judgment by adults. What is interesting, however, is that by definition the covert interaction of these three orientations is likely to result in cognitive conflict. The likelihood of such conflict occurring will be, in part, a function of the situation which is to be judged. If that situation is, in fact, a "dilemma" for the respondent, then the covert interaction just mentioned will probably occur.[16]

A second point concerns Piaget's assertion that moral development depends upon the erosion of egocentrism. Egocentrism implies two characteristics: a confusion of the ego with the external world and a lack of self-conscious involvement in cooperative social interaction. These are, of course, the properties which go hand in hand with unilateral respect. The acquisition of the moral orientations of mutual respect and equity depends upon intellectual development, and this development is marked by the acquisition of a concept of self and by the ability to decenter perspective in social interaction (i.e., the ability to role-take). As Piaget states, "cooperation presupposes minds that know themselves and can take up their positions in relation to each other" (Piaget, 1965: 93). He goes on to suggest that:

> In so far as constraint is replaced by cooperation, the child dissociates his ego from the thought of other people ... he can discuss matters more and more as an equal and has increasing opportunities (beyond those of suggestion, obedience, or negativism) of freely contrasting his point of view with that of others. Henceforward, he will not only discover the boundaries that separate his self from the other person, but will learn to understand the other person and be understood by him (Piaget, 1965: 95).

Thus, though he does not use the phrase very frequently, the ability to role-take the perspective of others is a fundamental requirement for advancement in Piaget's theory of moral development.

An emphasis on role-taking as the cognitive process mediating moral responses leads us to the third theme in Piaget's book. Nowhere in The Moral Judgment of the Child does he make explicit reference to the organism-environment interchange model of adaptation; however, it is certainly assumed. The interesting point about this model of learning and development is that its relevance for research can be interpreted in at least two different ways.

On the one hand, it is feasible to perceive the respondent as having acquired various attitudes based upon previous experience with the three moral orientations outlined above, as well as with the types of role-taking utilized to mediate these moral orientations.[17] Given this fact, the respondent's judgments of moral dilemma are interpreted by most contemporary researchers as "modal" styles of judging stemming from his most predominant moral orientation. Thus, a direct relationship is thought to exist between the respondent's past experience and his current judgment. For example, the "modal" moral orientation for males is thought to consist of a societally oriented value system. Concerns for responsibility, duty, lawful expectations,

etc., are characteristic of this perspective.

This line of theoretical speculation assumes, of course, that it is accurate to postulate that persons do have "modal" moral orientations. More will be said concerning this assumption later in the discussion. What should be noted at this point is that this interpretation of the moral judgment phenomenon is, in fact, at odds with what Piaget stated concerning the establishment of more than one moral orientation in adulthood.

Another interpretation of the organism-environment interchange model involves taking a perspective which focuses not on a description of the developmental process over time, but rather on the dynamics of making judgments within the context of an on-going social act. Here the role of past experience is interpreted in a different fashion. Instead of postulating a "modal" or habitual tendency to respond (due perhaps to differentials in the extent to which one moral orientation has been conditioned with respect to others) one assumes that the judgment made will be a manifestation of the manner in which meaning is derived from the present context of social stimuli. The derivation of such meaning will be a function of an interaction between the respondent's "definition of the situation" and the experience he has had with a variety of different moral orientations. This interpretation would seem to be consonant with Piaget's assertion that the adult is capable of making a variety of qualitatively different moral judgments.

We have, then, two interpretations of any specific moral judgment. A judgment can be seen as the result of a more or less habitual tendency on the respondent's part to judge in a certain way,

regardless of the situation. In contrast, a judgment can be interpreted as an active adaptation by him to a particular type of social stimulation. It is suggested here that the latter interpretation is the more accurate one, especially in those situations which are seen by the respondent as being truly of a dilemmatic nature.

The above three characteristics of Piaget's work; the existence of several moral orientations whose interaction may produce dissonance, the importance of the concept of role-taking, and the interpretation of the organism-environment interchange model as suggesting an active adaptation to an on-going social act, should be kept in mind for they represent the conceptual foundation of this dissertation.

III. CONFIRMATION AND CRITIQUE

It will be recalled that the major developmental trend noted by Piaget was a shift from a heteronomous morality to one characterized by autonomy. These general categories of moral orientation have been investigated by scrutinizing development along eleven dimensions or aspects of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1964). Research dealing with this topic indicates that six of these aspects represent major developmental dimensions while five do not. The following have received supporting evidence.

1. Intentionality in judgment: studies by Boehm (1957), Boehm and Nass (1962), Lerner (1937), and MacRae (1954) have supported Piaget's assertion that intentionality as a variable in moral judgment is focused upon primarily by older children. Samples of younger children, by comparison, stress to a much greater extent the physical consequences of behavior.

2. Relativism in judgment: young children perceive an act as either wrong or right whereas older children

tend to make finer distinctions and do not see behaviors as being so polarized (MacRae, 1954).

3. Independence of sanctions: younger children are quick to judge an act by its association with the probability of reward or punishment. Older children, on the other hand, are capable of judging behavior on its own merit (probably due to their ability to focus on the intentions of the actor) and are capable of upholding a decision as to its nature regardless of ensuing sanctions (Kohlberg, 1963: 22).

4. Use of reciprocity: Piaget's observation that the use of reciprocity eventually develops from a strict egalitarian expectation to one of equity has been borne out by the studies of Durkin (1959b) and Bull (1969a and 1969b).

5. Use of punishment as restitution and reform: the postulated trend of favouring expiatory punishment at an early age and restitutive punishment at a later age has been supported by Harrower (1934) and Johnson (1962).

6. Naturalistic views of misfortune: the finding reported by Piaget that there is an inverse correlation between belief in imminent justice and age has been supported by Lerner (1937), Medinnas (1959), MacRae (1954), and Johnson (1962).

Kohlberg (1964) reports that the five dimensions suggested by Piaget's theory which have not been supported as being developmental in nature are:

> Modification of obedience to rules or authority because of situational demands of human needs; maintaining peer loyalty demands as opposed to obedience to authority; favoring direct retaliation by the victim rather than punishment by authority; favoring equality of treatment rather than differential reward for virtue or for conformity to authority; punishment based only on active individual responsibility rather than collective responsibility (Kohlberg, 1964: 399).

In reference to these dimensions, clearly defined increases with age have not been found (Durkin, 1959a and 1959b); variation by class has been noted (Harrower, 1934); and, variation by stories used to test

respondents has been observed (MacRae, 1954) and (Durkin, 1961).

In reference to the results just reported, Kohlberg (1964) reasons that the first six aspects meet developmental expectations because they "seem primarily to reflect cognitive development, as suggested by the fact that they are related to I.Q. as well as age (Kohlberg, 1964: 398). He goes on to suggest that the remaining five aspects have not been confirmed as developmental dimensions because they are basically social-emotional rather than cognitive-developmental components of moral judgment. Kohlberg concludes that a "general trend of moral development in childhood from an authoritarian to a democratic ethic" has not been supported (Kohlberg, 1964: 399).

It is interesting that these social-emotional aspects do not exhibit a developmental trend toward a "democratic ethic."[18] One must exercise caution, however, in assuming that this finding suffices as a criticism of Piaget. It should be noted that he would not expect a clearly defined and complete shift from an "authoritarian to a democratic ethic." According to his theory, the utilization of judgmental styles appropriate to either ethic depends upon one's perception of one's involvement in the two ideal-typical forms of social interaction (i.e., unilateral or mutual respect). To achieve a complete shift to a democratic ethic would imply that all the judgments one makes are based on a perception of oneself or others as always being involved in interaction with "equals." Now to assert that most children or most adults interpret all social relationships (both their's and other's) as being of an egalitarian nature would clearly be absurd. As far as this writer can discern, nowhere in his book does Piaget make such an

assertion. On the contrary, in order to suggest that a morality of constraint exists to some extent during adulthood, Piaget is forced to assume the opposite.

Much has been written in the attempt to criticize Piaget's book. A discussion of this criticism will now be undertaken. Though there are areas of his work which must be questioned, it will be seen that most of Piaget's "critics" constructively extend rather than criticize his work.

A. Intelligence

Some writers (e.g., Durkin, 1959b and Johnson, 1962) have criticized Piaget for failing to take into account the role of intelligence in the development of moral judgment. Such an objection is:

> ... perfectly valid if 'intelligence' is used to mean a hereditary potential for intellectual growth which experience can develop, but only within genetically set limits. Such a concept, virtually axiomatic among American psychologists, does in fact have no place in Piaget's theory (Lickona, 1969: 339).

Piaget defines intelligence as:

> The development of an assimilatory activity whose functional laws are laid down as early as organic life and whose successive structures are elaborated by interaction between itself and the external environment (Piaget, 1963: 359).

Defined in this fashion, intelligence in Piaget's theory can be considered as being partially responsible for moral development.

Though most tests of intelligence do not measure what Piaget means by the term (Wright, 1971) several studies, nevertheless, report significant positive relationships between their measures and the maturity of moral judgment (Durkin, 1959b; MacRae, 1954; Kohlberg, 1964;

and Johnson, 1962). A study which employed a measurement of intelligence based on the concept of decentration would appear to have construct validity with Piaget's definition. Such a study was conducted by Stuart (1967) and reports that maturity in both moral and causal judgments is related to decentering ability.

The relationship between intelligence and moral judgment must be scrutinized carefully. Implied in the association is a rather unique bond between covert mental functioning and the manner in which persons adjust to social interaction situations. Both activities can be thought of as being based on the same process. Lickona (1969) states that the "adherence to logical norms such as rationality and verification in thought and discourse is, in the sphere of intellectual activity, what cooperation is in the realm of morals" (339-340). Another way of stating this point is to assert that egocentrism is broken down by the child's conscious involvement in cooperative social interaction.

> It is through such experience that he ... becomes aware of his own thought, learns to take another's point of view, and comes to understand that reciprocal moral behavior is necessary for the stability of social relationships (Lickona, 1969: 338).

This postulated isomorphism between covert intellectual functioning on the one hand and cooperative social interaction on the other has been expounded upon by Feffer (1970). He bases his perspective on Piaget's theory of the construction and elaboration of mental structures (i.e., the "give and take" of assimilating reality to existing schemata and accommodating these schemata to external reality). This covert mental activity, Feffer suggests, can be seen as being isomorphic to that process known as "role-taking," a process which the

human being utilizes to achieve a stable adjustment to forms of social interaction.

Acknowledging that the equilibrium of mental structures, including "moral schemata," is achieved by a process which is, in a formal sense, similar to one's adjustment to social roles by the process of role-taking, is an important idea to keep in mind. This idea allows one to appreciate the degree to which the development of moral judgment is contingent upon the interplay between cognitive development and the social forms of interaction which Piaget calls constraint and cooperation.

B. Social Class

Some authors have criticized Piaget on the grounds that his theory cannot explain the variations in moral judgment which have been found to be correlated with social class.

Harrower (1935), the first to investigate the relationship between moral judgment and social class, found significant differences in moral maturity scores between upper and lower class English children. Another study, published two years later (Lerner, 1937), found that moral realism decreased earlier for American upper-class children than for their lower-class counterparts. Lerner suggested that this result was due to the fact that adult constraint was less salient for upper-class children and that egocentricity was therefore overcome more quickly. Thus, these children acquired the ability to judge subjectively and relate to others on the basis of "mutual respect" sooner than did those in the lower-class. Lerner's findings have more recently been supported by the studies of Boehm (1957) and Harris (1970).

In considering the relevance of social class, one must be careful to realize that the research reports just mentioned do not in any way contradict Piaget's theory. In order for them to do so would require that they demonstrate:

> ... variation in the sequence of judgmental orientations - if they showed, for example, that in some culture or class children first considered extenuating circumstances in evaluating acts and later ignored them, or that they first defined duty in terms of mutual respect among equals and later equated it with obedience to the rules imposed by authority. Departures of this nature from the Piaget pattern have not been reported, and are difficult even to conceive (Lickona, 1969: 342).

On the contrary, a great deal of evidence directly supports Piaget's work. Kohlberg (1964) reports that the predicted sequence in Piaget's theory has been observed in:

> ... various nations, in various social classes within nations, and among boys and girls. The Kohlberg studies indicated the same basic stages of moral judgment in middle- and working-class children, in Protestants and Catholics, in popular and socially isolated children, and in Formosan Chinese and American children (Kohlberg, 1964: 406).

The recent work in the area of "stage-mixture" (Turiel, 1969; Glassco et al., 1970) can also be considered as confirming Piaget's assertions.

It would seem that the relevant point to be noted in reference to social class is that though sequence in development is not affected by it, the rate of development is. Apparently upper- and middle-class children move faster and farther than lower-class children (Kohlberg, 1964: 406).[19]

C. Development and Stability

A reading of Piaget's book leaves some with the conclusion that moral judgment develops through an invariant sequence of stages and that

one can expect stability or continuity of judgmental response depending upon and defined by the stage at which a child is located. Such an interpretation should not be accepted without qualification, for it can be recalled that Piaget expected the continuation of various "moralities" into adulthood. His assertions concerning invariant sequence and stability were meant to imply only the heuristic value of interpreting moral evolution within a general developmental perspective. Surely the value of his work does not stand or fall on approximating an intimate conformity to these developmental parameters.[20]

However, other writers, most notably Bandura and McDonald (1963) have taken Piaget "at his word" and have argued that his perspective is lacking. They insist that the "development" of moral judgment can be best understood as a function of the manipulation of social learning variables rather than being viewed from a developmental perspective. Bandura and McDonald suggest that a "child's moral orientations can be altered and even reversed by the manipulation of response-reinforcement contingencies and by the provision of appropriate social models" (1963: 275). These authors observed a lack of stability in response which they attributed to the effects of children modelling adults. It should be noted, however, that this finding does not cast doubt on Piaget's work but rather confirms it! Piaget stated in his book that objective and subjective responsibility (the dimensions which Bandura and McDonald observed) should be conceived of as two distinct processes "which, broadly speaking, follow one another without, however, constituting definitive stages" (Piaget, 1965: 195). Piaget goes on to state that:

> These two attitudes may co-exist at the same age and even in the same child ... (they are) ... partially overlapping,

> but the second gradually succeeds in dominating the first (1965: 133).

Thus, obtaining objective moral judgments from children whose pre-test responses were of a subjective nature and vice versa, does not contradict Piaget. Rather, these findings would appear to indicate the rather banal fact that children tend to conform in the presence of adult models. Piaget was fully aware of the importance of this given the role he gave to adults in the heteronomous stage of moral development.

There appears, however, to be more at stake in this dialogue between Bandura and McDonald and Piaget than a mere accommodation of the latter's theory to the former's observations. More generally, the controversy can be seen as that with which social learning theorists have been continually concerned regarding their evaluation of the cognitive-developmental perspective. They argue that the developmental approach to socialization:

> ... emphasizes intraindividual variability over time and similarities among individuals at a common age or stage, (and) neglects marked interindividual variability in behavior due to biological, socio-economic, cultural, and personality differences. ... (On the other hand, learning theorists assert that since) ... widely differing reinforcement contingencies and social models experienced by children at the same age level result in considerable interindividual variability ... (and that since) ... social training experiences remain relatively constant throughout much of the child's earlier lifetime, we should (therefore) expect considerable intraindividual continuity in behavior at successive ages (Zigler and Child, 1969: 457).

However, the learning theorist's expectation that the behavioral continuity perspective is the better perspective to take is in itself questionable. It does not suffice in explaining the fact that developmentalists have illustrated quite conclusively: that is, the

existence of qualitatively distinct eras in the development of cognitive functioning (Piaget, 1963).

In a sense this debate is futile for the protagonists are really concerned with different problems. Generally speaking, social learning theorists are concerned with the nature of the processes responsible for the acquisition of information and behavior while the developmentalists focus their interest on "those formal features of cognitive processes which tend to be characteristic of particular developmental levels" (Zigler and Child, 1969: 458). To assert that learning can be understood as a function of reinforcement, modelling, etc. in no way contradicts the observation that the human organism, at different times in its development, is capable of subjecting information to qualitatively distinct cognitive operations.

The Bandura and McDonald study is valuable in that it indicates that moral judgments may be variable, depending upon the circumstances in which they are made. However, for several reasons, their work does not suffice as a critique of the developmental perspective that moral judgment emerges through distinct stages. In the first place, they did not scrutinize whether the variability in judgment was a function of conformity or whether it indicated real differences in the thought processes of the experimental subjects. In order to do this, the childrens' <u>reasons</u> for their judgments would have to be taken into account. Bandura and McDonald failed to do this.[21] A second problem with their study concerns the way in which they attempted to indicate that the variation in judgment produced was stable.

> Their post-test of the stability of judgmental changes was a poor evaluation of both their permanence and generalizability, since it followed immediately after the

> experimental session and confronted the child with a situation which differed essentially only in the number of adults he had to please (Lickona, 1969: 344-345).

As Turiel (1966) and Smedslund (1961) have indicated, one must wait a considerable period of time between experiment and post-test in order to determine whether the experimental results should be considered a function of superficially learned responses or of true changes in cognitive structure. By taking into account only the childrens' pre-test judgmental choices and not the reasons for their choices (which would indicate their current stage of conceptual organization) Bandura and McDonald failed to realize the importance of the distinction between superficially learned responses and "true cognitive changes." For Piaget, any lessons learned by an egocentric child concerning a subjective moral orientation must be learned in a cooperative interactive context. Otherwise these lessons will only be "falsely accommodated" rather than being assimilated to existing cognitive structure.[22] Now:

> This lesson, from the standpoint of Piaget's theory, is clear: if attempts to teach new concepts or change judgments do not take into account the child's existing level of intellectual development, they will produce only the acquisition of an isolated and unstable response (Lickona, 1969: 346).

Given the deficiency just noted in the Bandura and McDonald study, it is difficult to determine the nature of the response-variability which they observed. The importance of this line of criticism is exemplified by Smedslund's (1961) study. After being apparently successful in teaching an experimental group of children in a conservation of weight task, he found that when confronted with challenging evidence they failed to maintain their newly acquired perspective. Such reversion to non-conservation was not observed in the control group who had

demonstrated conservation, supposedly acquired from everyday experience.

D. The Impact of Religion

The studies which have explored the relationship between religion and moral judgment have not succeeded in shedding much light on the matter. The reason for this deficiency stems from both the inconclusiveness of their findings as well as from the arbitrariness of their working assumptions.

One approach to the problem has been to reason that exposure to religious teachings may condition moral orientation. MacRae (1954), for example, reported a higher incidence of moral realism (i.e., one aspect of an objective and heteronomous moral orientation) among children attending parochial schools. Boehm (1962) reports what would appear to be a contradictory finding. She concluded that students attending Catholic schools center on intentions (i.e., one aspect of a subjective and autonomous moral orientation) more often than those attending public schools. This finding was explained by her on the premise that Catholic teachings stress the importance of taking the intentions of the other into account. In reference to her study, one writer states that we must be cautious in interpreting her findings. Though it seems that Catholic concern with "responsibility" may advance the judgments of children where it is relevant:

> ... the evidence from a few questions is slight; the superiority of the Catholic children may be relatively superficial, may represent little more than a better trained verbal habit, and may, in the absence of follow-up studies, be relatively transient (Graham, 1972: 255).

In addition to exploring the relationship between religion and

moral judgment by reference to religious teachings and denominational affiliations, some authors have chosen to consider the effect of religion in terms of frequency of church attendance. In this context results tend to be disappointing. Stephenson (1966) reports that "there is little evidence that public religious observance increases, or is associated with strength or type of conscience" (117) and Bull (1969b) reports that the associations between attendance and moral judgment "were generally scattered, unpatterned, and inconsistent" (283).

It was stated above that the expected effects of religion can be seen as stemming from rather arbitrary assumptions. It appears reasonable, for example, to suggest that religion, whether considered on the basis of teachings or frequency of attendance, may foster either an autonomous or heteronomous moral orientation. From the perspective which this writer holds, the effect of religion and the effect of values in general depends upon the way in which one's cognitive organization mediates these values. Recalling Piaget, it will be remembered that one's cognitive organization is a product of an interaction between the organism and, in this case, the social environment. Given this perspective, the impact of religion can be seen as being dependent on one's perception of self vis a vis the perceived source of the values in question. That is, the tendency to utilize religious moral codes as generalized maxims to be applied across all moral situations would seem to be a function of having an orientation of unilateral respect toward the source of these codes (i.e., church clergy, the deity, etc.). One would expect such an orientation to buttress psychological defences[23] and the inability to tolerate the inevitable ambiguity of moral dilemmas.

On the other hand, if one sees oneself as oriented to rules or value-directives because one rationally or non-egocentrically appreciates their utility (i.e., what Piaget designates as the interaction form of mutual respect), then religion can be interpreted as a source of "food for thought" in the progression toward an autonomous moral orientation. In the words of one author, the significance of religion for moral judgment lies in the fact that it provides:

> ... the material about which a rational man can most profitably learn to think, and by engaging in such thought, to learn, unlearn and learn anew the styles of the moral life that enable him to participate in the human community ... (Graham, 1972: 257).

This theoretical emphasis on cognitive organization as the intervening variable in the above relationship is seen as being consistent with material discussed at the beginning of this chapter concerning the heuristic value of perceiving moral development as a function of ego-strength variables. Bull (1969a: 102) agrees with this interpretation and suggests that if the focus of inquiry is children, it would be profitable to investigate such variables as types of parental discipline and forms of familial relationships as determining the effect of religion on moral orientation.

If this is an adequate assessment of the impact of religion, then one should expect any relationship found between it and moral judgment to disappear if one controls for the effect of cognitive mediation. A more thorough discussion concerning this argument will be given in the following chapter.

E. The Impact of Sex

Many authors criticize Piaget for ignoring the variable of sex in his study. It is true that he did not devote much effort to the subject, since his major interest lay in illustrating the continuity of sequential moral stage development; however, it is certainly not true that he ignored sex effects. In his study of the game of Ilet Cachant (Piaget, 1965: 76-84), a girls' game, he noted two interesting differences between the sexes. He found that girls were less concerned than boys with the specification of rules (i.e., stage four of the practice of rules labelled "codification") and that they achieved the ability to be tolerant of others earlier than boys did.

The research since Piaget has yielded inconclusive results regarding sex differences (Wright, 1971; Weisbroth, 1970). A study by Magowan (1966) on the subject of imminent justice found no sex differences and research conducted by Whiteman and Kosier (1964) dealing with moral realism also failed to report differences between the sexes. On the other hand, Porteus and Johnson (1965) found differences on Piaget-type moral judgment questions with girls scoring more maturely, a finding supporting Piaget's work. Bull (1969a) suggests that one can understand moral development as progressing through the following four stages: i) pre-moral (anomy); ii) external (heteronomy); iii) internal-external (socionomy); and iv) internal (autonomy). Utilizing story items similar to Piaget's, Bull reports that at all ages boys more frequently than girls judge at the stage of anomy, that at seventeen years boys are more heteronomous than girls, and that girls provide more responses coded at the stage of socionomy. In terms of

autonomy, Bull reports the sexes to be similar (81). However, a rather interesting finding in Bull's work, which he mentions in passing, is that boys may utilize a far more sensitive and insightful moral orientation than they normally do under certain circumstances. The particular circumstance in this case concerned one of the moral dilemmas Bull employed dealing with "life and death." (His other stories consisted of "stealing," "lying," and "cheating" dilemmas.) However, Bull is careful to point out that it is:

> ... only in this stark issue of life and death that boys keep anything like in step with girls in moral insight. When it comes to personal relationships - the essence of all morality - they are almost lost in the distance (88).

Bull's finding can be interpreted as supporting evidence for the hypothesis that moral judgments may vary depending upon the "definition of the situation." It will be recalled that this idea is one of the main tenets of the present dissertation.

There is additional evidence indicating sex differences in moral judgment responses. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) attempt to explain the differences they found on the basis of conventional role expectations. They suggest that:

> While girls are moving from high school or college to motherhood, sizeable proportions of them are remaining at stage 3, while their male age mates are dropping stage 3 in favor of the stages above it. Stage 3 personal concordance morality is a functional morality for housewives and mothers; it is not for businessmen and professionals (108).

It may be that sex differences are more a function of the measurement instrument used to observe them than has previously been thought. It will become apparent that there is reason to hypothesize the existence of at least two "types" of morality: one in which the

focus of orientation is upon societal expectations and the other in which the focus of orientation is upon the needs of specified significant others known to the respondent. Several authors have recognized this distinction (Durkheim, 1961; Bull, 1969a and 1969b; and Kay, 1970); however, no one has investigated the implications which this distinction suggests for a theory of moral judgment. An explicit attempt to measure these different moral orientations may yield information concerning sex differences which has, until now, remained undetected. It may be the case that for one orientation sex differences exhibit one pattern while for the other orientation they exhibit another. The specific hypotheses concerning the presence or absence of sex differences will have to await the conclusion of the theoretical discussion of these moral orientations.

F. Social Relationships and the Role of Affect

In his theory of moral development Piaget emphasized the importance of acknowledging the difference between the effects of unilateral and mutual respect. As was stated earlier, unilateral respect is thought to encourage a heteronomous moral orientation and mutual respect is thought to yield an orientation of autonomy. Piaget suggests that increasing interaction with peers aids in the break-down of intellectual egocentrism, the subsequent development out of heteronomy, and the establishment of "mutual respect" relationships between equals leading to moral autonomy.

Given the above, several writers have studied the effects of social relationships in general and the effects of peer interaction

specifically. In terms of the former, it will be recalled that Weisbroth (1970) found that identification with parents was a relevant factor in the moral judgment performances of subjects between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-nine. In reference to a younger sample, Hoffman (1963) reports that we may:

> ... tentatively conclude that an internalized moral orientation is fostered by an affectionate relationship between the parent and child, in combination with the use of discipline techniques which utilize this relationship by appealing to the child's personal and social motives (47).

In other studies both MacRae (1954) and Johnson (1962) found no support for the hypothesis that children of authoritarian parents were retarded in terms of moral insight.

The above results would appear to seriously challenge Piaget's emphasis on the role which parents play in the moral development of children. Though he occasionally acknowledges that adults can, under certain circumstances,[24] aid in the progression from the morality of constraint to the morality of cooperation, Piaget nevertheless sees the adult role as largely functioning to inhibit such progression. It would seem that Piaget overlooked the eufunctional role which parents often play in the moral socialization of the young.

In terms of peer group effects, Einhorne (1971) reported that:

> At age 8, but not at age 5, cheating was an inverse function of the degree of (group) cohesiveness, supporting Piaget's theory that group ties produce moral autonomy at age 8, but not at age 5; and prior social experience bore a significant inverse relationship to cheating at age 8, but not at age 5, supporting Piaget's theory that such experience is the principal factor responsible for moral autonomy at age 8, but not at age 5 (10).

Here is evidence that both social experience and "cohesiveness with peers" are positively associated with the development of an internal,

subjective moral orientation. However, Einhorne's findings, as well as Piaget's, have been seriously challenged by the work of other authors.

In a study conducted by Kugelmass and Breznitz (1967), no difference was found between Kibbutz children and children raised in nuclear, urban families in their usage of intentionality. These authors see a dual significance in their findings. On the one hand, they found confirmation of Piaget's assertion that intentionality is more frequently used by older children. However, their finding of no significant difference between city and Kibbutz children in intentionality usage was interpreted by them as being a refutation of the hypothesized importance of peer group experience. Bull (1969a) also suggested that Piaget erred in emphasizing the role played by peers. He based this conclusion on the finding that there was "no reference to co-operation with peers" in the moral responses of his subjects (34).

Kohlberg (1958), employing sociometric techniques, defined peer group influence in terms of the number of "mutual choices" each respondent received in his school class. The resulting "group-isolate" and "group-integrate" scores were correlated with respondents' performance on Kohlberg's moral judgment scale. The resulting coefficients were interpreted by him as being indicative of the effect of group ties on an individual's moral orientation. Kohlberg (1964) goes on to state that:

> While peer group participation (measured by friendship choice) is an important factor associated with general development of moral judgment, it has not been found to be specifically associated with advance on measures of intentionality or reciprocity (399).

The manner in which the role of peer group experience has been assessed in the above studies deserves careful scrutiny. Kugelmass and

Breznitz simply assumed that a Kibbutz environment provides the ideal situation to test Piaget's hypothesis; Bull expected the peer effect to be expressed in the responses of his subjects; and Kohlberg felt that sociometric techniques represented a viable operationalization for investigating the problem. It seems clear that these authors interpret the impact of peer group interaction as an antecedent variable, the effects of which have supposedly been internalized by the respondent through development, generalized to non-specific others, and thought to influence him in his making of moral judgments. Such an interpretation of Piaget's writings is certainly reasonable. Given that the peer group phenomenon provides the social forum to practice cooperation and relationships based upon mutual respect, it can be suggested that the more experience a youth has with this kind of social interaction the more likely he will be to develop an autonomous moral orientation. All that is asserted in this interpretation is the child's growing capability to generalize to many moral dilemmas the rational expectation of the role of rules and the expectation of reciprocal benefits and punishments for all.

There is, however, another interpretation of Piaget's peer hypothesis, one which leads us to utilize a different methodological approach to the problem. It involves asking respondents to judge their peers in the moral dilemmas with which they are confronted. In comparison to gauging their sociometric integrate scores or asking them to judge "fictitious" others, which are the techniques previous studies have employed, the present suggestion seems to represent a better test of Piaget's theory.

Little mention has been made regarding the possible role which affect may play in the making of moral judgments. This variable has, however, been recognized by several authors (e.g., Cooley, 1962) as being relevant to the understanding of moral development. Piaget certainly does not discuss this variable to any great extent and has been justly criticized for the omission (Bull, 1969a and 1969b). However, if one "looks between the lines," it can certainly be argued that he was cognizant of its role. It will be recalled (see pages 21 and 22 of this chapter) that he made reference to "the special relations of affection" and "friendliness" as leading to the emergence and usage of "equity" in the making of moral judgments. Also, Piaget stated that:

> Apart from our relations to other people, there can be no moral necessity. The individual as such knows only anomy and not autonomy. ... Autonomy appears only with reciprocity, when mutual respect is strong enough to make the individual feel from within the desire to treat others as he himself would wish to be treated (Piaget, 1965: 196).

Implied in this statement is something more than the fact that mutual respect leads to a rational acceptance of "the golden rule" as a generalizable social code. There is, in addition to this, an implication concerning the role played by emotional attachment to specific primary others. Given the above comments, there is reason to scrutinize the role which the primary attachment may play in influencing moral judgments. In the following chapter further comments are found regarding this matter.

As was the case in determining the effects of peer group interaction, there are at least two methodological approaches to take when investigating the variable of affect. It is known from the work of Hoffman (1963) that affectionate relationships may aid in the

progression toward moral autonomy. However, investigating the role of affect in this manner is based upon the same orientation which was employed by those authors who studied the effects of peer group interaction. Again, it would seem that the best way to determine the role of this variable would be to ask the respondent to judge someone he likes.

G. Summary

In concluding this discussion, mention should be made of a few problems pertaining to Piaget's theory and to the manner in which he conducted his research. As has been indicated above, he largely ignored the impact of religion, sex, and social class in his study; he failed to include a detailed discussion of the non-cognitive, orectic element in moral development; and, he overemphasized the negative aspects of parent-child interaction during the heteronomous era. In addition, he failed to realize that the process of moral development continues into late adolescence. One author asserts that Piaget, "by not extending his studies beyond the age of about twelve years, failed to come to grips with the development of true autonomy" (Graham, 1972: 204). As will be seen, Kohlberg compensates for this deficiency. Also, Piaget's data collection procedures were unstandardized and the results he reported were portrayed in a non-quantitative manner (Kohlberg, 1963a: 316). Though his discussions have obviously been fruitful to the understanding of moral development, this paucity of quantitative analysis has made it extremely difficult for others to comment on the reliability of his work.

Another criticism which has been noted is that Piaget's designation of moral stages was based upon inferences made from moral "choices." For Piaget, the relevant question concerned whether or not a child relied on intentions or objective, material consequences to form the basis of his judgment. As will be noted, the hallmark of Kohlberg's contribution has to do with his ability to analyze not the choices of respondents but rather their reasons for their choices. Implied in this distinction between "reasons" and "choices" is the idea that studying changes in the former is much more meaningful from a developmental perspective. As Kohlberg reports in one of his studies, it appears that concerning oneself with "choices" proves to be unfruitful. He states that:

> Age trends toward choice in favor of human needs, such as might be expected from Piaget's theory, did not appear. The child's reason for his choice and his way of defining conflict situations did turn out to be developmentally meaningful, however (1963b: 12).

Also implicit this "choice-reason" distinction is the possibility that defining a mature moral judgment on the basis of choice may not be feasible. Further discussion concerning this matter will be found in succeeding chapters of this dissertation.

One final comment is in order. In his work, "Piaget virtually ignores the whole question of moral conflicts, their possible effects and different possible modes of resolving them" (Graham, 1972: 205). The subject of moral conflict is, obviously, the essential variable to be focused upon in the study of moral development. Without reference to such conflict, the description of "the mature moral judger" becomes synonymous with the description of an "oversocialized man" (Wrong, 1961).

The discussion will now turn to the contribution of Kohlberg. In summary, of central importance is the fact that Piaget's theory of moral development can, without contradiction, incorporate the concept of role-taking; suggests the need to consider the role of affect; is based on an organism-environment interaction model; and is, therefore, open to the general hypothesis that moral judgments may vary according to the respondent's definition of the situation.

IV. KOHLBERG

The work of Lawrence Kohlberg stands as a significant addition to Piaget's ground-breaking efforts in the study of moral judgment. As will be noted momentarily, Kohlberg has managed to articulate to a greater extent than did Piaget, the conceptual linkage between cognitive and moral development. His work has extended our knowledge of the nature of moral development beyond the period of late childhood. What is perhaps more important is his relatively sophisticated methodological contribution to the task of investigating the development of "moral reasoning."

The underlying assumptions of Kohlberg's cognitive-development approach to moral development are the following:

1. Basic development involves basic transformations of cognitive structure which cannot be defined or explained by the parameters of associationistic learning, and which must be explained by parameters of organizational wholes or systems of internal relations.

2. Development of cognitive structure is the result of processes of interaction between the structure of the organism and the structure of the environment, rather than being the direct result of maturation or the direct result of learning...

3. Cognitive structures are always structures (schemata) of action. While cognitive activities move from the sensori-motor to the symbolic to verbal-propositional modes, the organization of these modes is always an organization of actions upon objects.

4. The direction of development of cognitive structure is toward greater equilibrium in this organism-environment interaction, i.e., of greater balance or reciprocity between the action of the organism upon the (perceived) object (or situation) and the action of the (perceived) object upon the organism. This balance in interaction, rather than a static correspondence of a concept to an object, represents 'truth,' 'logic,' 'knowledge,' or 'adaptation' in their general forms. This balance is reflected in the underlying stability (conservation) of a cognitive act under apparent transformation, with development representing a widened system of transformations maintaining such conservation.

The assumptions just listed are assumptions which hold for cognitive development in general... Their application to social development is made more concrete by the following additional assumptions about social-emotional development.

5. Affective development and functioning, and cognitive development and functioning are not distinct realms. 'Affective' and 'cognitive' development are parallel; they represent different perspectives and contexts in defining structural change.

6. There is a fundamental unity of personality organization and development termed the ego, or the self. While there are various strands of social development ... these strands are united by their common reference to a single concept of self in a single social world. Social development is ... the restructuring of the (1) concept of self, (2) in its relationship to concepts of other people, (3) conceived as being in a common social world with social standards. In addition to the unity of level of social development due to general cognitive development ... there is a further unity of development to a common factor of ego maturity.

7. All the basic processes involved in 'physical' cognitions, and in stimulating developmental changes in these cognitions, are also basic to social development. In addition, however, social cognition always involves role-taking...

8. The direction of social or ego development is also toward an equilibrium or reciprocity between the self's actions and those others toward the self ... The social analogy to logical and physical conservations is the maintenance of an ego-identity throughout the transformations of various role relationships... (Kohlberg, 1969: 348-349).

Kohlberg's work in the area of moral judgment remains consistent with the above assumptions and with the following criteria, derived from Piaget, defining the utilization of the stage concept.

1. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in childrens' modes of thinking or of solving the same problem at different ages.

2. These different modes of thought form an invariant sequence, order, or succession in individual development. While cultural factors may speed up or slow down, or stop development, they do not change its sequence.

3. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms a 'structural whole.' A given stage response on a task does not just represent a specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity with that task. Rather, it represents an underlying thought organization, e.g., 'the level of concrete operations,' which determine responses to tasks which are not manifestly similar.

4. Cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations. Stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures to fulfill a common function. The general adaptational functions of cognitive structures are always the same (for Piaget the maintenance of an equilibrium between the organism and the environment, defined as a balance of assimilation and accommodation). Accordingly higher stages displace (or rather reintegrate) the structures found at lower stages (Kohlberg, 1969: 353).

In his doctoral dissertation (1958), Kohlberg presents the following six developmental stages which he classifies into three moral levels:

Premoral Level

Type 1. Punishment and obedience orientation.
Type 2. Naive instrumental hedonism.

Morality of Conventional Role-Conformity

Type 3. Good-boy morality of maintaining good relations, approval of others.
Type 4. Authority maintaining morality.

Morality of Self-Accepted Moral Principles

Type 5. Morality of contract and of democratically accepted law.
Type 6. Morality of individual principles of conscience.

The above typology of moral development was derived from the responses to interviews conducted with 72 suburban Chicago boys of three age groups (10, 13, and 16 years). Kohlberg employed several hypothetical moral dilemmas as the interview stimulus, each of which posed a conflict between the "social-legal" expectations of society and the specific needs of fictitious persons. Examination of the boys' responses to the dilemmas identified twenty-five different general aspects of morality upon which the above typology was based. Given that there are twenty-five aspects and six levels of morality, the yield is 150 cells into which moral judgments can be classified. For example, a statement made in reference to the "definition of moral rules and norms" (aspect 12) would be classified into one of the following stages:[25]

Stage 1. Rules are interpreted as tabooing single acts. Rules say 'don't do...' The respondent invokes 'breaking the law' or other labels as the reason for designating the act as being wrong.

Stage 2. Rules are utilized as prudential directives. E.g., 'Stay out of trouble,' 'Look before you leap.'

Stage 3. Rules are seen as prescribing positive virtues or motives. E.g., 'Be honest, be good to your family, work hard, etc.'

Stage 4. Rules are seen as prescribing jobs or duties in one's role.

Stage 5. Employs a legalistic definition of the situation. E.g., considers, wonders about, the detailed legal definition of the particular act in deciding its wrongness. Tends to see the act 'in the eyes of the law.'

Stage 6. Respondent invokes principles (i.e., non-legal rules which serve as guides to making decisions or for setting up rules).

In order to meet the expectations of the stage criteria outlined above, evidence of hierarchical stage organization, age trends, and invariant sequential movement would have to be observed. Kohlberg confirms these expectations. He reports that:

> The first two types of thought decrease with age, the next two types increase until age 16. Analyses of variance of the percentage usage of each type of thought by the 10-, 13-, and 16-year old groups were carried out. The differences between the three age groups in usage of all types of thought but one (type 3) were found to be significant beyond the .01 level (1963b: 15).

Through the use of "Guttman's quasi-simplex correlation matrix" Kohlberg stated that the "expectation applied to the matrix is that the correlations between two types of thought should decrease as these two types are increasingly separated in the developmental hierarchy" (1963b: 17). He observed the expected pattern, and in support of his distinction among the three levels, he reported that "correlations of types within the three main levels ... (were) ... higher than between levels (1963b: 17).

Other support for sequentiality and hierarchical stage

organization was reported by Kohlberg (1968) in the form of cross-cultural evidence. He observed similar trends of moral development in the United States, Taiwan, Turkey, and Yucatan. Turiel (1966, 1969) also reports evidence supporting the expectations of invariant sequence and hierarchical organization (involving further differentiation and displacement of preceding stages). He experimented with three groups of children. Two groups were exposed to moral judgments one and two levels above their pre-test level scores, and a third group was exposed to judgments one level below their pre-test scores. Turiel states that:

> The developmental interpretation is strengthened by the finding that subjects assimilated the next higher stage more readily than the lower stage, even though they could understand the concepts of the lower stage as well as, if not better than, those of the higher stage. Hence, we have an indication that the attainment of a stage of thought involves a reorganization of the preceding modes of thought, with an integration of each previous stage with, rather than in addition to, new elements of the later stages (1966: 616).

Other training studies have been conducted with experimental designs similar to Turiel's, (e.g., LeFurgy and Woloshin, 1969; Schleifer and Douglas, 1973; Glassco et al., 1970; and Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg, 1969) all of which provide supporting evidence for the hypotheses of sequentiality and hierarchical stage organization.

Kohlberg (1969) discusses several factors which he recognizes as being important for the development of moral judgment. First, he considers the role of cognitive maturity. He finds a nonlinear relationship between I.Q. and moral maturity ("... children below average in I.Q. are almost all below average in moral maturity ... (whereas) ... children above average in I.Q. are equally likely to be low or high in moral maturity") and suggests that the relationship

between the two variables declines with age (1969: 391). He concludes that I.Q may be a "better indicator of early rate of development than it is of terminal status, which is more determined by social experience" (1969: 391). The latter part of this statement is based upon the evidence procured by Kramer (1968) and Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) indicating that while moral judgment develops thorugh the early twenties and then tends to stabilize, intellectual maturity does not.

In order to specify the cognitive-developmental basis of moral judgment, Kohlberg makes the following analogy between his stages of moral development and Piaget's stages of the development of intelligence.

He states that the premoral level corresponds with pre-operational thought, the conventional level with concrete operational thought, and the principled level with formal operational thought. A similar comparison is made by Bull (1969a) between his stages of anomy, heteronomy, socionomy, autonomy, and Piaget's model.

Kohlberg was very much aware of the relationships among role-taking, empathy, and moral judgment. In the case of the first, he states that the social world includes moral rules:

> ... which the child understands through conceptually organized role-taking. The mere process of role-taking the attitudes of others in organized social interaction is believed to transform concepts of rules from external things to internal principles (1963a: 313-314).

Knowing that role-taking is fundamentally involved in moral development, Kohlberg goes on to suggest that each of his six stages can be understood as being based upon various role-taking styles, with the progression of moral stages being analogous to the progressive differentiation of role-taking abilities. Kohlberg suggests that moral

development itself is "fundamentally a process of the restructuring of role-taking" (1969: 399).

In reference to empathy (i.e., the emotive aspect of morality) Kohlberg suggests that it is mediated by role-taking. He argues that:

> Empathy does not have to be taught to the child ... it is a primary phenomenon. What development and socialization achieve is the organization of empathic phenomena into consistent sympathetic and moral concerns... (1969: 394).

There are several aspects of Kohlberg's work which should be noted. First of all, his studies have been extended far beyond Piaget's to include respondents ranging between the ages of ten and twenty-five. As was stated earlier, this extension has enlightened us to the fact that moral development is certainly not completed when Piaget implied that it was. Secondly, Kohlberg's method of measuring moral judgments codes not the choices but the reasons utilized by respondents. This procedure is certainly a more meaningful measure of a theory of moral judgment which is based upon a cognitive model of development. Lastly, what is apparent from the above review is Kohlberg's realization of the importance of the affective component in moral judgment which, along with the judgment itself, is mediated by the process of role-taking. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) summarize the cognitive-developmental approach to moral development by stating that:

> Moral development involves a continual process of matching a moral view to one's experience of life in a social world. Experiences of conflict in this process generate movement from structural stage to structural stage. Even after attainment of the highest stage an individual can reach, there is continued experience of conflict. The developmental product of this conflict is stabilization, i.e., a greater consistency of structure with-in itself (greater stage purity) and a greater consistency between thought structure and action. The evidence that adult stabilization is the integration of conflict rather than social learning

> or socialization, is indicated by our finding one pattern of adult stabilization that involves temporary retrogression. The integration of conflict in adult development may be conceived in terms of functional stages of ego development which are quite different from structural stages (1969: 118).

A. Discussion

It would seem that Kohlberg presents a convincing case for viewing moral judgment as a developmental phenomenon attaining a modal level[26] which is employed consistently across situations. Such a conclusion, however, should be held in abeyance for at least three reasons.

1. By his own admission, styles of moral judgment can be understood in the most general sense as types of role-taking. Though facility to role-take is, in itself, a developmental phenomenon (Mead, 1965; Flavell, 1966) it must be stressed that the ability to utilize more differentiated types of role-taking (i.e., to simultaneously role-take various standpoints in any given situation) is not attained at the expense of earlier, more simplistic types. In Meadian terms, the role-taking of the "generalized other" does not preclude role-taking any "particular other." The point to be made is that one can draw on various role-taking types at any time. Yet Kohlberg, to the extent that he insists on the existence of modal levels of moral judgment, (particularly during and after late adolescence), would appear to be suggesting that modal types of role-taking emerge in parallel fashion. For example, a respondent who has "stabilized" at level four during his early twenties would appear to have also acquired a stable "generalized other" orientation. Are we to conclude from this that he is incapable

of role-taking particular others in moral dilemmas either reflexively or non-reflexively,[27] from other than a "generalized other" perspective? Such a conclusion seems highly suspect and yet this would appear to be the logical implication of Kohlberg's argument.

2. There is a related point which must be stressed. Kohlberg appears to be employing the concept of role-taking in extremely formal terms. It is, of course, not inaccurate to conceive of various types of role-taking as various types of cognitive process. If such a conception is utilized to the extent of ignoring the stimulus instigating the process however, then the total import of the concept has not been grasped. Turner (1950) states that:

> The important relationship among types of role-taking lies in the fact that they are alternative relationships which the individual can establish to the role of the other which will make the effect of that other's attitudes quite different (1950: 324).

In other words, a knowledge of "who" is being role-taken as well as the characteristics of the "situation" within which the process is occurring are important variables to be taken into account.

3. One other consideration should be mentioned. When one questions others with the intent of establishing what their moral judgment characteristics are, it would seem to be necessary, given what has just been noted, to be aware of the nature of the method used to obtain this information. Would it not be profitable to investigate moral judgments by attempting to control for the possible variations in role-taking process which a respondent may utilize? Kohlberg does not seem to have been sensitive to this, for the dilemma situations which he employed suggested antagonisms between the needs of fictitious

individuals and community or societal expectations (see Appendix II). What about the needs of particular and significant others who are actually known to the respondent? Would this not encourage a different response than the hypothetical others implicated in Kohlberg's situations? Over and above this, a further complication must be noted when one considers the research conducted on the concept of "reference group" (e.g., Kuhn, 1964; Shibutani, 1955). The implication of this work for Kohlberg's methodology is that over and above recognizing the importance of variation in particular others, one may be utilizing a rather precarious assumption in postulating the existence of a specific and universally accepted set of societal expectations. As Shibutani (1955) questions, "which generalized other's role is to be taken" (167) in any particular situation? Thus, Kohlberg's dilemmas between individuals and societal expectations may be considered to be over-simplifications due to their reliance on the assumption of a universally shared set of community standards and due to their failure to control for variation in the particular other being role-taken. For these reasons, Kohlberg's assertion of a modal level of moral judgment stabilizing in early adulthood (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969) must be considered as a hypothesis to be tested, not as a demonstrated conclusion.

V. THE STABILITY-SPECIFICITY DEBATE

It will be recalled that the study conducted by Bandura and McDonald (1963) reported that moral judgments were easily modified by varying the characteristics of the adult models used to elicit them.

Also, other studies have reported that variation in moral dilemma produces variation in judgment. Durkin (1959a, 1961), in her investigations of the nature of reciprocity, reported that individuals were inconsistent in their judgments across dilemmas. Boehm and Nass (1962) report similar findings. Both Bull (1969a) and Graham (1972) suggest that these findings regarding specificity should not be considered as unusual. In the words of the former, one should expect that moral judgments will "naturally vary from one individual to another, depending upon the variable factors shaping both the individual and the environment" (Bull, 1969a: 4). And in the words of the latter, "we must allow that the specific characteristics of situations" will produce variation in judgment (Graham, 1972: 15). Finally, Lickona (1969) observes that "moral judgments are more situation-specific than one would assume on the basis of Piaget's theory" (348).

Stage theorists, most notably Kohlberg, bring to their studies the opposite expectation, i.e., that a style of moral judgment eventually stabilizes. They base this expectation on their theory concerning the existence of cognitive structures which are thought to underly moral judgments. They argue that through development these structures become equilibrated and that the judgments which stem from them likewise become equilibrated. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969), for example, report that most males stabilize at stage four and most females at stage three by the age range 18 to 25 years. The task of these theorists, as they define it, consists in identifying the modal score of a respondent and inferring from this score the moral stage at which he is fixated. The failure to detect a modal score (i.e., the

respondent fails to score at least 50% of his responses at a particular stage) results in designating the respondent as "mixed" (i.e., as being in the process of stabilizing). This theory of "stage-mixture" (Turiel, 1969) is, of course, consistent with the cognitive-developmental stage model and offers a suitable way of integrating the above mentioned research findings reporting judgmental variation. However, there is a change in emphasis which must be noted. The authors mentioned previously (e.g., Graham, 1972; Lickona, 1969), interpret variation in judgment as a result to be expected. Thus, the implied underlying assumption which they hold would assert the existence of different cognitive structures each being responsible for qualitatively different moral judgments. Stage theorists, on the other hand, tend to deny that judgmental variation is the norm and see it instead as a temporary phase in development. For them it is indicative of the fact that the respondent is in the process of progressing toward stability (i.e., his most highly developed cognitive structure is in the process of displacing or reintegrating earlier, less differentiated structures). This latter interpretation is a necessary one for the stage theorist to hold, for without it he cannot justify what he sees as a meaningful search for modal response tendencies.

These two different interpretations of the meaning of specificity appear to be at odds with each other. The stage theorist finds the specificity perspective threatening because he reasons that it contradicts the finding of an invariant sequence of hierarchical stage organization occurring through development. For this writer, however, this perception of contradiction is faulty. It stems from the stage

theorist's designation of the role played by earlier, less differentiated cognitive structures. Kohlberg asserts that later, more differentiated structures "displace" or "reintegrate" earlier ones. If this means that earlier structures atrophy from lack of use then we are in a position to point to the source of the problem. If it is held that earlier structures do atrophy, then explaining judgmental variation becomes a problem. As has been noted, such specificity can only be explained by imputing the existence of more than one cognitive structure. Some stage theorists do admit that earlier structures persist but are "available for use (only) under special conditions, such as frustration, stress, pathological states, or experimental conditions of primitization" (Turiel, 1969: 106).

The point which this writer would like to make is that earlier moral structures are <u>always</u> available for use. This must be the case for several reasons. How else can Kohlberg (1963b: 15) explain the lack of variation in the usage of type 3 morality across his age groups? (See page 53 above.) How else can the other specificity findings reported above be explained if one still wishes to accept the cognitive developmental model? Finally, the data collection procedures which stage theorists employ (i.e., hypothetical moral dilemmas) assume the existence of more than one functioning cognitive structure! Moral dilemmas can be dilemmas only if the respondent is capable of interpreting them in at least two qualitatively different <u>and</u> conflicting ways. Now, according to stage theory, this conflict must imply the existence of at least two qualitatively distinct cognitive structures.

A synthesis of these two interpretations of the meaning of

specificity can be developed. However, in order to achieve such a synthesis several additions to the theory of moral judgment must be made. First of all, a clear statement is required concerning the hypothesized role played by earlier acquired cognitive structures in the making of moral judgments. Secondly, it must be pointed out that asserting the presence of several structures leading to qualitatively different judgments does not necessarily contradict cognitive-developmental stage theory. Thirdly, an explanation of why different structures are utilized under different circumstances must be offered. This explanation will be based upon acknowledging the relevance of four variables: role-taking, "standpoint," affect, and the "definition of the situation." The following chpater presents these theoretical revisions.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Emphasizing the judgmental variable as the orienting perspective for the study of moral development implies the assumption that man is an active, organizing agent in his dealings with the environment. This is the fundamental assumption of this dissertation. Though an involved discussion of moral behavior lies beyond the scope of this work, the role which emotional attachment plays in the cognitive process underlying moral judgment will certainly be considered.

[2]Hartshorne and May state in the conclusion to their study that: "... neither deceit not its opposite, 'honesty,' are unified character traits, but rather specific functions of life situations. Most children will deceive in certain situations and not in others. Lying, cheating, and stealing as measured by the test situations used in these studies are only very loosely related. Even cheating in the classroom is rather highly specific, for a child may cheat on an arithmetic test and not on a spelling test, etc." (1930: 411-412).

[3]This latter finding concerning the lack of relationship between moral knowledge and moral conduct would seem to challenge the notion of the superego as an internalized set of proscriptions successfully inhibiting tendencies to deviate behaviorally. A study by Lowe and Shimberg (1925) found no significant differences between a sample of delinquent and non-delinquent youths on the basis of moral knowledge. They concluded that their results made them suspicious of "... all tests having as their underlying principle the assumption that moral judgments offer a reliable estimate of moral integrity" (59). Likewise, Pittel and Mendelsohn (1966) state that no test of moral knowledge has been successful in predicting moral behavior.

[4]In this context, a mature moral judgment can be interpreted as an indication of the respondent's reliance upon an internal system of proscriptions as opposed to a reliance on external concerns of ensuing punishment or fear of detection.

[5]According to Aronfreed, the distinction between induction and sensitization techniques of parent discipline implies the distinction between psychological and corporal techniques respectively. Induction techniques involve asking the child why he did what he did; insist that damage resulting from his behavior be corrected; and desist from physical punishment when the child indicates self-punitive actions or, more generally, his own moral initiative. Sensitization practices, on the other hand, tend "... not to be translated into a set of independent

moral functions because they emphasize only the painful consequences of the child's transgression and the importance of external threats or demands in carrying out moral actions" (Aronfreed, 1961: 226).

[6]In determining that the effects of "threat of love-withdrawal" on moral orientation were weak, Hoffman and Salzstein controlled for affection. Thus, whether one suggests that moral development is a function of "identification with the aggressor" or rather a function of "anaclytic identification," neither view is supported strongly. This does not imply that identification with parents is inconsequential, as Weisbroth (1970) would argue. These findings, however, do suggest that a great deal more is involved in the acquisition of an internal moral orientation than simply early parental identification.

[7]On the theoretical plain, this shift in emphasis from the superego to the ego is not a new phenomenon. The work of Parsons (1958), Parsons and Bales (1955), Erikson (1950), and Mills (1940) all suggest that this should be the case.

[8]Piaget (1965) and a host of other authors (reviewed in Kay, 1970) have also corroborated this finding that the resolution of the Oedipal crisis does not mark the end of moral development.

[9]Stephenson suggests that the "conscience motive" is important in that it alleviates the Freudian bias of designating the "moral agent" as being primarily of a punitive nature.

[10]He argues that "a certain level of intelligence is clearly a prerequisite for the development of moral judgment and hence for conscience motive. A high level of intelligence, however, does not (necessarily) reflect a highly developed conscience."

[11]Graham (1972) in the fourth chapter of his book entitled "Identification and its Ambiguities" asserts that though reference to identification certainly serves a heuristic function in terms of the general dynamic involved in early childhood, it far from meets the scientific goal of conceptual clarity. He suggests that its several connotations (i.e., imitation, introjection, emotional involvement and dependency, etc.) have led to a great deal of confusion as to what, in fact, the concept is meant to imply.

[12]This inconsistency is well documented by Mischel (1968). It should be remembered that the influence of guilt and certain child-rearing practices have been shown to be associated with moral development. Attempts in this line of inquiry have been far more successful than those which make reference to "moral character." However, the point being made is that neither approach serves adequately in the attempt to designate the underlying nature of moral development.

[13]Kohlberg asserts that the study of moral development "in terms of early experiences centering specifically on the moral training of honesty, guilt, etc. is less likely to be fruitful than is a study of moral behavior in terms of more general experiences relevant to ego development and ego control in nonmoral contexts" (Kohlberg, 1968: 485).

[14]Kohlberg (1964) states that the interpretation of moral development as reliant on ego rather than superego strength may prove to be a more successful approach to take. He continues: "This interpretation implies that the consistencies in moral conduct represent decision-making capacities rather than fixed behavior traits. It is thus consistent with the findings on situational variation, which suggested that moral conduct was the product of a situational decision. The 'ego-strength' interpretation also seems consistent with the difficulties in distinguishing situational factors stimulating prudential caution from situational factors stimulating moral obligation in the production of honest behavior. Both sets of factors appear to appeal to ego-strength." (391-392).

[15]Likewise, the ego-strength, or what can also be called the cognitive-developmental approach to moral development promises to be a more effective predictor of moral behavior. Kohlberg (1968, 1969) reports that principled moral subjects (i.e., those scoring predominantly at levels five or six on his moral judgment questionnaire) are less likely to cheat in unsupervised situations than are conventional or pre-conventional subjects (1968: 486). In another experiment conducted along the lines of the work done by Milgram (1963), 75% of the principled subjects as compared to 13% of all remaining subjects refused to administer electrical shock (Kohlberg, 1969:395).

In the area of "political activism" similar results concerning the expected behavior of principled moral judgers has been documented (Haan, Smith, and Block, 1968; Fishkin, Keniston, and MacKinnon, 1973).

Finally, the argument being proposed is "strengthened by the findings of substantial correlations of moral conduct with intelligence. Both these correlations and correlations with 'ego-strength' ratings suggest a view of overt adolescent moral conduct as a product of the development of broad social-cognitive capacities and values rather than of a 'superego' or of 'introjection of parental standards'" (Kohlberg, 1963a: 324-325).

[16]The concept of cognitive dissonance is relevant to both the work of Kohlberg and the theoretical orientation of this writer. Its importance will be articulated to a greater extent when these topics are discussed.

[17]The idea that one can conceive of various types of role-taking has not as yet been introduced into the discussion. The elucidation of these types will be presented in the following chapter. Suffice it to

say that for now there is reason to assume that qualitatively different moral judgment orientations are mediated by equally different role-taking types.

[18]As will be noted in the following chapter, this finding supports and partially suggests the theoretical orientation of this writer.

[19]The variation by social class just noted does not seem to be at odds with Piaget's theory for at least two other reasons. As Lickona (1969) points out, interpreting an earlier shift to a subjective moral orientation on the part of higher class children can be explained by reference to (a) the difference in the nature of constraint imposed on lower class children by their parents and by reference to the fact that (b) general intellectual development occurs more quickly in children of higher social strata. Both of these explanatory approaches are congruent with Piaget's perspective.

[20]Though some adhere to such an orthodox interpretation of Piaget, they must still admit that much of his theory has been confirmed. It can be noted, however, that while an invariant sequence in moral development has been observed, the expected stability of response has not. This paradox is more apparent than real. Stability can only be expected on the basis of a very particularistic interpretation of the importance of the concept of "invariance." It seems to depend upon how one utilizes the developmental concept known as "hierarchization." This problem will be addressed in the following chapter. What can be stated at the moment is the point that the concept of stage need not logically imply stability of response.

[21]This has been one of the major criticisms of their work. However, it may not be a legitimate one. What is interesting is the fact that even if they had scrutinized the children's reasons and found that these reasons were both qualitatively different and subsumable under different developmental-stage categories, they would still be unable to conclude that the developmental perspective was inaccurate. The developmentalist does not assert that all early forms of thought become extinguished with age. Rather, he simply suggests that more advanced forms will have a greater probability of being utilized once they have been conserved by the child. The point which may have to be realized is the fact that a critical experiment adjudicating the debate between the learning theorists and the developmentalists is impossible to conduct. However, another interesting aspect of the problem is that the developmental theory of moral judgment may only be verifiable and not falsifiable. An in-depth discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of the present study.

The research conducted by this writer is based on the hypothesis that one can stimulate subjects to "think differently" about moral dilemmas. Thus, respondent's reasons will be looked at carefully. In lieu of the above, however, this research is not being carried out with

the goal of either confirming or refuting the developmental perspective. Rather, what we are concerned with is producing variation in judgment in a predictable way and commenting on the implications of this variation for a particular and questionable aspect of post-Piagetian developmental research.

[22]False accommodation refers to the process by which new information is incorporated superficially, without being assimilated to relevant cognitive structures.

[23]The specific defense mechanism with which we are concerned is known as "compartmentalization." Its relevance to the discussion will become more apparent in the following chapter.

[24]As far as Piaget is concerned, the role of the parent functions to inhibit moral growth. This is not thought to be so due to an imputation of authoritarian motives to an ideal-typical parent. On the contrary, Piaget makes this argument on the basis of the egocentric child's perception of the parent rather than on the basis of the latter's perception of the child. If the parent can break through the child's egocentricity by "placing himself on the child's own level" (1965: 137) and by "preaching by example rather than by precept" (1965: 319) then he becomes useful in helping to push the child toward moral autonomy. However, some writers (e.g., Bull, 1969a and 1969b) argue justifiably that Piaget over-emphasizes the phenomenon of adult constraint and thus fails to appreciate the fact that the stage of heteronomy can also be seen as preparing the child for a progression toward autonomy. As Bull suggests, achieving an autonomous moral orientation depends upon many factors, one important one being the acquisition of moral knowledge, a portion of which is learned during the heteronomous era.

[25]A more thorough description of Kohlberg's stage model can be seen in Appendix I.

[26]For a respondent to be at a modal or dominant level, a minimum of 50% of his responses must be classifiable as pertaining to one stage with no more than 20% of his responses falling into any other stage. If he scored, for example, 55% stage 4, 25% stage 3, and 20% stage 2, he would be classified as "mixed."

[27]Reflexive role-taking refers to role-taking the perspective of a particular other who serves as a validative source of the role-taker's concept of self. "Validative" implies that this particular other is a <u>significant</u> other. Non-reflexive role-taking refers to the emulation of a particular other without the process being self-conscious. This distinction derives from Turner (1950) and will be discussed more fully in Chapter Three.

CHAPTER 3

EXPLAINING MORAL JUDGMENTS: A THEORETICAL RATIONALE

This chapter presents a discussion of the concept of development in order to clarify the preferred interpretation of the role played by earlier acquired, less differentiated moral structures. It will be argued that the active role which has been assigned to these structures need not be seen as contradicting the cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment. It will also be suggested that the functioning of moral structures can best be understood in conjunction with the concept of role-taking. Role-taking is seen as the cognitive process which mediates the interaction between moral structures and the social environment. In addition, when one realizes that the object (i.e., standpoint) of role-taking is also relevant to the moral judgment process, it will become apparent that there is reason to perceive both variation and stability as characteristics of the moral judgment phenomenon.

The discussion will then turn to the task of constructing a model which synthesizes role-taking types with moral structures. Also, reference will be made to the work of Rokeach (1960) in order to derive a cognitively based definition of a mature moral orientation. Finally, the propositions derived from this theoretical statement will be presented.

I. THE CONCEPTS OF DEVELOPMENT AND HIERARCHIZATION

The preceding chapter concluded that variation in moral judgment was explained by certain stage theorists as a temporary phenomenon, illustrative of the fact that a higher, more differentiated moral structure was in the process of being acquired. Given this perspective, a theory of "stage-mixture" (Turiel, 1969) was considered from the perspective of several authors as a sufficient explanation of the lack of stable response observed. On the other hand, this writer asserted that such an interpretation of judgmental variation prematurely denied the possibility of interpreting variation in judgment as a substantive phenomenon in its own right.

It will be recalled that conceptualizing judgmental variation, either as an indication of developmental progression or as a stable characteristic of judgment, requires making the assumption that earlier acquired moral structures remain as employable strategies within the covert vocabulary of the respondent. Understanding more fully what this assumption implies necessitates a consideration of the concept of development.

The concept of development when applied to morality implies that through time variations occur in a person's orientation toward rules. Conceptualizing morality within a developmental framework takes one beyond the behaviorist perspective which seems to be concerned with an attempt to explain the acquisition and maintenance of "moral knowledge" by reference to reinforcement contingencies (see, for example, Skinner, 1972). A developmental perspective, on the other hand, is, by definition, concerned not only with moral knowledge but also with the

changes that occur in one's cognitions concerning the applicability of this knowledge to actual situations. A behavioral perspective, or for that matter any non-mediationist orientation, is not equipped to deal with developmental questions concerning changes in how a respondent "feels about rules, how he reasons with them, or how he evaluates them" (Hogan, 1973: 220). It is assumed, however, that a non-mediationist would argue that a developmental perspective on morality merely represents "excess theoretical baggage." Such a perspective would appear to be accurate if one was only concerned with moral knowledge, for it is difficult to conceive of knowledge of rules per se as evolving developmentally. However, what does seem to develop are the varieties of cognitive operations which mediate this knowledge. This distinction between moral knowledge and "moral cognition" is instructive, for it suggests the focus which a developmental perspective might appropriately take. A failure to make this distinction led Nagel to assert that in discussions of moral growth, the concept of development can be employed "in what is perhaps only an analogous sense" (1957: 16). One can agree with Nagel, but only in reference to the variable of moral knowledge. However, Nagel does go on to state that with regard to morality:

> "... an individual is commonly said to be developing only if he is progressively exhibiting greater sensitivity and coordinated response to various cultural stimuli, and if his responses and attitudes fall into a stable pattern that is adapted to the vicissitudes of external fortune (1957: 16).

The importance of Nagel's statement can be seen in its implicit emphasis on cognitive process, for it is cognitive "process" that matures and it is cognitive process which can be fruitfully investigated

from a developmental perspective. In and of itself, however, such a "cognitive-developmental" orientation toward morality cannot ignore moral knowledge; both variables require consideration for they are not mutually exclusive. As will be noted later in the discussion, process and content (i.e., cognitive activity and moral knowledge) are in constant interaction and tend to determine the nature of each other. What can be concluded then, is that an application of the concept of development to the subject of morality must make reference not only to one's knowledge of rules but also to the existence of variations in cognitive styles which mediate these rules.

The concept of development implies movement from an undifferentiated state of cognitive process and structure to a state of "increasing differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration" (Werner, 1957: 126). The organism is thought to begin its development with certain structural and operational properties which can be described as "global" or undifferentiated and then progresses through a "sequential set of changes ... (which yield) ... relatively permanent but novel increments not only in structure but in modes of operation as well" (Nagel, 1957: 17).

Most theorists would appear to be in agreement concerning the above general definition of development. When one addresses oneself to the subject of acquired cognitive structures, however, divergence of opinion emerges in the literature. The concept of "hierarchization," meaning "the comprehension of parts or part-systems into larger units or 'wholes'" (Harris, 1957: 3) is an inadequate one in that it (a) fails to specify the role played by earlier acquired structures once "larger

units or 'wholes'" are formed and (b) neglects a specification of the characteristics of the process which leads to the formation of these superordinate structures. How one describes this process leading to more differentiated structures depends upon how one perceives the role played by less differentiated structures.

In the view of Strauss prior cognitive structures lose their original identity in the process of hierarchization. As the child develops:

> ... his earlier concepts are systematically superseded by increasingly complex ones. The earlier ones are necessary for the later; each advance depends upon the child's understanding a number of prerequisite notions. As newer classifications are grasped, the old ones become revised or qualified or even drop out entirely from memory (Strauss, 1962: 66).

It will be recalled that a similar viewpoint is adopted by Kohlberg (1969: 353) (see page 52 in the preceding chapter).

There seems to be a physiological emphasis at work in the orientation of these authors; an emphasis suggesting a process analogous to biological mutation.[1] Their perspective appears to assume that cognitive structures are in some sense physical entities which become synthesized through the process of hierarchic integration. If this interpretation of their perspective is valid, then by definition previous structures must be thought of as playing an increasingly smaller role in the cognitive functioning of the organism. A theorist who accepts this orientation as being a suitable one for understanding the nature of morality is naturally inclined to expect the emergence of a stable cognitive style of judgment during development.

There exists however, another school of though on the subject of

hierarchic integration. This second orientation holds that prior structures once acquired, remain in a usable state. To quote Heinz Werner (1957):

> The assumption that all organisms normally operate upon a relatively fixed and rather sharply circumscribed developmental level appears to be tacitly accepted by many psychologists. A contrary view is that all higher organisms manifest a certain range of genetically different operations. This means ... that a child of a certain age or an adult, depending on the task or on inner circumstances, may ... perform at genetically different levels. ... the more mature compared with the less mature individual has at his disposal a greater number of developmentally different operations (138).

Baldwin (1969), in agreement with Werner, informs us of the fact that "some behavior continues to be mediated by the simpler mechanisms even while other behavior is mediated by the later developing mechanisms" (327). Finally, Ausubel (1958) agrees that "few developmental phases in human being are ordinarily irreversible, especially in those instances in which environmental determinants are influential" (117); an instance which is clearly the case in terms of moral judgment.

It was argued earlier that this latter interpretation of hierarchization was the necessary one to hold in order to account for judgmental variation from a cognitive-developmental perspective. Arguing that less differentiated cognitive structures remain in the covert vocabulary of the respondent requires that one assume the existence of a reflexive cognitive process at work which is responsible for the formation of more differentiated structures. Rather than suggesting, either implicitly or explicitly, a process of integration based upon a physiological analogue, this perspective assumes a reflexive, nativistic ability to scrutinize the cognitive structures one

holds, to realize the contradictions they suggest, and on the basis of this realization, formulate a more integrated structure which more adequately serves the adaptive needs of the self in social interaction. In terms of the covert assimilation of moral structures yielding more differentiated ones, the suggestion being made in this context refers to one's ability to realize the conflicting demands which the self faces during a moral dilemma. It is this realization of contradiction which forces one to attempt to synthesize less differentiated structures into a larger "whole" in order to resolve the dilemma. This interpretation of the hierarchical integration of moral structures has received support from several sources (Turiel, 1969; Langer, 1969) and it is an interpretation which does not require the assumption that less differentiated structures atrophy.

Perhaps the best way to clarify this point is to briefly review what Feffer (1972) has to say concerning the developmental progression beyond the simplistic "eye for an eye" view of justice. Given that moral judgments can be understood as evaluative components of particular social interactions, Feffer argues that the form such judgments take are therefore partially dependent upon ways of knowing the other involved in the interaction. He suggests that the "eye for an eye" interaction situation provides "the condition for contradictory ways of knowing the other ... (The other can be known) ... from the perspective of the aggressor's role as well as from the perspective of the victim's role" (41). This ability to know the other from both role standpoints implies the ability to see the self in a similar way. The inevitable perception of contradiction and futility inherent in this

manner of social interaction leads, in Feffer's perspective, to the process by which these "contradictory 'selves' of aggressor and victim become integrated as constituent parts of a single, more stable self-structure" (41).

In the above example we have an instance of two self definitions being assimilated into a more differentiated and more stable definition of self. The ability to know the self and other as aggressor and the ability to know the self and other as victim are two perspectives which become coordinated and yield, in terms of moral judgment, the "golden rule of 'doing as one would be done by'" (Feffer, 1972: 41). Feffer (1972) concludes the following:

> In contrast to oscillating eye-for-an-eye behavior, the behavior of the golden rule is neither that of aggressor or victim. Rather it is governed by the realization that one is capable of being both an aggressor and a victim, that is to say, it is governed by a new organization which can simultaneously focus on its constituent parts (41).

It can be concluded from Feffer's discussion that the utilization of more differentiated structures is not dependent upon the displacement of less differentiated ones. Rather, it would appear that the formation and utilization of such higher order structures depends upon two characteristics of mind. First, there must exist as part of the respondent's covert vocabulary several less differentiated cognitive structures. Secondly, through what was earlier labelled a "reflexive cognitive process," there must occur a conscious realization that these structures are in contradiction. It is this reflexive thought process which enables one to realize the contradiction and which also enables one to achieve the subsequent structural synthesis. What must be

stressed, however, is that the utilization of this synthesis requires the existence and maintenance of the less differentiated structures, rather than their displacement. In Feffer's words, this "simultaneous focus on constituent parts" is dependent upon the ability of the respondent to utilize and understand the "parts" in and of themselves.

Thus, it is asserted that earlier acquired moral structures remain intact and that the formation and utilization of more mature structures evolve from an awareness of certain properties of the earlier structures which are in a relationship of contradiction. There does not appear to exist the need to impute the phenomenon of displacement to this developmental process. Again, it is argued that such an interpretation must be accepted if one wishes to understand judgmental variation from a cognitive-developmental perspective. Later in the discussion this interpretation of the role of prior structures as active entities will gain further support from the present study's successful attempt to manipulate the frequency of moral stage usage.

What needs to be clarified at this point is that this perception of the active role played by prior structures does not contradict the cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment. It must be admitted that either interpretation of hierarchization is consistent with the cognitive-developmental perspective. The assertion that an invariant sequence of stage development occurs does not stand or fall on whether one assumes that prior structures are extinguished or remain in use. Thus, the decision to accept one or the other interpretation of hierarchization would appear to be an arbitrary one. Several observations can be made, however, which support the present interpretation of the concept. To these we now turn.

II. THE EXISTENCE AND UTILIZATION OF LESS DIFFERENTIATED STRUCTURES

It will be recalled (see pages 50 through 52) that a cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment employs the following concepts: structure, organism-environment interaction, equilibrium, invariant sequence of stages, and hierarchical integration of stages. In descriptive terms, the theory states that moral structures are formed by interaction with the social environment. When this interaction can be considered suitably adapted, the structure is thought to be equilibrated. That is to say, the moral structure adequately serves the person in his need to meet what he thinks are the expectations of others with whom he is interacting. The theory goes on to suggest that early structures do not serve the adaptive needs of the organism as well as later, more differentiated structures. In other words, when the person in question realizes that his viewpoint does not adequately integrate all the relevant information, the probability of formulating a more sensitive perspective increases. The other criterion of developmental theory (i.e., the concept of invariance) asserts that the formation of these more sensitive or more adaptive perspectives cannot occur before the formation of less sensitive or less adaptive structures.

Several comments can now be made in connection with the above description which support the present interpretation of hierarchization. The first comment concerns the concept of adaptation. It appears reasonable to assert that a more differentiated structure is, by definition, more adaptive. In making this assertion, however, one cannot necessarily assume that more adaptive structures, once attained, will always be utilized by the respondent. On the contrary, more

adaptive structures may be seen as threatening or inapplicable by the respondent under certain situations. For example, let us grant that the stage 4 structures of Kohlberg's model are more adaptive (i.e., more differentiated) than the stage 3 structures. Let us also assume that a particular respondent is capable of utilizing both types of structures in making moral judgments. Thirdly, let us assume that the moral dilemma we ask the respondent to judge involves a conflict between societal expectations of normative conduct and the needs of a person whom he considers a close friend. Given this set of conditions does it not seem reasonable to hypothesize that, from the respondent's perspective, the more adaptive response would be mediated by stage 3 and not stage 4 reasoning. In other words, a more differentiated structure capable of processing more information in the dilemma may only be utilized under those circumstances in which "more information" is, in fact, desired. There is, then, a distinction which must be made between the structural criterion used by the theorist to define more adaptive cognitive mechanisms, and the respondent's "naive" designation of what is and what is not "adaptive" under certain circumstances. The theorist and respondent may not always agree.

These comments concerning the concept of adaptation lead us to reconsider the meaning of judgmental variation. Let us assume that a respondent's designation of what is and what is not an adaptive response may vary from situation to situation. If this is granted by the researcher, then how is he to explain the variation in response which this respondent exhibits? Is it a manifestation of the respondent's awareness that certain moral attitudes are more appropriate to certain situations than are others? Or, is such variation to be interpreted as

a temporary phenomenon, illustrating the respondent's current attempt to achieve stage synthesis?

It can be conceded that the theory of stage mixture provides a useful orientation for explaining the judgmental variation due to the actual construction of more differentiated moral structures. This theory does not, however, explain the variation in judgment observed once these more differentiated structures are acquired. For example, it was reported above (page 54) that Kohlberg (1963b) did not observe a significant decrease in stage 3 usage across the three age groups which he studied. Presumably, the oldest group (16 years) had at least acquired a stage 4 orientation by this time and, therefore, the stage 3 responses observed in this group cannot be considered as being a manifestation of progression toward stage 4.

It can be concluded that explaining how structures evolve may provide an adequate account of judgmental variation which can be thought of as a manifestation of stage progression. It would appear, however, that another explanation is required to account for judgmental variation once more differentiated structures have been acquired.

The above distinction suggests that current theories of the developmental characteristics of moral judgment may not be applicable to older age groups (i.e., late adolescence). As Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) suggest, "adult moral stabilization appears to be more a matter of increased congruence between belief and social role" (108) than of developmental changes in cognitive structure.[2] Thus, if judgmental variation is observed in samples of older adolescents, it would appear that the theory of stage mixture does not provide an adequate explana-

tion for it. An examination of the theoretical perspective which is necessary to understand the phenomenon of moral judgment in late adolescence will follow shortly.

To summarize our argument, we have seen that definitions of adaptation cannot be based on cognitive criteria alone but must also take into account any actor's perception of what the situation defines as an adaptive response. If this is a reasonable conclusion to make, then the assumption must be made that less differentiated moral structures remain in a utilizable state of readiness. What follows from this assumption is the realization that a theory based upon the present interpretation of hierarchization is necessary in order to obtain an adequate explanation of moral judgment styles in late adolescence or young adulthood. This assertion is based on Kohlberg's (1968a) finding that by the age of 16 years most respondents are at least capable of making judgments at five of the six stages of his typology.

The use of the concept called "retrogression" provides another example from which one can conclude that it is necessary to asssume that less differentiated structures remain within the covert vocabulary of respondents. In a recent article, Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) introduced this concept to the moral judgment literature. For them the concept of "regression" is to be distinguished from "retrogression" by reference to the distinction between structural and functional adaptation, respectively. Regression is a concept which refers to:

> ... development that is opposite in direction to the prevailing trend of growth. It indicates that after attaining a more advanced, complex, or highly differentiated level of behavior or personality organization, an individual reverts to an earlier and more primitive level characteristic of younger or less

> mature persons ... (It is the process by which) ... behavior becomes less specific and adaptive and more primitive and undifferentiated (Ausubel, 1958: 106-107).

In other words, the term regression designates the process by which the organism adopts an earlier acquired cognitive structure to deal with the social environment. The implication of the concept of regression is that the ability to use more differentiated structures is rejected by the organism and that the less differentiated cognitive structures brought forth remain in use for a relatively long period of time.

In contrast, Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) speak of "retrogression" as a special case of regression. For them it is a phenomenon which occurs during the adolescent's attempt to resolve the developmental tasks involved in obtaining a stable ego-identity. As such, retrogression refers to a process of functional rather than structural adaptation to one's social milieu.[3] These authors introduce this concept in order to account for an unusual observation which some would consider to be a contradiction of the cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) report the following:

> Between late high school and the second or third year of college, 20% of our middle class sample dropped or retrogressed in moral maturity scores. ... In their college sophomore phase, they kicked both their conventional and their stage 5 morality and replaced it with good old stage 2 hedonistic relativism, jazzed up with some philosophic and sociopolitical jargon (109).

These writers argue that this observation does not contradict cognitive-developmental premises because it does not imply structural regression but rather functional retrogression. They continue:

> The retrogression of our subjects is more like a functional regression than it is like a structural regression. While our retrogressors choose to use stage 2 relativistic

> egoism, they have not lost their earlier capacity to use stage 4 and stage 5 thinking. This is evidenced by three facts. First, the retrogressors continue to use a little stage 4 and 5 thinking. Second, when asked to give what the world would consider a high moral response to our stories, the retrogressors tend to give straight 4 responses. Third, the fact that the retrogressors eventually return to stage 4 and 5 strongly suggests that these stages were never lost (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969: 112).

It would seem that Kohlberg and Kramer have managed to maintain consistency in their perspective. One can argue that the displacement interpretation of hierarchization which they hold is not contradicted by their concept of functional retrogression. Over and above this, however, one can still not ignore the fact that they have reported an example of judgmental variation in the above quotation. Their respondents were, after all, judging at three distinct levels. Whether or not one is convinced that their distinction between the concepts of structural regression and functional retrogression is a useful one to make, one must still conclude that in order to make stage 2 responses, people must be able to utilize stage 2 moral structures.

The above discussion points out that whenever judgmental variation is observed which cannot be accounted for by the theory of stage mixture, the displacement interpretation of hierarchization becomes a conceptual obstacle which must be circumvented by the introduction of the concept of functional retrogression. This line of reasoning is, however, ironic. By introducing the concept of retrogression one substantiates not the displacement interpretation of hierarchization but rather that view of hierarchization which has been discussed above. It must be concluded that Kohlberg and Kramer's exposition of functional retrogression exposes the conceptual inadequacy

of their stage-displacement theory.[4]

One final and detailed argument which can be proposed in defense of the current view of hierarchization has to do with the implications of considering the act of making a moral judgment as an embedded property of social relationships.

As Piaget (1965: 1) informs us, morality "consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules." We know from the work of both Piaget and Kohlberg that differences in the qualities of respect acquired for rules can be meaningfully understood as a variable which follows an invariant sequence of stage-development. What must always be kept in mind, however, is the obvious point that moral orientations are manifested in judgments which invariably pertain to social dilemmas involving persons. Bull (1969a: 88), for example, insists that the "essence of all morality" is to be found in personal relationships and Piaget, when he states that "apart from our relations to other people, there can be no moral necessity" (1965: 196) obviously agrees. The banal fact that moral judgments are about rules and people suggests the necessity of first understanding how we know people in order to understand the characteristics of moral judgments. Piaget's (1965) emphasis on the variables of constraint and cooperation indicates his awareness of this necessity. When we ask "How do we know people?" we must come, in the end, to an analysis of the concept of role-taking.[5]

Earlier in the discussion (see pages 3 and 4) it was argued that a cognitive-developmental perspective on moral judgment must take into account not only moral knowledge (content) but also the cognitive

mechanism (process) which mediates this knowledge. The manner in which the construction of moral knowledge occurs, a point to be discussed in more detail when the concept of the "social act" is introduced, can only be meaningfully understood in conjunction with its dependence upon the cognitive process known as role-taking.

In conceptualizing the development of moral judgment, then, we must make reference to the concomitant development of this cognitive process called role-taking. That growth in the facility to role-take efficiently is positively related to age is a hypothesis well substantiated in the literature (Dymond et al., 1962; Burns and Cavey, 1957; Gollin, 1958; Feffer and Gourevitch, 1960; and Flavell, 1966). These studies report that as children age they become more sensitive to the communicative needs of others; gain more depth in their perceptions of others; and gain the ability to synthesize into a consistent perspective seemingly divergent personality characteristics portrayed by a single actor. If one assumes that the cognitive process which mediates moral judgments is, in fact, role-taking, then the above studies lend support to the hypothesis that increasing proficiency with the ability to role-take (i.e., the more adaptive one's role-taking skills become) parallels one's progress in attaining more adaptive moral structures. This suggestion that the degree of adaptiveness of moral structures requires a parallel development in role-taking skills can be intuitively understood by reviewing Kohlberg's typology of moral stages. In order to describe this relationship more succinctly, a model has been devised which synthesizes moral stages with types of role-taking. This model will be presented shortly. What must be emphasized in the present

context, however, is that role-taking is a cognitive process which assimilates to cognitive structures information pertaining to the expectations of other concrete persons in the actor's environment.[6] Another way of stating this point is to note that role-taking occurs in conjunction with a "standpoint." The importance of taking into account the object or standpoint of the role-taking process does not merely lie in the fact that it rounds out the conceptual scope of the intricacies of this cognitive activity. On the contrary, there is reason to suspect that the specific characteristics of the object or standpoint have a direct bearing on the actor's construction of "meaning" in the social act. As one author states;

> What kinds of children do better on what kinds of role-taking tasks vis a vis (and this could be an important variable) what kinds of other persons? (Flavell, 1966: 176).

Perhaps the best "classical" exposition of the relationship between role-taking and standpoint can be read in G.H. Mead's (1965) discussion of the origins and development of the self-concept.[7]

In focusing our perspective on the role of the "other" (i.e., standpoint) we become aware of three implications which this variable suggests for the study of moral judgment.

1. In the first place, realizing that role-taking assimilates information in the actor's environment requires that we conceptualize the activity of making moral judgments as a property of a particular on-going social act.

2. Secondly, given that "standpoint" is an important variable, we can follow Flavell's (1966) suggestion and investigate the difference which different others may have on the moral judgment process. In this

context our concern will be with the variable of affect and the question we will ask is whether or not one may expect different moral structures to be utilized when judging "strangers" as opposed to persons who may be thought of as being "primary others" for the respondent.

3. Thirdly, through focusing on the variables of "the act" and "standpoint" it becomes apparent that it is necessary to reject the displacement interpretation of hierarchization because of its inability to explain the variation assumed by points 1 and 2 above.

A. The Act and Moral Judgments

> Moral judgments are not made in a vacuum. The situational element is a vital factor in each such judgment. This is not to hold that judgment is determined by the situation. Judgment is the application, and therefore adaptation, of principle to situation. The principle must be known, and the situation assessed. Both are involved (Bull, 1969a: 8).

Defining a moral judgment as a property of an on-going social act conforms to the description of it expressed in the above quotation. Through a reliance upon the work of Mead (1965), Piaget (1963) and others to form an interactionist perspective on moral judgment making, we derive a theoretical orientation which synthesizes the following ideas:

> (a) That there may be several moral structures equilibrated by the respondent and that we cannot assume that the most differentiated of these structures will always be employed.
>
> (b) That conceptualizing the judgment process requires defining the role played by (1) the information the respondent brings with him to the dilemma; (2) the characteristics of the dilemma itself; and (3) the cognitive process (i.e., role-taking) which both assimilates the dilemma to the structure and accommodates the structure to the dilemma.

The concept of interaction between the organism and the social environment is being emphasized because it provides the orientation necessary to conceptualize moral judgment making as a mental activity which synthesizes prior experience with the present environment being addressed; this synthesis being mediated by the process of role-taking. Clearly, this perspective does not guarantee specific judgmental outcomes as would Kohlberg, who wrote in reference to his scheme of stage development:

> I have called this scheme a typology. This is because about 50 percent of most people's thinking will be at a single stage, regardless of the moral dilemma involved (1968: 28).

Rather, the perspective being presently promulgated requires an emphasis on the potential effects of the "definition of the situation" (i.e., the actor's perception of the moral dilemma). From the above quotation we can conclude that such an emphasis would be seen by Kohlberg as being superfluous to the problem at hand. For him there exists a direct link between the most differentiated moral structure acquired and the ensuing judgment. In other words, for Kohlberg there exists a unitary (i.e., as defined by the most differentiated acquired structure) predisposition to judge. In contrast, the perspective utilized in the present context does not assume such a powerful, superordinate role played by the most differentiated moral structure already acquired. On the contrary, we assume that a respondent's judgment:

> ... is not a result of such things as environmental pressures, stimuli, motives, attitudes, and ideas but arises instead from how he interprets and handles these things in the action which he is constructing. The process of self-indication (i.e., role-taking) by means of which human action is formed cannot be accounted for by factors which precede the act. The process of self-

> indication exists in its own right and must be accepted and studied as such (Blumer, 1962: 183).

The orientation suggested does not deny that there is a continuity or stability factor in the moral judgment activity. What we do deny, however, is that this stability is always mediated by a respondent's most adaptive moral structure. It is assumed that there are several structures acquired by the late teen years, any one of which may be utilized depending upon the respondent's definition of which is, in fact, the most adaptive structure to apply. Of course, we assume that the respondent's definition of the most adaptive structure is contingent upon his "definition of the situation" or his construction of the meaning of the social act in which he finds himself implicated. Thus, if our ideal-typical respondent is capable of making stage 5 judgments, we assume that depending upon the moral dilemma presented to him, he may give responses classifiable at other stages. Given this, we must assume that the continuity or stability in judgment observed under certain situations may not be the continuity or stability in judgment observed under other situations. There may be as many potential judgmental continuities as there are acquired moral structures and which one is observed by the researcher will depend upon the nature of the stimulus presented to the respondent. The point is that some dilemmas may have a greater probability of eliciting one type of judgment rather than another.[8,9]

Describing moral judgments within the conceptual confines of "the act" requires that one emphasize the role played by three interacting factors in the making of these judgments. We have the following:



The variables in this model which function to make this perspective different from Kohlberg's are those of "process" and "the definition of the situation." As has been stated, process, in the case of moral judgments, can be thought of as role-taking and it plays an active part in the construction of the meaning of the moral dilemma. This meaning is formulated through a synthesis of the definition of the situation with one's moral structure. In Mead's (1965) words, the process of role-taking, which enables the respondent to take the perspectives of others and reflect upon them:

> ... is a phase of conduct within which conflicts between reactions are met by reorganization of the environment and of the tendencies within the organism to respond to it - the validity of the reorganization, and therefore of the object of reflection, being tested by the success of the reconstruction (89).

The meaning conveyed by Mead's statement is strikingly similar to that conveyed by Piaget in his description of the functional invariants of intelligence. One of these invariants, adaptation, consists of the processes of assimilation and accommodation. "Intelligence is assimilation," writes Piaget, "to the extent that it incorporates all the given data of experience within its framework" (1963: 6). Intelligence, however, is constantly adapting itself to the environment through the process of accommodation. As Piaget states:

> Assimilation can never be pure because by incorporating new elements into its earlier schemata the intelligence constantly modifies the latter in order to adjust them to new elements (1963: 6).

Accommodation, Piaget continues, is contingent upon its reciprocal process, assimilation. The implication of this reciprocal relationship is that:

> ... the very concept of the object is far from being innate and necessitates a construction which is simultaneously assimilatory and accommodating (1963: 7).

Piaget suggests that intelligence is adapted when the processes of accommodation and assimilation are in equilibrium. This adaptation of intelligence to the environment, through the construction of "meaning," turns back upon itself, and this process of "turning back" constitutes Piaget's second functional invariant which he calls "organization."[10] Piaget explains:

> The 'accord of thought with things' and the 'accord of thought with itself' express this dual functional invariant of adaptation and organization. These two aspects of thought are indissociable: It is by adapting to things that thought organizes itself and it is by organizing itself that it structures things (1963: 8).

Piaget's words can, of course, be interpreted as providing a description of the acquisition of various cognitive structures throughout the life-span. The relevance of his work for this discussion, however, lies in its functioning as a description of the cognitive activity which occurs when one is confronted with an actual moral dilemma. What can be concluded, then, is that moral judgments can be seen, not as habitual tendencies to respond, but rather as active constructions of "meaning" within the context of the present. This viewpoint emphasizes the moral judgment as "process." What must now be considered is the role played by the symbolic content to which the respondent adapts.

The second factor which cannot be ignored in the study of moral judgment is "the definition of the situation." As can be gleaned from the following statement, "the definition of the situation" is a factor which synthesizes the concept of "mind" or "process," to which we have been referring, with the symbolic entities present in the act.

> Preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may call the definition of the situation. And actually not only concrete acts are dependent on the definition of the situation, but gradually a whole life-policy and the personality of the individual himself follow from a series of such definitions (Thomas, 1931: 41).

In the present discussion, the "definition of the situation" is the product obtained or the meaning constructed by the respondent when he confronts the moral dilemma. This concept implies that the respondent's judgment can be influenced by any stimulus to which he attaches symbolic meaning and defines as relevant to his judgment. One of the hypotheses to be tested in the present research concerns whether or not respondents will construct different definitions of a moral dilemma when the specific others who are involved in that dilemma are varied. Another hypothesis which follows from our consideration of the definition of the situation is that the moral dilemmas presented to the respondent should, in and of themselves, produce variation in judgment. These hypotheses and others will be reviewed in the concluding portion of the next chapter. The discussion will now turn to the variable of affect in order to lend support to the expectation that variation in affective involvement with the other implicated in the dilemma will produce variation in the ensuing judgment.

B. The Role of the Primary Attachment in Making Moral Judgments

It has been stated that the potential impact of the definition of the situation will be observed in the present research by varying the nature of the "other" implicated in the moral dilemmas presented to the respondents. It appears reasonable to expect that respondents will employ stage 3 moral reasoning when judging their primary others. There are several writers who expect that this may be the case.[11] Piaget's (1965: 282) discussion of the social contingencies which lead to "equitable" decisions which was reviewed earlier (see pages 84 and 85) as well as Gouldner's (1960) statement on the "norm of reciprocity"[12] would appear to be appropriate examples of this expectation that stage 3 orientations will be utilized in the "primary other" situation. The perspective being expressed is described lucidly in a statement made by Shibutani (1955).[13]

> Crucial, apparently, is the character of one's emotional ties with them (i.e., significant others). Those who think the significant others have treated them with affection and consideration have a sense of personal obligation that is binding under all circumstances, and they will be loyal even at great personal sacrifice (168).

The greatest impetus for suspecting that the "primary other" is of relevance to the understanding of moral judgment, however, comes from the work of Charles H. Cooley. Cooley (1962) described the primary group as that type of group "characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation" (23). He realized, however, as did Faris several years later (1932), that all "face-to-face" contacts were not necessarily "primary"[14] and that the important point to note was the "intimacy and fusion of personalities" (26) characterizing a "we"

perception involving sympathy and mutual identification.

Though employing a different vocabulary and lacking a certain sophistication concerning cognitive apparatus, Cooley's discussion of the origins of justice is, nevertheless, strikingly similar to Piaget's conception of "equity" (1965: 283). Justice, among intimates, was derived from the primary ideals of loyalty, truth, service, and kindness. Though mention of these sympathetic qualities is scarce in Piaget's discussion of the importance of peer contacts, it is suggested that their inclusion in his work as well as Kohlberg's would make a substantial contribution to their theories of moral development. In Cooley's view the relationship between the primary other and morality is a close one. He states that the primary ideals, those qualities which Piaget would certainly not exclude from his discussion of equity,[15] grow because:

> ... familiar association fills our minds with imaginations of the thought and feeling of other members of the group, and of the group as a whole, so that, for many purposes, we really make them a part of ourselves and identify our self-feeling with them (Cooley, 1962: 33).

In Cooley's discussion of these primary ideals there is to be found certain suggestions which parallel Piaget's assertion that the two moralities of constraint and cooperation can co-exist in the mind of the adult. It would appear that intimacy and familiarity have much to do with this.

> Intimate association has the power to allay greed. One will hardly be greedy as against his family or close friends, though very decent people will be so as against almost anyone else (Cooley, 1962: 36).

And, in reference to the truncation of kindness in secondary contact, Cooley argues that:

> ... one reason for the restriction is that kindness is aroused by sympathy, and can have little life except as our imaginations are opened to the lives of others and they are made part of ourselves (1962: 42).

For these reasons, as well as others, the extension of primary ideals beyond the scope of intimate contacts is a difficult task to accomplish.

In addition to Cooley's emphasis on the uniqueness of the primary relationship, one may note his recognition of the hiatus separating primary from secondary expectations. This hiatus has also been recognized by Durkheim (1961), but in his writing it is identified explicitly as a contradiction between familial and societal moral orientations.

Durkheim writes that the family is "by definition ... an inappropriate agency" for the task of moral education (1961: 19). He reasons:

> That which is essential to the spirit of discipline ... can scarcely develop in the familial setting. ... By virtue of its natural warmth, the family setting is especially likely to give birth to the first altruistic inclinations; but the morality practiced in this setting is above all a matter of emotion and sentiment (1961: 146-147).

From reading the work of Cooley and Durkheim it becomes apparent that an individual may acquire divergent and contradictory moral viewpoints. The moral expectations which one can think of as being eufunctional for the maintenance of primary groups appear to be dysfunctional for the integrative needs of secondary social organization. In terms of Kohlberg's moral stage typology, the implication is that the conventional moralities of stage 3 and stage 4 can be interpreted as being at odds with each other. In the most general terms, if a respondent employs a stage 4 response, he can be said to be role-taking the appropriate third-person or collective expectations in making his

decision. However, if the individual in the dilemma who stands against these community expectations calls out in the respondent an altruistic disposition to judge, then this tendency may very well stand in contradiction with those collectively sanctioned expectations. To the extent that respondents can simultaneously call upon these two qualitatively different styles of judging, a capability which is highly probable for adolescents, to that extent they will experience conflict. There would appear to be three ways by which such conflict could be avoided:

1. By withdrawal from making a decision;[16]

2. By synthesizing to stage 5;

3. By compartmentalizing these two moralities and being unaware that they stand in opposition to each other.

Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) state that the incidence of stages 5 and 6 is very low in the populations they have studied. And, as was stated earlier, they also report that men tend to stabilize at stage 4 and women at stage 3. It would appear, therefore, that the synthesis to stage 5 is a difficult one to make. There may be at least two reasons for this difficulty.

1. Any stage of moral judgment, according to Kohlberg, can be inferentially tied to an underlying cognitive structure. As Turiel (1969) and Langer (1969) indicate, success in the reciprocal assimilation of various structures depends upon the "distance" separating them in the respondent's mind. When faced with a dilemma between societal and primary other expectations, it would appear that many are incapable of achieving this synthesis.

2. From an emotive of affectual point of view, the synthesis of stages 4 and 3 involves at least some modicum of estrangement from the valued other whom one is judging. It is assumed that such a synthesis will imply more difficulty to the extent one's definition of self is dependent on the other being judged.

It would seem, then, that the most common alternative used by respondents is compartmentalization. Deutscher (1972) defines this process as:

> The ease with which people in a complex society can hold contradictory attitudes in insulated compartments, with no manifestations of dissonance or anomie... (329).

Evidence provided by Deutscher, as well as the work of Kay (1970) and Wheelis (1966), support the thesis that compartmentalization is a common property of persons' moral orientations. Thus, it seems that "we have situated moral and other meanings for many different types of situations and feel relatively little need to relate the situations to each other via abstract meanings" (Douglas, 1972: 331). If the concept of compartmentalization does provide an accurate description of cognitive organization, then in the context of moral judgment we can expect variation to occur in usage of stage 4 and 3 moral reasoning when responses based on dilemmas implicating strangers as opposed to dilemmas implicating one's best friend and/or mother are compared.

C. Implications for the Concept of Hierarchization

The general theoretical orientation on moral judgment making just outlined has stressed the idea that moral judgments are based upon an interaction between cognitive structure and social environment. It has

also been suggested that this interaction is mediated by the process of role-taking. It can now be hypothesized that variation in respondents' definitions of moral situations is due to variations in the role-taking styles which they utilize. It can also be hypothesized that the style of role-taking used is determined through the joint effect exercised by the social environment and already acquired moral structures. This joint effect constraining the manner in which the meaning of the dilemma is constructed is specified more succinctly by the formal model which is presented below. What must be emphasized at the present time, however, is that if the theoretical orientation being discussed is an adequate one, then moral judgments should be variable. Given this, we can once again conclude that the displacement interpretation of hierarchization is suspect.

III. AN INTEGRATION OF THE VARIABLES OF MORAL STRUCTURE, ROLE TAKING, AND THE "OTHER" IN THE DILEMMA

It has been suggested that in conceptualizing the importance of the variable of role-taking in the moral judgment process, one must consider this variable in conjunction with the concept of "standpoint" (i.e., the assumed perspective, characteristics, etc. of the "other" implicated in the moral dilemma). In this way the link between moral judgment and one aspect of the "situation" becomes explicable. A specific conceptualization of role-taking will now be suggested with the intent of systematically relating it to Kohlberg's stages of moral judgment. This role-taking scheme will also clarify the relationship between moral judgment and primary relations.

Turner's discussion of role-taking and standpoint (1950) can be

summarized in synthesis with Kohlberg's six stages of moral development as in the chart on page 100. In reference to type (A) role-taking, Turner states:

> From reflexive identifying role-taking the individual begins to develop an estimate of his own adequacy and worth. His own self-esteem is the adoption of the estimate of himself which he infers from the standpoint of the role of the other. The bonds of intimacy ... determine that the evaluations of relevant others will become the self-evaluations of the individual (1950: 322).

In this instance, a salient or primary other is the object of role-taking. The terms "salient" or "primary" communicate that this particular other functions as a validative source of the role-taker's concept of self. Thus, the role-taker is conscious of the importance of this particular other's value to him. When one role-takes in this fashion the relevance of "third party" directives or impersonal generalized-other norms is at a minimum. It can be seen in the accompanying chart that responses coded in Kohlberg's stage 3 category would most likely be based upon this type of role-taking.

Type (B) role-taking is seen in situations in which the other serves as a "model or standard which is accepted without self-consciousness" (Turner, 1950: 322). Though this other is also "salient" or "primary" he is not relevant to the role-taker's conception of self. Perhaps the best example of this type can be seen in the egocentric child who role-takes rules or expectations during the heteronomous era of moral development. Given this, it is appropriate to place it in correspondence with Kohlberg's stage 1.

Type (C) role-taking provides the actor with various standpoints which allow him to "react selectively to his audiences" (Turner, 1950:

AN INTEGRATION OF
THE CONCEPUTAL SCHEMES OF TURNER AND KOHLBERG

STANDPOINT	ROLE-TAKING: REFLEXIVE	ROLE-TAKING: NON-REFLEXIVE
STANDPOINT VIEWED AS: IDENTIFICATION	(A) KOHLBERG: Stage 3	(B) KOHLBERG: Stage 1
	PARTICULAR OTHER: VALIDATIVE	PARTICULAR OTHER: DERIVATIVE
STANDPOINT VIEWED AS: PERSONALIZED THIRD PARTY OR DEPERSONALIZED NORM	(C) KOHLBERG: Stage 4(3)	(D) KOHLBERG: Stage 4
	THIRD PARTY OR NORM: VALIDATIVE	THIRD PARTY OR NORM: DERIVATIVE
STANDPOINT VIEWED AS: Its potential effect in INTERACTION FOR SELF-BEHAVIOR	(E) KOHLBERG: Stage 2	(F) KOHLBERG: Stage (5)(6)
	INSTRUMENTAL: VALIDATIVE: IMPLEMENTIVE	INSTRUMENTAL: DERIVATIVE: IMPLEMENTIVE

FUNCTIONS OF STANDPOINTS WITH RESPECT TO VALUES

DERIVATIVE: (Values of individual derived by adopting others' standpoints; i.e., identification.)

VALIDATION: (Implies the reflexive attention actor gives to either particular other's expectations of him or to designated standards.)

IMPLEMENTIVE: (Actor's awareness that his behavior is conditional upon role of relevant others; or, his consideration of probable effects of interaction of roles in promoting a given objective. Dependent upon both derivative and validative functions.)

323). In comparison with identification, however, the actor's behavior is not automatically directed. Depending upon his perception of the saliency of the others involved, "he can accept the evaluations of certain others as legitimate and reject the evaluations and expectations of different others as lacking legitimacy" (Turner, 1950: 323). Turner suggests that the third-party standpoint, once stabilized, "operates in reflexive role-taking as a fully evolved self-conception or self-image" (Turner, 1950: 323). One should be careful not to assume, however, that a "fully evolved self-conception" implies some sense of regidity in the presentation of self. On the contrary, an evolved self-conception is fluid. As Cottrell (1969) states:

> ... a person participating in a series of life situations requiring different roles and composed of reference others who present different expectations will operate with correspondingly different perceptions of himself (553).

In a moral dilemma situation, the relevant characteristic of Type (C) which should be stressed is that its standpoint functions validatively. It may be true that the role-taker vacillates among various relevant others but this vacillation is oriented by the desire to align the self with one of the standpoints in question, not by any desire to make an autonomous decision. It is an other-directed process and is thus inevitably sanctioned by external directives.

As can be seen from the chart, Type (C) role-taking may lead to a stage 4 or a stage 3 response. Either outcome would depend upon which other in the dilemma situation was most valued (i.e., the choice is between centering on "the law" or on the "needs of the individual" who stands against the law). Thus, even though this type of role-taking does not involve identification, it is nevertheless reflexive and it is

this reflexive quality which may lead the respondent to either a stage 4 or a stage 3 response.

The non-reflexive characteristic of Type (D) role-taking "directs attention to attitudes in the role of the other whose recognition makes it possible to act according to a pre-existing directive" (Turner, 1950: 322). In all likelihood stage 4 responses are derived from this type of role-taking.

When a respondent's judgment is coded as stage 2, his role-taking involves projection (i.e., "... he constructs the other-role as he would if he himself were in the situation or had made the particular gesture. When role-taking proceeds in this manner, the particular identity of the other is immaterial to the role content..." (Turner, 1950: 318). Projecting as he does, this respondent judges in terms of future states of the self. His orientation toward the dilemma is reflexive and hedonistic and the role-taking he engages in can be classified as Type (E). Thus, cells (B) and (E) represent those types of role-taking which can be thought of as mediating pre-conventional moral reasoning. Pre-conventional moral orientations are based upon an essentially egocentric cognitive activity and one would not expect young adults to utilize them to any great extent. This expectation has received empirical support from Kohlberg's (1969) research. However, to the extent that stage 1 and 2 moral reasoning is employed by respondents taking part in the present investigation, it can be hypothesized that the usage of these two stages will be lower when judging a "primary-other." This hypothesis is based on the assumption that there is a greater probability that a respondent will define pre-conventional

reasoning as inappropriate for dilemmas which implicate any others who are valued by him.

Role-taking designated as Type (F) is non-reflexive. Being of an implementive nature, it deals with as much information as is possible in order to comprehend both the nature of the situation and the direction it is likely to take. The non-reflexive aspect of this type is not a result of egocentrism but is a manifestation of the state in which the self-role is autonomous. Turner describes this clearly.

> One form of this autonomy is indicated when a person is said to have interiorized a social norm, meaning that an earlier process of role-taking has become truncated. The self-role may then persist unchanged even if the perceived attitudes of the relevant other change or if the affective relationship between self and other change (1950: 326).

A respondent who makes stage 5 or 6 judgments is in all probability utilizing this type of role-taking as the basis for his decision. Given Turner's description of this type of role-taking, we should expect that the frequency of stage 5 and 6 responses which it produces will not be influenced by variation in the nature of the particular other implicated in the moral dilemma.

The utility of the above conceptual model is obvious. If the relationship between the types of role-taking and moral stages which it suggests is accurate, then by providing the appropriate standpoint as a stimulus (i.e., a primary other), one should be capable of eliciting stage 3 moral judgments. This hypothesis is based upon the belief that "differing relations vis a vis alter allow the role to be understood in different ways..." (Turner, 1962: 30).

A. Multiplicative Role-Taking and Post-Conventional Morality

One other aspect of the above model must be emphasized in more detail. Cells (A) through (E) can be thought of as representing "singular" forms of role-taking in the sense that each is defined in terms of a "singular" standpoint. In contrast, cell (F) represents a "multiplicative" form of role-taking in the sense that it functions to adapt the respondent to the "multiple" standpoints (i.e., the combined standpoints implied by cells (A) through (E)) contained in the dilemma. This distinction between multiplicative and singular forms of role-taking suggests that it may be possible to isolate the distinguishing characteristics of a post-conventional morality on the basis of the variable of cognitive complexity.

If one employs a cognitively based theory in order to understand the nature of moral judgment then one should attempt to define mature morality on the basis of identifying those cognitive properties which are peculiar to mature moral judgments. To attempt a definition of moral maturity on the basis of "choice" is certainly a deficient approach to the problem at hand. A mature response is not mature because it is based upon a "principled orientation" which leads to "principled choices." In and of themselves, principled choices cannot be evaluated as being more mature than "conventional choices" unless they are sanctioned as such by appeal to an arbitrary authority. However, if one appeals to these authorities, one is, ironically, sanctioning autonomy by an appeal to heteronomy. It would seem that a more valid conceptualization defines a mature moral judgment as "mature" on the basis of the manner in which the principle is adapted to the

moral dilemma. In other words, we must focus our interest on the problem of documenting how a respondent thinks about moral dilemmas, rather than on what choices he makes in attempting to resolve them. The work of M. Rokeach provides a suitable conceptual and operational orientation for dealing with this task.

In his book, The Open and Closed Mind, Rokeach (1960) presents several conceptualizations of "belief-disbelief systems." The one with which we are concerned distinguishes three interrelated belief regions: the central, intermediate, and peripheral.

The first region, the central region, is thought to contain one's "primitive beliefs" concerning the nature of the physical world (i.e., "color, form, sound, space, time") (1960: 40) and the social environment. Primitive beliefs about the latter are concerned with "whether people in general are characteristically to be trusted or feared" (1960: 41).

The intermediate region contains the beliefs which are concerned with "the nature of the positive and negative authority to be depended on to fill out a map of our world" (1960: 42). In contrast to the central region, where the theorist's concern is with the "specific content of primitive beliefs," the interesting feature of the intermediate region is that it represents ways in which one can be dependent upon authority. Rokeach conceives of this dependence as ranging from "rational, tentative reliance on authority at one extreme to arbitrary, absolute reliance on the other" (1960: 44).

"Every (non-primitive) belief and disbelief eminating from positive and negative authority" (1960: 17) is represented in the peripheral belief region. Its content is comprised of all those

specific beliefs which a person may hold toward war, sex, drugs, god, nationalism, etc. The importance of the peripheral region lies in: (a) the manner in which the beliefs and disbeliefs of which it is comprised are interrelated, and (b) the type of relationship it holds with the intermediate region.

The relevance which the above descriptions of the three belief systems have for our concern with moral judgment lies in their synthesis as a definition of the open-closed continuum and, as will be momentarily illustrated, the conceptual tie between this definition and cell (F) of the above chart.

An "open belief system" designates, for our purpose, a style of thought organization. It refers to:

> ... the extent to which the person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information received from the outside on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from within the person or from outside.
>
> ... the more open one's belief system, the more should evaluating and acting on information proceed independently on its own merits, in accord with the inner structural requirements of the situation (1960: 57-58).[18]

When related to the peripheral and intermediate regions, the above description of open mindedness implies that novel information is scrutinized by an adaptive cognitive activity which attempts to assimilate this information to one's beliefs stemming from the intermediate region as well as to the other beliefs held in the peripheral region.

The closed mind simply accepts or rejects information on the basis of its agreement or disagreement with authority. In contrast, the open mind, though not denying the utility of reference to authority, does not interpret it as absolute and thus evaluates information on the

extent to which it can be assimilated in consistent manner with the other beliefs of the peripheral region. Thus, for the open mind, peripheral beliefs are "in relative communication with each other" (1960: 56) while in the closed mind they are in relative isolation.

It can be concluded that an open mind is a more cognitively complex mind which assimilates as much information as it defines as relevant to a particular problem. In this sense, it represents that type of thought organization which is required to make moral judgments at Kohlberg's post-conventional level (i.e., cell (F)).

Though being open-minded may be a necessary attribute of the mature moral judger, it cannot be considered a sufficient one according to the theoretical orientation outlined earlier. Another way in which to convey this point is to assert that persons who make a large proportion of post-conventional responses must be open-minded whereas persons who respond at pre- or conventional levels may or may not be open-minded. Thus, it is assumed that the "situation" is capable of producing variation in judgments stemming from both the open and closed mind. In the case of the open mind, we expect that variation in judgment can occur across all moral stages, whereas in the case of the closed mind we expect that variation in judgment can occur only across the first four stages.

There exists the temptation to expect that Rokeach's dogmatism scale will be positively related to the usage of stage 4 conventional morality because of the fact that the latter is thought to utilize an "absolute reliance" on authority in the making of moral judgments. However, caution should be exercised in this matter for this expectation is based upon a "content" interpretation of both Rokeach's scale and

Kohlberg's typology. If we take each writer at his word and center on the cognitive bases of their work, it becomes apparent that one should not expect the above hypothesized relationship to materialize. This is the case for the following reason. If, as has been stated above, the closed mind is capable of responding at stages 1 through 4 and the open mind is capable of responding at stages 1 through 6, then the only significant relationship which can be expected to materialize is an inverse relationship between the dogmatism scale and post-conventional response rate. What also follows from what was stated above (i.e., that the open mind can respond at all six stages) is that we cannot expect any significant relationship to exist between conventional or pre-conventional response rate and the dogmatism scale. Again, this should be the case because it is only at the post-conventional level that multiple role-taking occurs.

Another hypothesis which follows from both this discussion, and what was stated earlier concerning the characteristics of cell (F), is that one should not expect the percentage of stage 5 and 6 judgments to vary on the basis of the characteristics of the "other" implicated in the moral dilemma. According to our interactionist orientation, however, we should expect that other characteristics of the dilemma will produce variation in post-conventional response rate. What these "other characteristics" are must remain an open question for future research.[19]

In conclusion, it is believed that if these hypotheses concerning the relationship between dogmatism and moral judgment are confirmed, then we have some indication that the theoretical orientation suggested above is a fruitful one.

IV. PROPOSITIONS

Several propositions concerning the impact of the moral dilemma, the "primary-other/generalized-other" distinction, and dogmatism can be derived from the above discussion. They are as follows.

A. Moral Dilemma

Moral judgments will vary qualitatively from one moral dilemma to another.

B. Primary-Generalized Other Distinction

1. The utilization of post-conventional moral reasoning will not be influence by varying the identity of the other implicated in the moral dilemma.[20]

2. The utilization of stage 4 moral reasoning will be decreased when the other implicated in the moral dilemma is a "primary" other.

3. The utilization of stage 3 moral reasoning will be increased when the other implicated in the moral dilemma is a "primary" other.

4. The utilization of pre-conventional moral reasoning will be decreased when the other implicated in the moral dilemma is a "primary" other.

C. Dogmatism

1. The utilization of post-conventional moral reasoning is based upon a cognitive process which can be described as "multiple role-taking." As such, it is a process which is relatively "open" in Rokeach's (1960) sense of the word. The open mind can be considered the necessary but not sufficient condition underlying post-conventional

moral reasoning.

2. The utilization of conventional and pre-conventional moral reasoning is based upon a cognitive process which can be described as "singular role-taking." The moral reasoning of these levels may be utilized by a cognitive organization which is either open or closed.

Operationalizations of the above propositions will be found at the conclusion of the following chapter.

There are several propositions which remain to be stated. These concern the variables of socio-economic status, religious denomination, frequency of church attendance, and sex. Before stating these propositions, a brief review of the theoretical rationale concerning the above variables is in order.

Socio-economic status, denomination, and attendance: It was reported above (page 31) that the shift away from moral realism occurred earlier for upper-class English children (Harrower, 1935). Further discussion served to clarify the point that though sequence in moral development was not influenced by social class, the rate of development was. It was concluded that upper- and middle-class children move faster and farther than their lower-class counterparts. Lerner (1937) explained this finding by reference to the fact that adult constraint was not a salient characteristic of socialization practices in the upper-classes, thus leading to an earlier breakdown of childrens' egocentric perceptions of rules.

It will be recalled that the work of Piaget suggests that pre-conventional morality is a function of childhood egocentrism and that the acquisition of conventional morality (i.e., stages 3 and 4 in

Kohlberg's typology) is a result of interaction with peers and the emergence of concrete operational thought. Thus, it is difficult to conceive of the acquisition of conventional morality being solely dependent upon social class. Similarly, it is difficult to conceive of any reason why the social stimulation and cognitive capacities required to generate and utilize the first four moral stages would vary from one socio-economic status group to another.

In terms of the acquisition and utilization of post-conventional morality, however, the situation may be different. Kohlberg (1964: 406-407) in stating that upper- and middle-class children move faster and farther reasons that this may be due to the fact that higher social status provides "roles entailing more participation and responsibility which stimulates greater moral maturity." If this greater "participation and responsibility" leading to "greater moral maturity" is indeed characteristic of high socio-economic status groups, then we would expect these groups to respond with greater frequency at the post-conventional moral level.

The theoretical perspective outlined in this chapter would suggest that differences between socio-economic status groups which may emerge in terms of the utilization of stages 5 and 6 can be meaningfully understood as being mediated by differences in dogmatism between these groups. Thus, it is hypothesized that controlling for dogmatism will significantly decrease socio-economic group differences in post-conventional usage.

It was reported earlier (pages 37-39) that the research investigating the relationship between religious variables (i.e., denomination and frequency of church attendance) and moral orientation had yielded

inconclusive results. Some of this research has been concerned with isolating the effect which Catholicism may have on moral judgment style. In the present study we will scrutinize the differences which may exist between Catholics and Protestants as well as those differences which may emerge among high, medium, and low church attenders.

As was the case with socio-economic status, we do not expect any significant relationships to materialize between these two religious variables and pre- or conventional moral orientation. The work of Boehm (1962) suggests, however, that the content of Catholic teachings may encourage the maintenance and utilization of a subjective, autonomous moral orientation. Given her findings, one can hypothesize that Catholic respondents will respond more frequently at the post-conventional moral stages.

In terms of the relationship between frequency of church attendance and post-conventional moral orientation, the literature is quite inconclusive (Bull, 1969a). We have no specific hypotheses regarding the relationship between this variable and post-conventional moral orientation. It can be argued again, however, that much of the influence which these variables exert on moral judgment is mediated by cognitive organization (see pages 38-39). Thus, as was the case with socio-economic status, it is hypothesized that any relationship found between religious denomination or frequency of church attendance and post-conventional moral judgment style will become significantly smaller when we control for the effect of dogmatism.

Sex: Several points were noted in previous discussion (see pages 40-42) regarding sex differences pertaining to moral judgment style. First it was concluded that findings in this area of inquiry

were inconclusive and secondly it was suggested that sex differences may vary depending upon whether we are observing them within a "generalized other" (i.e., stranger) treatment or a "primary other" (i.e., best friend or mother) treatment.

It will be recalled that Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) attempted to explain the sex differences which they observed by reliance upon a "social involvement" thesis. They suggested that adolescent males stabilize at stage 4 and adolescent females at stage 3 because of their respective degrees of involvement in different social settings (i.e., a stage 4 orientation is more adaptive for the business and professional world while a stage 3 orientation is more appropriate for a family and "personal concordance" morality).[21] On the basis of Kohlberg and Kramer's findings we can hypothesize that males will employ a stage 4 orientation more often than females, within a "generalized-other" treatment.[22] Similarly, we can hypothesize that females will employ a stage 3 orientation more often than males, within a "generalized-other" treatment. Since we do not have a sound theoretical basis upon which to hypothesize the sex differences which may emerge at the conventional moral level within a "primary-other" treatment, no predictions can be made.

Again, no hypotheses can be formulated regarding the possible sex differences which may materialize at the post-conventional moral level. The evidence suggesting sex differences at this moral level is inconsistent. Bull (1969a: 81) reports no significant differences between males and females at his stage of autonomy while Graham (1972: 250) reports that in a study he conducted males scored significantly

higher at Kohlberg's post-conventional stages.

Finally, at the pre-conventional moral level we hypothesize that no significant sex differences will be observed. There does not seem to be any reason for suggesting that the tendency to project (the type of role-taking (cell (E)) mediating stage 2 responses) or to accept directives heteronomously (the type of role-taking (cell (B)) mediating stage 1 responses) should be either more or less characteristic of either sex.

The above review suggests the following propositions.

D. Socio-Economic Status

1. The utilization of pre-conventional and conventional moral reasoning will not vary from one socio-economic status group to another.

2. Because members of higher socio-economic status groups have a greater opportunity to gain experience in social roles which involve "more participation and responsibility," they will utilize post-conventional moral reasoning more often (Kohlberg, 1964).

3. The relative advantage which higher socio-economic status groups have regarding the usage of post-conventional moral reasoning can be explained as a function of the relatively greater "open mindedness" of their members. If this is an accurate explanation, then differences between socio-economic status groups, in terms of post-conventional moral reasoning, should fail to be significant when the influence of this cognitive variable is held constant.

E. Religious Denomination and Frequency of Church Attendance

1. The utilization of pre-conventional moral reasoning will be similar for Catholics, Protestants, and "high, medium, and low" church attenders.

2. Because Catholics are exposed to religious teachings which encourage "the maintenance and utilization of a subjective, autonomous moral orientation" (Boehm, 1962), they will utilize post-conventional moral reasoning more often than Protestants.

3. The relative advantage which Catholics have regarding the usage of post-conventional moral reasoning can be explained as a function of their relatively greater "open mindedness." If this is an accurate explanation, then the difference between Catholics and Protestants in terms of post-conventional moral reasoning should fail to be significant when the influence of this cognitive variable is held constant.

F. Sex

1. The utilization of pre-conventional moral reasoning will be similar for males and females.

2. When the person implicated in the moral dilemma is a "stranger," males will utilize a stage 4 orientation to a greater extent than females.

3. When the person implicated in the moral dilemma is a "stranger," females will utilize a stage 3 orientation to a greater extent than males.

Operationalizations of the above propositions will be found at the conclusion of the following chapter.

V. SUMMARY

By focusing on the concept of hierarchization, the above discussion has argued that judgmental variation observed in older samples can be best explained by assuming the existence and functioning of earlier acquired, less differentiated moral structures. Also, with reference to the work of Mead (1965), Piaget (1963), Turner (1950), Cooley (1962), and others, an attempt has been made to illustrate the point that moral judgments may be more dependent upon the exigencies of the situation than has previously been thought. In order to substantiate this point, the suggestion has been made that judgmental variation can be partially explained by reference to the concepts of role-taking and standpoint. Furthermore, an emphasis on the concepts of role-taking, standpoint, and the "primary other" has led us to suspect that judging a valued other (i.e., to be [illegible]rationalized as one's best friend or mother) may involve a different [illegible]ive decision making process than judging a stranger. Finally, it was suggested that post-conventional moral responses can be considered products of the open mind.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Whether or not Strauss and Kohlberg do accept this writer's assertion that their work assumes a physiological orientation does not really matter. The point to be made is that such an assumption does not appear to be in contradiction with their orientation.

[2]In their article Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development (1969), Kohlberg and Kramer develop a perspective based upon Erikson's (1950) psycho-social stages of development in order to explain the nature of moral judgment in late adolescence and early adulthood. Their orientation perceives changes in moral response patterns at this age as being a manifestation of the quest for a stable, coherent ego-identity. They base this perspective on the premise that:

> Adult psychosexual or moral development could certainly not result from cognitive transformations or growth, as can childhood development, because there appears to be no such adult cognitive transformations (1969: 95).

[3]Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) state the following in reference to the concept of retrogression:

> In introducing such terminology, we are indicating that late adolescent or adult moral changes reflect ego development rather than representing the development of morality or moral stage structures itself. Our moral stages are hierarchical structures for fulfilling the function of moral judgment. Ego development in the moral sphere is learning how to use the moral structures one has for one's personal integration (1969: 116).

[4]Kohlberg is more or less aware of the irony of which we are speaking. He admits:

> The formulation we have just made is inadequate. We have superimposed developmental task 'stages' of ego function in adulthood upon childhood stages of moral structure and claimed structural regression was functional advance. Obviously, such an attempt to have one's cake and eat it too is inadequate (Kohlberg and Kramer, 1969: 118).

[5]In the preceding chapter mention was made of the fact that both Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg (1969) emphasize the importance of role-taking in the development of moral judgment. More recently Hogan (1973) has argued the same point. Also, Gunsberg (1973), in conducting training experiments in the area of moral judgment, suggests that the development of more differentiated moral structures is contingent upon the prior integration of contradictory perspectives which are mediated by role-taking.

[6]The use of the word "concrete" does not necessarily imply, of course, the physical presence of the "other." On the contrary, the "other" can just as feasibly be thought of as existing in the actor's mind as an image from his past. Also, the "other" can imply the image of the general expectations held by the community vis a vis one's behavior; hence Mead's term, the "generalized other" (1965: 218).

[7]Mead's (1965: 206-228) discussion of the development of the self-concept through what can be designated as the preparatory, play, and game stages clearly assumes, though at an abstract level of conceptualization, the importance of the role of the other in this process. (The designation of this first stage as the preparatory stage does not stem from Mead but rather from Meltzer, 1967: 10.)

[8]This statement does not by-pass the role of the "process of self-indication" but rather assumes it. Thus, we do not mean to imply the fruitfulness of an S-R explanation for moral judgment. It will be noted later in this dissertation that the nature of the interaction between cognitive structure and moral dilemma will vary depending upon the structure to which we are referring. Specifically, it may be that conventional moral structures (i.e., stages 3 and 4) are stimulated by certain characteristics of dilemmas while post-conventional structures (i.e., stages 5 and 6) are not.

[9]Theoretically, the role which the moral dilemma ought to play in the construction of a moral judgment can be seen in the following statement:

> Typical actors in a given identity enter a typical setting with a specific intention or action orientation in mind. Certain aspects of their surroundings, ... activate or awaken some of the predispositions the actors characteristically carry with them. These aspects of surroundings, the intention, and the activated predispositions, when considered together, lead to the selection of a cultural or habitual definition. This definition directs subsequent action in the situation, at least until a reinterpretation occurs (Stebbins, 1969: 196).

[10]The act of attaining an organized cognitive structure can be thought of as being based upon a process of the covert reciprocal role-taking of schemata. This point was raised earlier in the second chapter in reference to Feffer's (1970) work (see page 30). Thus, the derivation of "meaning" is dependent upon two similar processes. The first adjusts "mind" to "environment" and vice versa. The second adjusts "mind" to itself in order to attain a coherent, equilibrated adaptation to the information assimilated. One author describes this second process in the following way:

> Further, two schemata are in disequilibrium until they have mutually accommodated and assimilated, and thereby been integrated into a new superordinate mental structure (Tuddenham, 1966: 214).

[11]Those writers to which we are referring do not, of course, state this expectation in terms of Kohlberg's definition of a stage 3 orientation. The point is that their descriptions of the exclusive moral orientations which respondent's can be expected to employ vis a vis their primary others are certainly subsumable within Kohlberg's definition of stage 3.

[12]Gouldner states that the "norm of reciprocity" makes two minimal demands:

> (1) People should help those who have helped them, and
> (2) People should not injure those who have helped them (1960: 171).

And, he goes on to suggest that this norm in our society is seldomly applied exogomously.

> Except in friendship, kinship, and neighborly relations, a norm of reciprocity is not imposed on Americans by the 'dominant cultural profile, ...' (1960: 171).

[13]Coutu's (1950) discussion of role-taking as being "clearly related to sympathy" for the other (182) would appear to compliment Shibutani's perspective. Also, Stouffer's (1949) research can be interpreted as providing empirical support for Shibutani's remarks.

[14]He states:

> It is perhaps only in modern days, along with the great and sudden differentiation of activities, that feeling has failed to keep up, and the idea of cooperation without friendship has become familiar (Cooley, 1962: 40).

[15]Unfortunately, Piaget's work on the relationship between affect and cognition came later in his career. The deficiency of reference to "orectic" factors in The Moral Judgment of The Child, pointed out by Bull (1969a), has, however, been compensated for by Piaget in discussions to be found in Six Psychological Studies (1968) and in The Relation of Affectivity to Intelligence in The Mental Development of The Child (1962). The work of Rosenhan (1969: 150) and Rokeach (1960: 8) can be interpreted as supporting Piaget's designation that "affectivity and intelligence are indissociable and constitute the two complementary aspects of all human behavior" (1968: 15).

[16]In the present study only one of approximately 680 respondents sampled took this first alternative.

[17]We do not mean to imply that Kohlberg, for example, defines stage 5 or 6 judgments as mature on the basis of "choice." Rather, the intention is to suggest that in order to escape the futility of defining mature judgments in this manner, one can more satisfactorily define maturity on the basis of the complexity of the cognitive process which yields the choice. In the realm of theory most would appear to be in agreement with this idea. No one to this writer's knowledge, however, has attempted to procure empirical evidence to support it.

[18]The phrase "irrelevant factors" refers to:

> ... pressures that interfere with the realistic reception of information ... (internally these refer to) ... unrelated habits, beliefs, ... (etc.) By irrelevant external pressures we have in mind ... the pressures of reward and punishment arising from external authority... (Rokeach, 1960: 57).

[19]The scope of the present research project has been necessarily restricted. We will be content to accept the general hypothesis that different moral dilemmas will produce variation in judgment stemming from all moral stages.

[20]Moral judgments will be coded in four categories: post-conventional, stage 4, stage 3, and pre-conventional. The reason for collapsing stages 5 and 6 and stages 2 and 1 into post- and pre-conventional, respectively, will be explained in the following chapter.

[21]It should be noted that this "social involvement thesis" is congruent with the synthesized cognitive-developmental/symbolic-interactionist perspective adopted by the present writer.

[22]The reader should be reminded of the fact that the moral dilemmas employed in all of Kohlberg's research present conflicts

between social-legal norms and the needs of fictitious others. Dilemmas such as these, it was noted, comprise our "stranger" or "generalized-other" questionnaire treatment. Thus, we would expect that our results would correspond to Kohlberg and Kramer's in terms of our first treatment. Whether or not similar trends emerge in the "primary-other" treatments which were employed must remain an open question for the moment.

CHAPTER 4

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The aim of this dissertation is to investigate whether variations in moral judgment style are influenced by the identity of the "particular other" implicated in the moral dilemma being judged. Previous discussion has illustrated that there is reason to expect that judgments may vary depending upon whether the "other" being judged is a "primary other" (operationalized as a "close friend" and "one's mother") or a "secondary other" (operationalized as a "stranger"). Furthermore, this research represents an attempt to corroborate the findings of other investigators (e.g., Durkin, 1959; Bull, 1969a and 1969b) who report that moral judgments vary depending upon the nature of the dilemma situation posed to the respondent.

The present chapter presents the research design, instrumentation, and coding procedures employed in this study. Prior to the discussion of the techniques of data analysis which were utilized, the hypotheses which were tested will be stated.

I. THE SUBJECTS AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The subjects who took part in the present study were enrolled as freshmen in introductory sociology classes at The University of Alberta. A total of 680 subjects completed one of three forms of a moral judgment questionnaire (i.e., a "stranger" treatment, a "best friend" treatment, or a "mother" treatment). Subjects drew questionnaires from one of two

stacks (male or female) consisting of the three treatment forms. These treatment forms were randomly combined in the stacks; thus, the selection of a specific questionnaire form was randomized for each sex sub-sample. Three sub-samples were randomly drawn from this pool of subjects, each consisting of 50 males and 50 females. Thus, 100 subjects answered each form of a moral judgment questionnaire yielding a total sample size of 300.

In this sample ages ranged from 16 to 21 with a mean age of 18.4 years. Other personal attribute information (i.e., sex, religious denomination, frequency of church attendance, socio-economic status as coded by Blishen's (1967) scale, grade 12 academic average, and ethnicity) was also collected by the questions found in Appendix III.

The intention is to determine whether each of the three questionnaire forms elicit qualitatively different moral judgments. Thus, the task consists of making comparisons between the "stranger" treatment (T_1) and the "primary other" treatments ("best friend," T_2), and "mother" treatment (T_3).

II. INSTRUMENTATION

The two measuring devices employed in this study are the Kohlberg (1958) moral judgment questionnaire and the Rokeach (1960) dogmatism scale.

A. Moral Judgment Questionnaire

Kohlberg (1958, 1963) devised nine dilemma situations in his original questionnaire (see Appendix II) each of which presents the respondent with a conflict between two culturally acceptable or

unacceptable alternatives. The intent is to code each scorable phrase within one of the six stages of his moral typology.[1] Kohlberg (1958: 92) reports that inter-judge reliability was significant (.01) for two of the nine situations (i.e., situation 2, r = .79; situation 7, r = .64) for which he was able to obtain the relevant data. Kramer (1968: 28), working with the same questionnaire, reported high inter-judge reliability correlations for each of the nine moral dilemmas across all six moral judgment stages.[2]

In the present study, three modified versions of Kohlberg's questionnaire have been devised. As was stated earlier, the questionnaire has been modified in order to represent dilemmas in which the respondent is asked to judge: (1) a stranger of the same sex; (2) a "best friend" of the same sex; or (3) his/her mother. Four of Kohlberg's nine situations were selected (situations 1, 3, 4, and 7) and each was modified in the three ways just mentioned.[3]

The revisions for the three experimental treatments[4] as well as the instructions preceding each questionnaire are as follows:

Instructions:

On the following pages you will find several stories each of which are followed by some questions. The purpose of these stories and questions is to get you to express your opinions and ideas. Please write down all the ideas or feelings they bring to mind rather than giving "yes" or "no" answers. Just writing "yes" or "no" is definitely not an adequate answer.

You are to write your answers in the spaces provided following each question. If you need more space you may write on the back of the page, but if you do, make sure that you specify which question you are answering. You should be able to answer most of the questions in the space that is provided.

Remember that this is not a test in the usual sense. There are no right or wrong answers. There can only be different ideas and

opinions about these stories. So, do not spend a long time thinking about how to answer any one question, but simply write down what your opinions and ideas are about it.

Situation 1

(T_1) An 18 year old boy wanted to buy a car. His father promised that if he saved up one half the amount of money required for it, that he would provide the rest. So the boy worked during the summer vacation and made the necessary amount of money. But just as he was about to buy the car, his father changed his mind. He and his wife had decided that they needed the money for living-room furniture. So the father asked his son for the money he had earned. The boy didn't want to give up the car so he thought of refusing to give his father the money.

Should the boy refuse to give his father the money? Why?

All respondents in the "best friend" treatment received the following additional instructions in their questionnaires.

Before you begin, please go through each of the remaining pages and in every underlined blank space you find, fill in the name of your best male friend. For example:

While driving through an intersection, JOHN 's car was hit by another vehicle travelling at a speed of 50 m.p.h. The damage done to JOHN 's car was extensive. The next day... etc.

Once you have done this, you may begin to answer the questions. Thank you. (Please use only the first name of your best friend.)

(T_2) _____ wanted to buy a car. _____'s father promised that if he saved up one half the amount of money required for it, that he would provide the rest. So, _____ worked during the summer vacation and made the necessary amount of money. But just as _____ was about to buy the car, his father changed his mind. He and his wife decided that they needed the money for living-room furniture. So he asked _____ for the money he had saved. However, _____ didn't want to give up the car so he thought of refusing to give his father the money.

Should _____ refuse to give his father the money? Why?

(T_3) Imagine that your mother wanted to buy a dishwasher. Your father promised that if she saved up one half the amount of money required for it, that he would provide the rest. So your mother obtained a part-time job and made the necessary amount of money. But just as she was about to buy the dishwasher your father changed his mind. He decided that he wanted the money for a new car. So your father asked your mother for the money she had earned. Your mother didn't want to give up the dishwasher so she thought of refusing to give your father the money.

Should your mother refuse to give your father the money? Why?

Situation 3

(T_1) A woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. The drug was expensive to make, and the druggist was charging $2,000.00 for a small dose of it. The sick woman's husband went to everyone he could to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000.00 which was only half of what the drug cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or to accept payment at a later date. The druggist refused. So the man got desperate and broke into the drug store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should he have done that? What it right or wrong? Why?

(T_2) Imagine that a good friend of _____'s was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save _____'s friend. The drug was expensive to make and the druggist was charging $2,000.00 for a small dose of the drug. _____ went to everyone he could to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000.00 which was only half of what the drug cost. _____ told the druggist that his friend was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or two accept payment at a later date. The druggist refused. So _____ got desperate and broke into the drug store to steal the drug for his friend.

Should _____ have done that? Was it right or wrong? Why?

(T_3) Imagine that your mother's best friend was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. The drug was expensive to make, and the druggist was charging more money for it than your mother could possibly raise. Though your mother went to everyone she could to borrow the money, she could only get together about $1,000.00 which was half of what the drug cost. She told the druggist that her friend was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or to accept payment at a later date. The druggist refused. So your mother got desperate and broke into the drug store to steal the drug for her friend.

Should your mother have done that? Was it right or wrong? Why?

Situation 4

(T_1) The drug didn't work and there was no other treatment known to medicine which could save the man's wife. The man knew that his wife had only 6 months at the most to live. His wife was in terrible pain and often delirious. However, in her calm periods she would ask him for an overdose of sleeping pills so that she could die quickly. She said that she couldn't stand the pain and was going to die soon anyway.

Should the man do what his wife asks and give her the overdose? Why?

He finally gave his wife the overdose. The police found out and the man was brought up on a charge of murder even though it was known that his wife had pleaded for the overdose.

What punishment should he receive? Why?

(T_2) The drug didn't work and there was no other treatment known to medicine which could save _____'s friend. _____ knew that his friend had at the most only 6 months to live. His friend was in terrible pain and often delirious. However, in calm periods his friend would ask him for an overdose of sleeping pills in order to die quickly. _____'s friend said that the pain was unbearable and that death was not far away.

Should _____ do what his friend asks and give him the overdoes? Why?

Imagine that _____ finally gave his friend the sleeping pills. The police found out and _____ was brought up on a charge of murder even though it was known that his friend had pleaded for the overdose.

What punishment should _____ get? Why?

(T_3) Imagine that the drug didn't work and there was no other treatment known to medicine which could save your mother's friend. Your mother knew that her friend had only 6 months at the most to live. Her friend was in terrible pain and often delirious. However, in her calm periods she would ask your mother for an overdose of sleeping pills so that she could die quickly. She said that she couldn't stand the pain and was going to die soon anyway.

Should your mother do what her friend asks and give her the overdose? Why?

Imagine that your mother finally gave her friend the overdose. The police found out and your mother was brought up on a charge of murder even though it was known that her friend had pleaded for the overdose.

What punishment should your mother receive? Why?

Situation 7

(T_1) Two friends were in trouble with the police. They wanted to leave Edmonton in a hurry but needed money. One of them stole $500.00 from a store. The other told a neighbour that he was very ill and needed $500.00 for an operation. However, he was not ill and had no intention of repaying his neighbour. The neighbour, not knowing this, loaned him the money and the two friends left town, each with $500.00.

If you had to say which friend did worse, which would you choose: the one who stole the $500.00 or the one who borrowed it with no intention of paying it back? Why?

(T_2) Imagine that _____ and a friend were in trouble with the police. They wanted to leave Edmonton in a hurry but needed money. The friend stole $500.00 from a store and _____ went to a neighbour to borrow the money. _____ told his neighbour that he needed the money for an operation. Of course, _____ was not sick at all and had no intention of repaying. Not knowing this, his neighbour loaned him the money. So _____ and his friend left town, each with $500.00.

If you had to say who did worse, which would you choose: the friend who stole the $500.00 or _____ who borrowed it with no intention of paying it back? Why?

(T_3) Let's suppose that one of your mother's friends was in trouble with the police and had to leave Edmonton in a hurry but needed money. Her friend stole $500.00 from a store but needed more money. So your mother told a neighbour that she was very ill and needed $500.00 for an operation. However, your mother was not ill and had no intention of repaying her neighbour. The neighbour loaned her the money anyway and your mother gave it to her friend who then left town.

If you had to say who did worse, which would you choose: your mother's friend who stole the $500.00 or your mother who borrowed it with no intention of paying it back? Why?

B. Coding and Scoring Procedures for the Kohlberg Instrument

It was stated above (see page 52) that one advantage of Kohlberg's orientation lies in its capability of coding not the respondent's "moral choices" but rather the respondent's "moral reasoning." This technique is considered as being more advantageous given the finding that age trends in moral choice have not been found to be developmentally meaningful while the opposite has been the case for moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1963b: 12).

Focusing on the task of coding rationalizations rather than actual choice obviously creates more difficulty for the researcher. Kohlberg has, however, provided a comprehensive coding manual in order to aid in the stage identification of moral responses.[5] Having defined six moral stages and 25 moral aspects (see Appendix IV), Kohlberg's manual specifies and gives examples for the 150 possible reasoning categories which have been derived from his moral typology. An example of moral response coding on moral aspect 1 (considering motives in judging

action) for situation 3 appears below.

Question: Should he have done that? Was it right or wrong? Why?

Moral Stage	Response Examples
1	"No, because he'd be a criminal."
2	"Yes, because he needs the drug and if he's careful he probably won't get caught."
3	"Yes he should steal the drug because he loves his wife and the druggist is being unfair anyway."
4	"No, because stealing is against the law."
5	"Though I can understand the man's needs and the unfortunate situation he finds himself in, nevertheless, the ends do not justify the means."
6	A stage 6 response for this moral aspect is not provided in the manual.[6] However, an example of a stage 6 response to the above question under aspect 19 (rights of possession or property) would be as follows: "The man has a right to the drug for it is the common property of all mankind due to the function it serves him with. Social justice must always supercede law and order."

Accompanying Kohlberg's coding manual is a section which designates several sentence-coding rules which should be followed to insure coding consistency between raters. Those rules which are applicable to the sentence coding completed for this study are as follows:

1. A codable phrase may be defined as any statement which is classifiable by the coding manual and which is not simply a paraphrase of the question asked or of the material presented in the moral dilemma.

2. Examples of phrases not to be coded:

   (a) Repetitions - E.g., "As I said before," "For the same reasons stated earlier," etc.

   (b) Reasons which cannot be assigned to a category in the

manual. (This rule is to be followed if scoring rule #3B (below) does not suffice.)

3. Scoring rules:

   (a) When there are good reasons[7] for assigning a response to two stages, then double code it.

   (b) When there is not sufficient reason for assigning a phrase to one stage as opposed to another, then assign it to the lower stage.

C. Scoring Procedures

Kohlberg interprets his typology as being representative of an interval scale. Consequently, in determining a respondent's "moral maturity score" (M.M.S.), Kohlberg utilizes a weighted percentaging technique. The example which is provided in the scoring manual appears on page 132.

The computation of a respondent's "moral maturity score" can be based upon either of two coding techniques which Kohlberg has recommended. The technique used in the example is called "global rating" and involves treating the entire response to any particular situation as a single or mixed unit. The second technique, "sentence coding," involves scoring each phrase that is given in the response. Since respondents will vary in the absolute number of responses given across the situations, a percentage score for each of the moral judgment stages is computed over the total questionnaire. From this information, one simply calculates the respondent's M.M.S. in the same manner as was illustrated in reference to the "global rating" technique. Kramer (1968: 25) reports that the two coding procedures correlate in the high 90's in both his and Kohlberg's research.

DETERMINING A RESPONDENT'S "MORAL MATURITY SCORE"

The respondent may be assigned more than one response per stage. If the respondent's score is of a single stage, one score is assigned and weighted 3 units. If the respondent's score is mixed, two stage scores are assigned (e.g., stages 3 (2)). If the score is mixed, the major stage response receives a weight of two units, and the minor stage response a weight of one. As a result, subjects receive a weighted score on each stage across the nine situations. For example:

STORY→		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
STAGE ↓	1	2	3	3	2	3	2	3	3	1
	2				1		1			1
	3	1								
	4									
	5									
	6									
SCORES		1(3)	1	1	1(2)	1	1(2)	1	1	2(1)

SUM	%	WEIGHTED %
22	81	1 x 81 = 81
4	15	2 x 15 = 30
1	4	3 x 4 = 12

M.M.S. = 123

Several authors (Loevinger, 1966 and Fishkin et al., 1973) question the validity of utilizing the moral maturity scores derived from the above two scoring procedures. They argue that Kohlberg's scale does not meet the criteria for assuming an interval level of measurement but should instead be interpreted as an ordinal scale. An ordinal interpretation of Kohlberg's typology simply asserts that a stage 6 response, for example, is based upon a more cognitively complex decision making process than is a stage 3 response. This writer has no quarrel with such an interpretation. However, testing the theoretical orientation outlined in the preceding chapter requires that Kohlberg's stage typology be interpreted as a representation of six nominal moral judgment categories. Since the theory outlined earlier predicts that certain types of moral judgments will have a greater probability of being utilized in different social situations, any attempt to derive summary moral maturity scores to label respendents as "more or less moral" does not serve our purpose.

The task of the present analysis requires that a "percent-response" score for each stage be derived for the total questionnaire as well as for each individual story. This task was accomplished by utilizing the sentence-coding information provided by two coders who worked independently (see Appendix V).

D. Inter-Judge Reliability

A Pearsonian correlation between coders' ratings is an inappropriate computation to make in determining inter-judge reliability. As Robinson (1957: 19) argues, a Pearsonian correlation indicates the

covariation between coders' ratings rather than the actual rate of agreement between coders.

Accordingly, we have simply computed the proportion of agreements between coders in order to determine inter-judge reliability. Of the 4,226 ratings made in the present study, the coders agreed upon 3,978 thus yielding a coefficient of agreement equal to .94.

E. The Dogmatism Scale

Rokeach (1960: 73-80) lists 40 items which comprise Form E of the Dogmatism Scale.[8] This scale preceded the moral judgment situations in the questionnaire format. The scale was designed to differentiate between individuals along an "open-closed" belief system continuum. As was stated earlier, scores on the dogmatism scale serve as indicators of relative degree of cognitive complexity. The instructions and items which comprise Form E appear below.

Instructions

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.

Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case.

+1: I AGREE A LITTLE	-1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE	-2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH	-3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

If you have no questions, you may begin.

Items involving the belief-disbelief dimension[9]

_____ 1. Canada and Russia have just about nothing in common.[10]

_____ 2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

_____ 3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

_____ 4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.

Items involving the central-peripheral dimension

_____ 5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

_____ 6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.

_____ 7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

_____ 8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

_____ 9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

_____ 10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

_____ 11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

_____ 12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

_____ 13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

_____ 14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

_____ 15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

_____ 16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

_____ 17. If given a chance, I would do something of great benefit to the world.

_____ 18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.

_____ 19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.

_____ 20. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

_____ 21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

_____ 22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

_____ 23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

_____ 24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

_____ 25. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the way we do.

_____ 26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

_____ 27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.

_____ 28. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.

_____ 29. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.

_____ 30. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

_____ 31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.

_____ 32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.

_____ 33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

_____ 34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

_____ 35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

_____ 36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

Items involving the time-perspective dimension

_____ 37. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

_____ 38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."

_____ 39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.

_____ 40. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

Now that you have finished, please go on the the next part of the questionnaire.

F. Scoring Procedures for the Dogmatism Scale

Responses for each item in the dogmatism scale were scored along a +3 to -3 agree-disagree scale with the zero point excluded. These scores were converted to a 1 to 7 scale by adding a constant of 4 to each response. Thus, the range of possible scores for the 40 item scale is from 40 to 280. A high score is an indication of closed-mindedness.

III. HYPOTHESES

The statement of the hypotheses which appears below is organized by moral stage. Justifications for each of them will be found by consulting the pages listed in reference to Chapter 3. The reader should note that stage 6 responses were combined with responses coded at stage 5, thus yielding a post-conventional summary response rate. Likewise, stage 1 responses were combined with those coded at stage 2, thus yielding a pre-conventional summary response rate. The pre- and post-conventional categories were collapsed because the frequency of stage 6 and stage 1 responses was less than 2% in any of the samples coded.[11]

A. Hypotheses for Post-Conventional Response Rate

It is hypothesized that:

(a) variation in questionnaire treatment will not have a significant effect on response rate (104).

(b) variation in moral dilemma will have a significant effect on response rate (89).

(c) response rate will be significantly greater for the high socio-economic status group (111).

(d) response rate will be significantly greater for Catholics (112).

(e) the regression of response rate on dogmatism will indicate an inverse relationship between the two variables (108).

(f) differences in response rate among socio-economic status groups will be significantly decreased when the effect of dogmatism is controlled for (111).

(g) differences in response rate between Catholics and Protestants will be significantly decreased when the effect of dogmatism is controlled for (112).

B. Hypotheses for Conventional Response Rate

1. Stage 4

It is hypothesized that:

(a) response rate will be significantly lower in treatments two and three in comparison with treatment one (99).

(b) variation in moral dilemma will have a significant effect on response rate (89)

(c) response rate will be significantly greater for males within treatment one (113).

(d) response rate will not be significantly related to socio-economic status (111).

(e) response rate will not be significantly related to religious denomination (111).

(f) response rate will not be significantly related to frequency of church attendance (111).

(g) the regression of response rate on dogmatism will indicate that the two variables are not significantly related (108).

2. Stage 3

It is hypothesized that:

(a) response rate will be significantly higher in treatments two and three in comparison with treatment one (99).

(b) variation in moral dilemma will have a significant effect on response rate (89).

(c) response rate will be significantly greater for females within treatment one (113).

(d) response rate will not be significantly related to socio-economic status (111).

(e) response rate will not be significantly related to religious denomination (111).

(f) response rate will not be significantly related to frequency of church attendance (111).

(g) the regression of response rate on dogmatism will indicate that the two variables are not significantly related (108).

C. Hypotheses for Pre-Conventional Response Rate

It is hypothesized that:

(a) response rate will be significantly lower in treatments two and three in comparison with treatment one (103).

(b) variation in moral dilemma will have a significant effect on response rate (89).

(c) response rate will not be significantly related to sex (114).

(d) response rate will not be significantly related to socio-economic status (111).

(e) response rate will not be significantly related to religious denomination (111).

(f) response rate will not be significantly related to frequency of church attendance (111).

(g) the regression of response rate on dogmatism will indicate that the two variables are not significantly related (108).

IV. TECHNIQUES OF DATA ANALYSIS

The data analysis will entail the use of analysis of variance in order to test the relationships predicted by the hypotheses. This technique will be employed in as much as testing most of the above hypotheses calls for the simultaneous comparison of more than two sample distributions of the dependent variables (moral judgment response rates). Furthermore, analysis of variance requires that only one variable (the dependent variable) need be measured on an interval level (Blalock, 1960: 248). In the present investigation we have met this interval criterion by measuring moral judgment in terms of percent response rate at each moral stage.

Several analyses of variance models have been employed throughout the data analysis. Using Winer's (1962) terminology, a 3 factor

repeated measures design with two between-subject factors (sex and treatment) and one within-subject factor (moral dilemma) was employed to test the hypotheses concerning the effects of sex, treatment, and dilemma on the dependent variables.

A second 3 factor design was employed to test the effects of religious denomination, frequency of church attendance, and treatment. Since this design contained cells with unequal frequencies, it was necessary to remove the effects of the independent variables and their interactions in a specific order. A 2 factor design was employed to test the effects of socio-economic status and treatment. Again, because of unequal cell frequencies, the effect of the independent variables and their interactions were removed in a specific order. Analysis of covariance was employed to determine the effect of the independent variables in these latter two designs controlling for the effect of dogmatism (Blalock, 1960: 375-382).

In utilizing analysis of variance one makes several assumptions. In the case of the analyses of variance designs used to determine the effects of treatment, religious denomination, frequency of church attendance, and socio-economic status, we have first assumed that the distributions of the dependent variable in the populations from which the samples have been drawn are normal (Ferguson, 1971: 219). We have also assumed "homogeneity of variance" (i.e., that the variances in the populations from which the sampels were drawn are equal) (Ferguson, 1971: 219).

In the case of the 3 factor repeated measures design, we have again made the normality assumption along with two assumptions concerning the variance-covariance matrices for the dependent variable (response

rate) over categories of the repeated measures factor (moral dilemma). Fox (1972: 198) states these assumptions in the following manner:

> First, we assume the equality of the population covariance matrices for the K conditions in the experiment:
>
> $$\Sigma_1 = \Sigma_2 = \ldots = \Sigma_K = \Sigma$$
>
> Secondly, we need to assume that the common population covariance matrix, Σ, is of the form:
>
> $$\begin{matrix} \sigma^2 & \rho\sigma^2 & \cdot & \rho\sigma^2 \\ \rho\sigma^2 & \sigma^2 & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \rho\sigma^2 & \sigma^2 & \cdot \\ \rho\sigma^2 & \cdot & \cdot & \sigma^2 \end{matrix}$$
>
> where, of course, σ^2 is the population variance of the dependent variable in each category of the repeated measures factor and ρ is the population correlation coefficient between categories.

The disadvantages inherent in making the above assumptions do not appear to be very great. The relatively large sample size selected (n = 300) indicates that the assumption of normality is not very problematic. According to Ferguson (1971: 219) the effect of a departure from normality will make the results of the analysis of variance appear more significant than they actually are. Ferguson goes on to suggest that if extreme departures are suspected, one should employ a more rigorous level of confidence in evaluating the F-ratio. Since most of the F-ratios obtained in the present analysis are significant beyond the .01 level, it would appear that the normality assumption may be accepted.

Tests for the assumptions concerning the variance-covariance matrices were not conducted in the present analysis. Fox (1972: 199) suggests, however, that since "the F-ratio appears to be a good deal

more "robust" than tests for homogeneity of variance" we can argue that "findings of significant differences among group variances do not necessarily indicate that the F-test should be discarded." Also, Box (1953) states that making "preliminary tests on variances is rather like putting to sea in a rowing boat to find out whether conditions are sufficiently calm for an ocean-liner to leave port."[12]

Computing analysis of covariance necessitates making two assumptions concerning the nature of the regression effects. First, we assume that the "residuals are normally and independently distributed with zero means and the same variance" (Winer, 1962: 586). Secondly, it must be assumed that the regressions are homogeneous; that is, we assume that there is no statistically significant interaction between the covariate (dogmatism) and the analysis of variance factors (treatment, religious denomination, socio-economic status, etc.). Schuessler (1971: 203-207) outlines the appropriate procedure for testing the homogeneity assumption. In the present investigation the tests for slope equality were made, the results of which appear in Table 2 of Appendix VIII.

To test several of the hypotheses stated above requires that comparisons between cell means be computed. The following formula (Winer, 1962: 208) was employed to make the necessary calculations.

$$F_{1,dfw} = \frac{(\overline{AB}_i - \overline{AB}_j)^2}{\frac{2\,(MSw)}{n}}$$

where $\overline{AB}_i$ is the first cell mean
$\overline{AB}_j$ is the second cell mean
MSw is the mean square of the error between subjects
and n is the number of observations in each cell.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Kohlberg's (1958) typology, presented in the second chapter, was derived from a longitudinal and cross-sectional study of children ranging between the ages of 10 and 16. See pages 52 through 54 for a review of the evidence he offers as confirmation that his typology meets the expectations of cognitive-developmental stage theory.

[2]The inter- and intra-judge agreement correlations which Kramer reports range from a low of .67 to a high of .96. Of the 42 coefficients reported, 32 were greater than .80.

[3]Situations 1, 3, 4, and 7 have been employed primarily because the dilemmas which these situations portray appear to be the most credible.

[4]The situations for male respondents are being presented. The reader should be aware, however, that pronouns were changed to the feminine gender where necessary for female respondents. Also, the presentation of questions was varied in each questionnaire so that any contaminating effect due to question order would be avoided.

[5]The present writer was enrolled in a one-year coding course prior to the data collection phase of his research. A copy of the coding manual was secured during this training period.

[6]There are several categories in the manual which do not give examples of stage 6 responses under certain moral aspects. It is, however, difficult to think of an example of a stage 6 response dealing with aspect 1. This may be indicative of a deficiency in the manual. More likely, it serves as confirmation of the theoretical expectation that stage 6 responses are oriented, not to the specific needs or motives of actors, but rather to the application of trans-situational principles to the problem at hand. Whatever the case may be, Kohlberg does not report an empirically derived example of a stage 6 response under this first moral aspect.

[7]A good reason is: (a) a close fit to two categories in the manual, and (b) when, after looking at the context of the whole answer, no clarification is forthcoming.

[8]For Form E of the scale, Rokeach (1969: 89) reports the following corrected split-half reliabilities:

English college sample (n = 80) .81
English worker sample (n = 60) .78

[9]These headings did not appear in the questionnaire. They are included here so that the reader may understand the relationship which the items listed under them have to Rokeach's theory.

[10]This item has been changed. Its original form reads as follows: "The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common."

[11]The reader may wish to consult Appendix VI for a mean-percent breakdown for each of the six sub-samples.

[12]Tests for homogeneity of variance for the 3- and 2-factor designs were computed. The results of these tests appear in Table 1 of Appendix VIII.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents the results of the study. The discussion of the findings will be organized by the categories of the dependent variable (moral judgment response rate) which were designated at the conclusion of the preceding chapter. We shall conclude with a summary of the results and a discussion of the hypotheses which are not supported by the data.

I. HYPOTHESES FOR POST-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE[1]

Table 3 presents the results of the analysis of variance for the post-conventional response rate. As can be seen, none of the interactions were statistically significant. Thus we need be concerned only with the main effects.

It was predicted (Hypothesis A) that variation in questionnaire treatment would not have a significant impact on response rate at stages 5 and 6. This hypothesis has received support. Table 3 indicates that the treatment main effect ($F_{2,294} = 1.82$, NS) was not statistically significant.

TABLE 3

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR POST-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE:
3-FACTOR REPEATED MEASURES DESIGN

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
BETWEEN S's				
SEX	4998.00	1	7.39	<.01
TREATMENT	2462.65	2	1.82	NS
S x T	782.16	2	.58	NS
ERROR (B)	198809.30	294		
WITHIN S's				
DILEMMA	4675.84	3	2.79	<.05
S x D	3200.02	3	1.19	NS
T x D	4411.10	6	1.32	NS
S x T x D	4991.96	6	1.49	NS
ERROR (W)	4913377.60	882		

As was predicted by hypothesis (B), the main effect due to variation in moral dilemma was statistically significant ($F_{3,882} = 2.79$, $p < .05$). Table 4 presents the mean response rates for each of the four moral dilemmas.

TABLE 4

POST-CONVENTIONAL: MEAN RESPONSE
RATE FOR EACH DILEMMA

DILEMMA	1	3	4	7
	15.65	11.48	11.32	10.65

The primary factor contributing to this moral dilemma main effect is the contrast between the mean response rate for the first dilemma and the mean response rates for the remaining three dilemmas.

It will be recalled that while the other dilemmas dealt with the themes of "theft in order to save a life," "euthanasia," and "deceit," the first dilemma was the only one which dealt explicitly with the problem of breaking or keeping a contract. Given this observation, it seems reasonable to suggest that post-conventional response rate was higher on the first dilemma because a stage 5 contractual-legalistic orientation is the most appropriate one to employ in dealing with the problem of breaking a promise.

The other independent variable which had a significant impact on response rate was sex. Supporting Graham's (1972: 250) finding is the present one showing a statistically significant sex main effect ($F_{1,294} = 7.39$, $p < .01$). The mean response rate for males was 14.32 while for females it was 10.23. Possible explanations for this finding will be discussed in this chapter's concluding remarks.

The results of the analysis of variance for determining the effect of socio-economic status[2] can be seen in Table 5.

TABLE 5

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR POST-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE: 2-FACTOR DESIGN*

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
TREATMENT	563.32	2	1.75	NS
S.E.S.	1335.91	2	4.16	<.05
T x S.E.S.	544.68	4	.85	NS
ERROR	46638.99	291		

*Effects removed in descending order.

Table 5 indicates that while the treatment x socio-economic status interaction was not statistically significant, the main effect due to the impact of socio-economic status was ($F_{2,291} = 4.16$, $p < .05$). The means for this main effect, presented in Table 6, ascend in the direction predicted by hypothesis (C) with the high socio-economic status group responding with a greater proportion of post-conventional judgments. This finding is consistent with Kohlberg's (1964: 406) observation that middle- and upper-class children attain a more mature moral orientation in comparison with their lower-class counterparts.

TABLE 6

POST-CONVENTIONAL: MEAN RESPONSE RATE FOR EACH S.E.S. GROUP

LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
9.15 (n = 100)	12.88 (n = 101)	14.44 (n = 99)

Hypothesis (D) predicted that the proportion of post-conventional responses would be greater for Catholics than for Protestants.[3] The results in Table 7 indicate that the main effect for religion is statistically significant ($F_{1,198} = 4.20$, $p < .05$). The mean response rate for Catholics (n = 73) was 13.59 while for Protestants (n = 143) it was 11.41. We may conclude that hypothesis (D) has been supported. Neither the main effect of frequency of church attendance[4] nor any of the interactions are statistically significant.

TABLE 7

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR POST-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE: 3-FACTOR DESIGN*

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
TREATMENT	587.07	2	1.96	NS
ATTENDANCE	751.74	2	2.51	NS
RELIGION	628.23	1	4.20	<.05
T x A	531.43	4	.88	NS
T x R	3.21	2	.01	NS
A x R	373.62	2	1.24	NS
T x A x R	1099.51	4	1.83	NS
ERROR	29601.60	198		

*Effects removed in descending order.

Of the three remaining post-conventional hypotheses, hypothesis (E) predicted that the regression of response rate on dogmatism[5] would yield a negative relationship. Hypotheses (F) and (G) predicted that by controlling for the effect of dogmatism, the main effects due to socio-economic status and religion noted above would be significantly reduced.

Table 8 presents the results of the analysis of covariance carried out to test the hypothesis that the socio-economic status main effect would be significantly reduced when dogmatism was entered as the covariate.[6]

TABLE 8

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE FOR POST-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE: 2-FACTOR DESIGN*

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
DOGMATISM	4556.95	1	31.40	<.001
TREATMENT	491.74	2	1.69	NS
S.E.S.	646.57	2	2.22	NS
T x S.E.S.	557.20	4	.96	NS
ADJUSTED ERROR	42028.03	290		

*Effects removed in descending order.

The first finding which may be noted in the above table is that the regression of post-conventional response rate on dogmatism is statistically significant ($F_{1,290} = 31.40$, $p < .001$). Further investigation indicated that the slope of this relationship was negative (-0.156). These observations clearly support hypothesis (E).

The main effect due to socio-economic status, with the impact of dogmatism held constant, is not statistically significant ($F_{1,290} = 2.22$, NS). Comparing this result with what was reported in Table 5, it can be seen that controlling for dogmatism decreases the sum of squares due to socio-economic status by more than half. It appears that we have substantial evidence for accepting hypothesis (F).

The results of the analysis of covariance computed to test hypothesis (G) are contained in Table 9.[7]

TABLE 9

ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE FOR POST-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE: 3-FACTOR DESIGN*

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
DOGMATISM	1072.83	1	7.40	<.01
TREATMENT	682.00	2	2.35	NS
ATTENDANCE	438.57	2	1.51	NS
RELIGION	460.34	1	3.17	NS
T x A	563.86	4	.97	NS
T x R	4.43	2	.01	NS
A x R	386.55	2	1.33	NS
T x A x R	945.42	4	1.63	NS
ADJUSTED ERROR	28528.75	197		

*Effects removed in descending order.

The above table indicates that the regression of post-conventional response rate on dogmatism is statistically significant ($F_{1,197} = 7.40$, $p < .01$). Further investigation indicated that the slope of this relationship is negative (-0.102). Once again, it would appear that hypothesis (E) is supported.

With the effect of the covariate held constant, the main effect due to religion is not statistically significant ($F_{1,197} = 3.17$, NS). Comparing this finding with what was reported in Table 7, it can be seen that the sum of squares due to religious denomination is decreased by more than one-fourth. This evidence suggests that we may accept hypothesis (G).

II. HYPOTHESES FOR CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE - STAGE 4

Table 10 presents the results of the analysis of variance for stage 4 response rate.

TABLE 10

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR STAGE 4 RESPONSE RATE:
3-FACTOR REPEATED MEASURES DESIGN

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
BETWEEN S's				
SEX	938.10	1	.78	NS
TREATMENT	31256.88	2	13.10	<.001
S x T	6196.89	2	2.59	NS
ERROR (B)	350712.30	294		
WITHIN S's				
DILEMMA	11953.89	3	3.78	<.01
S x D	9894.57	3	3.09	<.05
T x D	8011.78	6	1.25	NS
S x T x D	8397.34	6	1.31	NS
ERROR (W)	940440.40	882		

Hypothesis (A) predicted that response rate would be significantly lower in treatments two and three. Table 10 indicates that the main effect for questionnaire treatment is statistically significant ($F_{2,294} = 13.10$, $p < .001$). The means for the three questionnaire treatments appear in Table 11.

TABLE 11

STAGE 4: MEANS FOR EACH QUESTIONNAIRE TREATMENT

T_1	T_2	T_3
36.14	23.76	28.44

The means exhibit the expected pattern with the contrast between the "best-friend" treatment (T_2) and the first treatment producing the most dramatic difference. It can be concluded that the overall pattern of

these treatment means substantiates our acceptance of hypothesis (A).

Hypothesis (B) predicted that variation in moral dilemma would have a significant impact on response rate at stage 4. Table 10 indicates that the main effect due to variation in moral dilemma is statistically significant ($F_{3,882} = 3.78$, $p < .01$), thus supporting this hypothesis. In addition to this main effect, however, we must note that the effect of moral dilemma depended somewhat upon the variable of sex. The cell means for this statistically significant sex x moral dilemma interaction ($F_{3,882} = 3.09$, $p < .05$) appear in Table 12.

TABLE 12

STAGE 4: CELL MEANS FOR SEX x MORAL DILEMMA INTERACTION

DILEMMA	1	3	4	7
MALE	28.07	24.61	31.33	30.25
FEMALE	23.77	33.09	37.78	26.71

Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the above table of cell means. It can be noted that males respond more frequently at stage 4 for dilemmas 1 and 7 while females respond more frequently at this stage for dilemmas 3 and 4. This finding of interaction between sex and moral dilemma suggests, of course, that the effect which our moral dilemmas have upon stage 4 response rate is different for males than it is for females. Knowing this, however, does not contradict our theoretical orientation since the variation expected in response rate due to the effect of moral dilemmas has been observed. Thus, this statistically significant interaction between sex and moral dilemma can

FIGURE 1

SEX x MORAL DILEMMA INTERACTION
STAGE 4



be considered as both a noteworthy finding and a serendipitous confirmation of our theoretical perspective. We shall comment further on these sex differences at the end of this chapter.

The third hypothesis, hypothesis (C), predicted that the response rate for males would be significantly higher than that for females, within the first questionnaire treatment (T_1). The overall difference between the sexes on stage 4 response rate is not statistically significant ($F_{1,294} = .78$, NS) nor is the sex x treatment interaction ($F_{2,294} = 2.59$, NS). The cell means for this interaction appear in Table 13. Within T_1 the mean response rate for males is 37.28 while for females it is 35.00. The mean difference between the sexes is 2.28 and this difference is not statistically significant ($F_{1,294} = .12$, NS). Thus, our data do not support the hypothesis which predicted a difference between the sexes within T_1.

TABLE 13

STAGE 4: CELL MEANS FOR SEX x TREATMENT INTERACTION

TREATMENT	1	2	3
MALE	37.28	19.70	28.70
FEMALE	35.00	27.81	28.18

The data in Table 13 indicates that response rate for males and females is almost identical for treatment three. The difference in response rate within treatment two, with males responding at a lower rate, is not statistically significant ($F_{1,294} = 1.50$, NS). It may be concluded, then, that the sexes are similar in their usage of the stage 4 orientation when judging a "primary other" within the dilemmas utilized in the

present investigation.

In terms of stage 4 response rate, it was predicted that there would be no significant differences between socio-economic status groups (hypothesis D). Table 14 presents the results of the analysis of variance computed to test this hypothesis.

TABLE 14

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR STAGE 4 RESPONSE RATE: 2-FACTOR DESIGN*

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
TREATMENT	9299.14	2	15.73	<.001
S.E.S.	108.24	2	.18	NS
T x S.E.S.	2063.10	4	1.74	NS
ERROR	85982.62	291		

*Effects removed in descending order.

The above table indicates support for hypothesis (D). Neither the treatment x socio-economic status interaction nor the main effect of socio-economic status are statistically significant.

Hypotheses (E) and (F) predicted that response rate would not be significantly related to either religious denomination or frequency of church attendance, respectively. The results of the analysis of variance for this 3-factor design appear in Table 15.

TABLE 15

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR STAGE 4 RESPONSE RATE:
3-FACTOR DESIGN*

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
TREATMENT	4496.11	2	8.61	<.01
ATTENDANCE	593.36	2	1.13	NS
RELIGION	137.45	1	.52	NS
T x A	418.33	4	.40	NS
T x R	499.25	2	.95	NS
A x R	126.18	2	.24	NS
T x A x R	671.48	4	.64	NS
ERROR	51642.81	198		

*Effects removed in descending order.

The above table indicates that none of the effects other than the treatment main effect are statistically significant. Thus, both hypotheses (E) and (F) are confirmed. In the case of the former, the main effect due to religious denomination failed to be statistically significant ($F_{1,198}$ = .52, NS). Nor is there statistically significant differences in response rate among high, medium, and low church attenders ($F_{2,198}$ = 1.13, NS). This outcome was predicted by hypothesis (F).

Hypothesis (G) predicted that the regression of stage 4 response rate on dogmatism would indicate that the two variables were not significantly related. We have tested this hypothesis in both the 3- and 2-factor designs. In the case of the former, dogmatism is not significantly related to response rate ($F_{1,197}$ = 2.98, NS). Similarly, in the case of the latter design, the relationship between the covariate and response rate is again statistically insignificant ($F_{1,290}$ = 1.55, NS). We may conclude from this evidence that hypothesis (G) is supported.

III. HYPOTHESES FOR CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE - STAGE 3

Table 16 presents the results of the analysis of variance for stage 3 response rate.

TABLE 16

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR STAGE 3 RESPONSE RATE:
3-FACTOR REPEATED MEASURES DESIGN

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
BETWEEN S's				
SEX	3194.80	1	2.32	NS
TREATMENT	52776.60	2	19.23	<.001
S x T	19316.78	2	7.04	<.001
ERROR (B)	403253,30	294		
WITHIN S's				
DILEMMA	24435.85	3	6.97	<.001
S x D	14414.84	3	4.11	<.01
T x D	8385.73	6	1.19	NS
S x T x D	5204.11	6	.74	NS
ERROR (W)	1029440.00	882		

Hypothesis (A) predicted that response rate would be significantly higher in treatments two and three. Table 16 indicates that the main effect for questionnaire treatment is statistically significant as predicted ($F_{2,294} = 19.23$, $p < .001$). The means for this main effect appear in Table 17.

TABLE 17

STAGE 3: MEANS FOR EACH QUESTIONNAIRE TREATMENT

T_1	T_2	T_3
43.72	58.65	56.73

These means exhibit the expected pattern with response rate being significantly greater for treatments two and three. It may be concluded that hypothesis (A) is supported.

Table 16 shows, however, that the sex x treatment interaction is statistically significant ($F_{2,294} = 7.04$, $p < .001$). The cell means for this interaction appear in Table 18.

TABLE 18

STAGE 3: CELL MEANS FOR SEX x TREATMENT INTERACTION

TREATMENT	T_1	T_2	T_3
MALE	38.30	62.58	53.34
FEMALE	49.14	54.73	60.12

Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the above table of cell means. It can be noted that while females repond more frequently in treatments one and three, the male response rate is greater for treatment two and it is this radical increase in response rate for males on the second treatment which appears to be the most interesting finding. We shall comment on this sex difference within treatment two later in the discussion. What should be noted at the present time is that over and above this difference between male and female response rate, Figure 2 nevertheless illustrates an increased response rate for both males and females for treatments two and three in comparison with treatment one. Thus, hypothesis (A) is substantiated for both males and females.

It was predicted by hypothesis (B) that variation in moral dilemma would exert a significant impact on response rate at stage 3. Table 16 indicates that this is indeed the case with the main effect of

FIGURE 2

SEX x TREATMENT INTERACTION
STAGE 3



moral dilemma being statistically significant ($F_{3,882} = 6.97$, $p < .001$). As was the case with stage 4 response rate, this dilemma effect depended upon the variable of sex. The sex x moral dilemma interaction is statistically significant ($F_{3,882} = 4.11$, $p < .01$) and the cell means for this interaction appear in Table 19.

TABLE 19

STAGE 3: CELL MEANS FOR SEX x MORAL DILEMMA INTERACTION

DILEMMA	1	3	4	7
MALE	42.64	60.28	47.87	54.82
FEMALE	53.80	52.90	49.99	61.98

Figure 3 provides a graphic representation of the above cell means. It can be noted that females respond more frequently at stage 3 for dilemmas 1 and 7 while males respond more frequently at this stage for dilemma 3. For the fourth dilemma, the sexes respond at almost the same rate. With the exception of the fourth dilemma, this sex x dilemma interaction exhibits a pattern opposite to that pattern noted for stage 4 response rate. In the conclusion of this chapter we will discuss the sex effects which have been found.

Hypothesis (C) predicted that within treatment one the response rate for females would be significantly higher than that for males. It was noted in Table 18 that the mean response rate for females is 49.14 while for males it is 38.30. The mean difference between the sexes is 10.84 and this difference is not statistically significant ($F_{1,294} = 2.52$, NS). Thus, there is no substantial evidence for accepting hypothesis (C).

FIGURE 3

SEX x MORAL DILEMMA INTERACTION
STAGE 3



The fourth prediction, hypothesis (D), was that there would be no significant differences between socio-economic status groups in terms of stage 3 response rate. Table 20 presents the results of the analysis of variance computed to test this hypothesis.

TABLE 20

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR STAGE 3 RESPONSE RATE: 2-FACTOR DESIGN*

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
TREATMENT	16383.51	2	25.31	<.001
S.E.S.	727.41	2	1.12	NS
T x S.E.S.	2506.31	4	2.01	NS
ERROR	94166.06	291		

*Effects removed in descending order.

Table 20 indicates that hypothesis (D) has been supported. Neither the main effect of socio-economic status nor the treatment x socio-economic status interaction is statistically significant.

The results of the analysis of variance for the 3-factor design appear in Table 21. It was predicted that neither religious denomination nor frequency of church attendance would be significantly related to response rate at stage 3 (i.e., hypotheses (E) and (F), respectively).

TABLE 21

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR STAGE 3 RESPONSE RATE:
3-FACTOR DESIGN*

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
TREATMENT	8702.94	2	14.19	<.001
ATTENDANCE	110.19	2	.17	NS
RELIGION	39.47	1	.12	NS
T x A	579.54	4	.47	NS
T x R	629.08	2	1.02	NS
A x R	42.07	2	.06	NS
T x A x R	2801.01	4	2.28	NS
ERROR	60684.75	198		

*Effects removed in descending order.

Table 21 indicates that both hypotheses (E) and (F) have been supported. In the case of the former, the main effect due to religious denomination is not statistically significant ($F_{1,198} = .12$, NS) thus indicating that Catholic usage of stage 3 moral reasoning is not significantly different than Protestant usage. Furthermore, there are no statistically significant differences in response rate among high, medium, and low church attenders ($F_{2,198} = .17$, NS). This latter finding was predicted by hypothesis (F).

Hypothesis (G) predicted that the regression of stage 3 response rate on dogmatism would indicate that the two variables were not significantly related. This hypothesis was tested in both the 3- and 2-factor designs. In the case of the former, dogmatism failed to be significantly related to response rate ($F_{1,197} = .06$, NS). Similarly, in the case of the latter design, the relationship between the covariate and response rate is again statistically insignificant ($F_{1,290} = .02$, NS). This evidence supports our acceptance of hypothesis (G).

IV. HYPOTHESES FOR PRE-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE

Table 22 presents the results of the analysis of variance computed to test the hypotheses concerning pre-conventional response rate.

TABLE 22

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR PRE-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE: 3-FACTOR REPEATED MEASURES DESIGN

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
BETWEEN S's				
SEX	235.85	1	.88	NS
TREATMENT	646.28	2	1.21	NS
S x T	1271.51	2	2.37	NS
ERROR (B)	78584. 56	294		
WITHIN S's				
DILEMMA	11461. 18	3	18.36	<.001
S x D	1516.35	3	2.42	NS
T x D	1046.53	6	.83	NS
S x T x D	567.77	6	.45	NS
ERROR (W)	183487.60	882		

It was predicted by hypothesis (A) that the response rate would be significantly lower in treatments two and three. The greatest mean difference in response rate between treatment one and any other treatment is 1.72 and this mean difference is not statistically significant ($F_{2,294} = 1.21$, NS). Thus, hypothesis (A) is not supported.

As was the case with the three preceding categorizations of the dependent variable, we have again hypothesized that variation in moral dilemma will have a significant impact on pre-conventional response rate. This hypothesis is confirmed. The main effect due to moral dilemma is statistically significant ($F_{3,882} = 18.36$, $p < .001$) and the means for this effect appear in Table 23.

TABLE 23

PRE-CONVENTIONAL: MEAN RESPONSE RATE FOR EACH DILEMMA

DILEMMA	1	3	4	7
	9.82	2.68	4.85	1.88

The primary factor contributing to this moral dilemma main effect is the mean response rate for the first dilemma. It will be recalled that there was also a greater proportion of post-conventional responses scored for this moral dilemma. The implication is that this first dilemma, a dilemma in which a father/husband arbitrarily breaks a promise and asks for the property belonging to another member of the family unit, calls out both pre- and post-conventional responses. This dilemma clearly presents a conflict of interests between the property and individual rights of the individual and the arbitrarily sanctioned authority of social status. It is the substantive nature of this conflict which appeals to both stage 5 and 2 moral orientations. As Kramer (1968) suggests:

> Clearly the 5's are more cognitively advanced, but they are similar to the 2's with respect to the focus on a maintenance of the individual's rights against the encroachment of arbitrary social custom (109).

Hypothesis (C) predicted that the response rate at the pre-conventional stages would not be significantly related to the variable of sex. As Table 22 indicates, the main effect due to sex is not statistically significant ($F_{1,294} = .88$, NS) thus supporting hypothesis (C).

The results of the analysis of variance conducted to test

hypothesis (D), which stated that S.E.S. would not be related to pre-conventional response rate, appear in Table 24. We conclude from the information presented in this table that variation in S.E.S. is not significantly related to pre-conventional response rate. This hypothesis is thus substantiated.

TABLE 24

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR PRE-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE: 2-FACTOR DESIGN*

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
TREATMENT	305.07	2	2.13	NS
S.E.S.	50.31	2	.35	NS
T x S.E.S.	126.72	4	.44	NS
ERROR	20762.86	291		

*Effects removed in descending order.

Hypotheses (E) and (F) predicted that the variables of religious denomination and frequency of church attendance would not be significantly related to pre-conventional response rate. Table 25 presents the results of the analysis of variance computed to test these hypotheses. As can be seen in this table, the main effect due to religious denomination was statistically insignificant ($F_{1,198} = .87$, NS) thus indicating that Catholics and Protestants are not significantly different in their usage of pre-conventional moral reasoning. Furthermore, differences in pre-conventional response rate among high, medium, and low church attenders are not statistically significant ($F_{2,198} = .27$, NS). We may conclude that hypotheses (E) and (F) are supported.

TABLE 25

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR PRE-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE RATE: 3-FACTOR DESIGN*

SOURCE	SS	DF	F	P
TREATMENT	214.81	2	1.84	NS
ATTENDANCE	31.41	2	.27	NS
RELIGION	50.53	1	.87	NS
T x A	173.74	4	.74	NS
T x R	111.89	2	.96	NS
A x R	59.36	2	.51	NS
T x A x R	22.36	4	.09	NS
ERROR	11519.80	198		

*Effects removed in descending order.

Hypothesis (G) is also supported. Analysis of covariance was computed for both the 3- and 2-factor designs in order to test the prediction that the regression of response rate on dogmatism indicates that the two variables are not significantly related. As predicted, the relationship between dogmatism and response rate is not statistically significant in the 3-factor design ($F_{1,197} = .48$, NS); nor is it statistically significant in the 2-factor design ($F_{1,290} = 2.18$, NS).

V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The purpose of this study was to empirically test the sixteen propositions stated in the conclusion of the third chapter.

The 680 subjects who took part in this investigation were randomly selected from the freshman student body enrolled in introductory sociology classes at The University of Alberta. Three sub-samples were randomly drawn from this subject pool on the basis of three forms of a moral judgment questionnaire which they had completed. The intention

was to determine whether the three questionnaire forms would elicit qualitatively different moral judgments. Each sub-sample consisted of 50 males and 50 females and the mean age of the total sample (n = 300) was 18.4 years.

Of the twenty-eight hypotheses generated from the sixteen propositions, twenty-five received empirical support. On the basis of this result it may be concluded that the theoretical orientation on adolescent moral judgment making outlined in the third chapter is a reasonable one. Of particular importance are the following propositions which have been supported by the results of the study:

1. That moral judgments vary qualitatively from one moral dilemma to another.

2. That stage 3 moral reasoning is the orientation most likely to be employed when judging dilemmas which implicate one's "primary-others."

3. That being open-minded is a necessary but not sufficient condition underlying post-conventional moral reasoning.

VI. DISCUSSION

In this section of the chapter we will first turn to a discussion of the three hypotheses which were not supported by the data. These hypotheses (i.e., hypothesis (C) for stages 3 and 4 and hypothesis (A) for pre-conventional response rate) were derived from the following propositions:

F(2) When the person implicated in the moral dilemma is a "stranger," males will utilize a stage 4 orientation to a greater extent than females.

F(3) When the person implicated in the moral dilemma is a "stranger," females will utilize a stage 3 orientation to a greater extent than males.

B(4) The utilization of pre-conventional moral reasoning will be decreased when the other implicated in the moral dilemma is a "primary" other.

The second set of findings which must be considered are the unexpected results involving: (a) the sex x moral dilemma interactions noted for response rate at stages 3 and 4, (b) the observation that males respond more frequently at the post-conventional moral level, and (c) the sex x treatment interaction observed at stage 3.

A. Hypotheses Which Were Not Supported

The above analysis failed to find support for the two hypothesized sex differences predicted for the first questionnaire treatment (i.e., hypothesis (C) for stage 4 and 3 response rate). It will be recalled that hypothesis (C) was incorporated into this investigation in an attempt to corroborate Kohlberg and Kramers' (1969) observation that males respond predominantly at stage 4 while females respond predominantly at stage 3. This hypothesis was predicted for the first treatment since it is only this treatment which is comparable to Kohlberg's original questionnaire.

It has been reported that hypothesis (C) for both stage 4 and 3 response rate was not supported by the data. This inconsistency between Kohlberg and Kramers' observation and the present investigation may be explained by differences in the sample characteristics of the two studies and, more generally, by reference to the "social involvement thesis."

Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) were observing a sample of adolescents and young adults which they had been studying longitudinally for

approximately 10 years. These authors observed females responding predominantly at stage 3 and attributed this fact to the proposition that a stage 3 orientation was the most adaptive one for housewives to employ in their judgments. One may accept this appeal to the "social involvement thesis" as a reasonable justification for what many housewives may employ as their moral orientation. The point which must be stressed is that many of Kohlberg and Kramers' female respondents were, in fact, married and playing housewife roles when they were last studied. Herein may lie the reason for the present investigation's failure to confirm the Kohlberg and Kramer observation. All the respondents surveyed for the current study, both male and female, were enrolled as freshmen in university. Given this fact, one would not expect the males to respond in a significantly different fashion from Kohlberg and Kramers' male subjects. However, one would expect the females to be more similar to the males, given that both sexes are more or less equally involved in the same social milieu. Thus, it is the gross similarity of their present social experiences which may account for the failure to find significant differences between males and females within treatment one.

The last prediction which was not supported by the results was hypothesis (A) for pre-conventional response rate. This hypothesis predicted that the usage of a pre-conventional moral orientation would decrease in treatments two and three. The assumption underlying this hypothesis was that most respondents would realize the egocentric qualities of such an orientation especially when employed in judging dilemmas implicating a "primary-other."

For reasons similar to the above, it was predicted that response rate at stages 1 and 2 would vary by moral dilemma. This hypothesis was supported and, in retrospect, the variation in the means noted for this dilemma effect was what one might expect, with response rate being low for dilemmas 3, 4, and 7 while it was high for dilemma 1. This pattern is "what one might expect" given that dilemmas 3, 4, and 7 clearly involve the "needs" of others while dilemma 1 focuses more upon the property or contractual-legalistic rights of the other implicated. Again, the assumption is that a pre-conventional orientation would be less likely used by adolescents in judging situations similar to those depicted in dilemmas 3, 4, and 7 because of the emphasis which these dilemmas place upon such themes as emotional stress, physical suffering, and deceitfulness.

One may now ask why pre-conventional response rate did not decrease significantly in the two "primary-other" questionnaire treatments. It seems reasonable to assume that a "primary-other" implicated in most moral dilemmas would conjure up in the respondent's mind a general moral orientation similar to that which we have assumed is elicited by the themes of emotional stress, etc. For the moment there is one explanation which can be offered for the fact that this expectation was not supported. We refer to the possibility that the questionnaire format employed in the present investigation was not sufficiently stimulating to produce variation attributable to the identity of the "other" implicated in the dilemma. It may be that the manipulation of pre-conventional response rate in the direction originally predicted can only be achieved in environments which are more realistic than a paper and pencil exercise.

B. Unexpected Results

The sex x moral dilemma interactions observed for stage 4 and 3 response rate are difficult to explain consistently. To this writer's knowledge there has not been an investigation using the Kohlberg instrument which has reported either a statistically significant effect due to variation in moral dilemma or due to a sex x moral dilemma interaction. On the contrary, Kohlberg (1958, 1968) and Kramer (1968) consistently report that moral judgments do not vary in significant fashion across the dilemmas employed to elicit them.

The only work providing information which can be partially compared with the present findings is the research conducted by Bull (1969a: 82-83). Unfortunately, however, Bull did not employ the Kohlberg instrument in his study and thus we must be cautious in comparing the present findings with those reported by him.

The present investigation contains two dilemmas which may be used in making comparisons with Bull's work. Dilemmas 3 and 7 are close approximations to two of Bull's stories; the first dealing with "saving a life," and the second concerning "stealing and deceit." Recalling the four-stage typology which Bull employs to score his subjects' responses (i.e., anomy, heteronomy, socionomy, and autonomy) he reports that in the "saving a life" situation, boys (age 15 years) were much more heteronomous in their orientation. Comparing this finding with the pattern observed for dilemma 3 in the present investigation, we conclude that our data do not support Bull's finding. On the contrary, the pattern observed for dilemma 3 is quite the opposite with girls employing a more heteronomous moral orientation. However, on dilemma 7, which closely resembles Bull's "stealing and deceit" situation, the results of

the two investigations are similar with males being more heteronomous than girls.

Basing his perspective on McDougall's (1963: 175) work as well as on his observation that girls consistently surpassed boys in their usage of socionomy, Bull suggests that girls have the "innate advantages of moral equipment and insight" (1969a: 88). It is through our recognition of this "innate advantage," Bull insists, that we will find the key to the successful investigation and understanding of sex differences. We feel that the evidence is far from adequate to justify utilizing an explanation based on "innate moral differences" between the sexes during adolescence. The findings of the present investigation, including the partial support for Bull's observations as well as the failure to confirm hypothesis (C) for stage 3 and 4 response rate, warn us against accepting an explanation of this sort. Other than drawing these comparisons with Bull's results, we do not have any explanation for the sex x moral dilemma interactions which have been observed. A general perspective which may shed some light on the matter will be mentioned in passing when the "social involvement thesis" is discussed.

Another unexpected sex difference which was observed in the present study concerned the greater response rate for males at Kohlberg's post-conventional moral stages. As was stated earlier, this finding supports Graham's (1972: 250) work with the Kohlberg instrument and contradicts Bull's (1969a) observation that by late adolescence the sexes are similar in their usage of autonomy. At first glance, it would seem that a cognitive-developmental perspective provides an adequate explanation for this sex difference at the post-conventional level.

Kohlberg would probably suggest that male superiority at stages 5 and 6 is a function of their greater experience and practice with stage 4 reasoning. For the present study this explanation does not suffice given the fact that there were no significant differences observed between the sexes in terms of stage 4 response rate.

Perhaps a more suitable explanation for the greater moral maturity exhibited by males can be found in the explanation offered by Kohlberg (1964) for the greater moral maturity of the middle- and upper-classes. That is to say, it may be the case that being a male provides one with more experience in "roles entailing more participation and responsibility" (Kohlberg, 1964: 406-407) with such experience leading to greater moral maturity.

The last sex effect which must be noted has to do with the sex x treatment interaction observed in terms of stage 3 response rate. It will be recalled that the most dramatic difference between the sexes occurred within treatment two. This suggests that males and females orient themselves toward same-sex friendships in different fashion with males utilizing to a greater extent a stage 3 orientation. De Beauvoir argues that whereas men achieve a genuine bond and "communicate as individuals through ideas and projects of personal interest" (1968: 511) womens' "feeling rarely rises to such genuine friendship" (1968: 513).

She explains this difference between the qualitative aspects of male and female same-sex friendships with the following:

> Women feel their solidarity more spontaneously than men; but within this solidarity the transcendence of each does not go out toward the others, for they all face together toward the masculine world, whose values they wish to monopolize each for herself. Their relations are not constructed on their individualities, but

immediately experienced in generality; and from this arises at once an element of hostility (513).

Simone De Beauvoir's perception of male and female friendships appears relevant to the sex x treatment interaction about which we are speaking. Clearly, however, further research is required into the nature of same-sex friendships before any conclusive comments can be made regarding their impact on moral judgment making.

It is clear from the above discussion that more questions have been raised about sex differences than explanations offered for them. It may be, as Graham (1972: 251) suggests, that "it is only for the few who have genuine superegos that we should expect to find any real difference between the sexes."

One perspective which can be reasonably brought to bear on the subject of sex differences is Kohlberg and Kramers' (1969) "social involvement thesis." This perspective argues that differences between the sexes' moral orientations may be best explained by the idea that males are more involved in one set of social circumstances while females are more involved in another. This appeal to "involvement in different roles" as the explanation for the sex differences which have been observed suggests, of course, that adolescent sex differences in moral judgment are not differences to be considered as being particularly stable ones. On the contrary, the "social involvement thesis" would predict that as role-involvement changes, so do sex differences in moral judgment styles.[8]

As an "after the fact" explanation, the "social involvement thesis" achieves a certain descriptive utility and appears to be at present the most adequate line of reasoning which we have at our

disposal for explaining the various findings concerning the variable of sex. As was noted in Chapter 3 the attractive feature of this type of explanation is its apparent consistency with our theoretical orientation. Clearly, however, such an explanation should be evaluated in terms of its predictive utility.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The cell means for each design x dependent variable combination can be found in Appendix VII.

[2]Blishen's scale (1961), "A Socio-Economic Index for Occupations in Canada" was employed in the present study. The occupational rankings in this scale are based on a combined measure of the variables of income and education. In this investigation, the range of codings was from a low of 28.03 ("labourers, railway transport") to a high of 76.44 ("dentists") with a mean of 49.79 and a standard deviation of 15.54. For the present analysis, these socio-economic status rankings were recoded into the three categories of high, medium, and low. The cut-points were as follows:

Low S.E.S.: 28.03 to 39.54 (n = 100)
Medium S.E.S.: 39.66 to 55.19 (n = 101)
High S.E.S.: 55.22 to 76.44 (n = 99)

[3]In the present study, Roman Catholics (n = 62) and Ukrainian Catholics (n = 11) were combined to form the Catholic category. The Protestant category consisted of Anglicans (n = 43), Presbyterians (n = 8), and members of the United Church (n = 92). "Others," including Baptists, Lutherans, members of the Greek Orthodox Church, etc., were excluded from the analysis.

[4]The range of codings for frequency of church attendance was from a low of 1 (never) to a high of 9 (several times a week) (see Appendix III). The median value for this variable was 3.59. For the present analysis, frequency of church attendance was recoded into the three categories of low, medium, and high. The cut-points were as follows:

Low: 1 to 3 (n = 145)
Medium: 4 to 6 (n = 86)
High: 7 to 9 (n = 69)

[5]Along with Rokeach (1960), we have assumed that the Dogmatism Scale represents an interval level of measurement. S. Labovitz (1970: 515-524) argues that most ordinal data can be treated as thought it was interval and that such manipulation yields the following advantages:

(1) the use of more powerful, sensitive, better developed and interpretable statistics with known sampling error,

> (2) the retention of more knowledge about the characteristics of the data, and (3) greater versatility in statistical manipulation... (523).

[6]The adjusted means given by the analysis of covariance appear in Table 2 of Appendix VII.

[7]The adjusted means given by the analysis of covariance appear in Table 3 of Appendix VII.

[8]As far as the sex x moral dilemma interactions are concerned, we would suggest further research with the goal of specifying more clearly the relationships which may exist between "types" of modal milieu involvements and "types" of modal orientations toward "types" of moral dilemmas.

CHAPTER 6

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The theoretical rationale and research findings reported in the preceding chapters suggest several implications concerning the nature of moral judgment. This final chapter will discuss these implications and offer the concluding comment for the investigation.

I. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The conceptualization of moral judgment employed in the present study has been based upon a synthesis of cognitive-developmental and symbolic interactionist premises. Rather than understanding moral judgments as being dictated by "character-type," "attitude," or "modal predisposition to judge," we have analyzed them as decisions stemming from a judger's active attempt to construct what he considers to be a meaningful response to a moral dilemma. The conceptualization offered as a description of the judgment process suggested that "standpoints" and "definitions of the situation" are adapted to the respondent's relevant moral structure; this process of adaptation being analogous to that process more commonly known as role-taking. It was concluded that if this conceptualization was adequate in dealing with the explanatory problems raised by judgmental variation, then it would be necessary to reconceptualize the role played by earlier acquired, less differentiated moral structures. Specifically, it was argued that these structures

remain as utilizable components of a respondent's moral reasoning capabilities. Finally, the emphasis placed upon the concepts of "standpoint" and the "definition of the situation" led us to hypothesize that varying the identity of the "other" implicated in the moral dilemma would produce variation in the quality of the moral judgments made by respondents. Similarly, it was expected that moral reasoning would also vary across the four dilemmas presented to the respondents.

With this brief review of the theoretical rationale in mind, we can now turn to a consideration of several implications which follow from the present investigation. These implications concern the following areas of the moral judgment literature: (a) the stability-specificity debate, (b) the conceptual adequacy of a linear model of the development of moral judgment, and (c) the task of defining the nature of a "mature" moral judgment.

A. The Stability-Specificity Debate

One of the theoretical issues which the present investigation has attempted to resolve is the question of whether moral judgments vary from situation to situation or whether they are stable manifestations of some consistent tendency to judge.

It is clear from the stage typologies of several writers that a developmental theory of the acquisition of stages of moral reasoning provides an adequate perspective on the subject of moral development. These various typologies, however, have been interpreted by some as implying that the acquisition of a more advanced moral structure implies that most subsequent judgments will be manifestations of that particular structure. It was concluded that those who adopted this view of the

matter had to rely upon the theory of stage mixture to explain the judgmental variation they had observed in their studies. It was also noted that while this reliance upon the theory of stage mixture provides a reasonable explanation for the variation observed in the judgments of children, it does not suffice as a tenable explanation for that variation observed in samples of young adults.

The problem appears to be that the specificity of moral judgments has been interpreted by some writers as representing a threat to the conceptual adequacy of cognitive-developmental theory. However, there does not seem to be any sound reason for interpreting the relevance of judgmental variation in this manner. The view of stage hierarchization described in the third chapter attests to the adequacy of our argument that there is no necessary contradiction between the following two facts: (a) the acquisition of moral structures on the one hand, and (b) observed judgmental variation on the other. It was suggested that various moral structures are acquired during development and remain in use and it is this assumption which explains why variation in moral judgment has been consistently observed by researchers. Kay (1970: 235) is in agreement with this view of the matter. He states:

> In discussions of morality it must be recognized that there are a whole series of qualitatively different 'moralities' which operate with the same person at different times ... Psychologically, this is rather important, for it suggests that when a person moves from a higher morality to a lower, one does not have to speak of regression, ... one has merely to accept that in this instance the moral agent has used an accessible 'morality.' (Emphasis added.)

The key to understanding that the stability-specificity debate does not represent an insurmountable conceptual obstacle lies in our recognition of the fact that cognitive-developmental theory provides an

explanation for the occurrence of two psychological phenomena. It explains both: (a) the acquisition of several "stable" moral orientations, and (b) the derivation of meaning as a process partially contingent upon present environmental stimuli. The cognitive-developmental explanation for the acquisition of moral structures stresses the idea of a constant interaction between organism and environment, an interaction which does not cease to have an impact on the mind once cognitive structures have been equilibrated. If the opposite were true one would have to describe the growth of knowledge in terms of a progression toward, rather than away from, egocentricity. Again, the importance of this theoretical orientation lies in its emphasis upon the fact that the process of adaptation never amounts to being a mere ritual.

We do not mean to imply that equilibrated moral structures must be continually reconstructed when a moral judgment is made. On the contrary, the nature of the environmental stimulus may be such as to elicit a more or less "habitual" moral response in some situations. If it may be assumed, however, that the moral dilemmas used in the present investigation are, in fact, perceived as dilemmas, then by definition they function to create a situation which requires that the respondent construct what he considers to be an adequate judgment.

Focusing on the moral judgment as based upon a process involving an active construction of meaning indicates the importance of recognizing the role played by the particular nature of various dilemmas. The hypothesis that the varying characteristics of moral dilemmas presented to a respondent represents an important variable to consider is borne out by the fact that the four dilemmas used in the present

study produced significant variation in the proportion of all categories of moral judgments elicited. The conclusion which can be drawn is that several moral structures are acquired through development, remain in use, and are brought into play selectively, depending upon the particular characteristics of the moral dilemmas presented. Given this observation, it is suggested that the question of whether or not moral judgments are "stable" is a somewhat misleading question to ask. It would appear that the stability of judgments might better be understood as being a function of the "best fit" between one of several equilibrated moral structures and an infinite number of environmental stimuli configurations. Only in this sense may moral judgments be said to be stable. It is in this same sense, however, that they may also be said to be variable.

B. The Conceptual Adequacy of a Linear Model of Moral Development

The theoretical rationale underlying the present investigation was prompted in large part by the works of two prominent sociologists. The writings of both Cooley (1962) and Durkheim (1961) led us to perceive Kohlberg's two stages of conventional morality as representing a compartmentalized dichotomy. As was noted, this conceptualization of stages 3 and 4 can be defined in terms of two different role-taking standpoints: a "primary-other" standpoint in the case of stage 3 and a "generalized-other" standpoint in the case of stage 4. This theoretical distinction between Kohlberg's two conventional moral stages as representing conflicting viewpoints and the fact that the hypotheses generated from it received empirical support, suggests that Kohlberg's linear model of moral development may not be an accurate one. What can be

suggested as a more appropriate alternative is a model depicting the bifurcation, after stage 2, of the developing moral orientations of stages 3 and 4.[1]

In reference to his linear six stage model, Kohlberg argues that a more advanced stage displaces a less advanced one because respondents recognize that the former represents a more adequate moral orientation. This relationship between more and less differentiated moral viewpoints, Kohlberg insists, holds for any possible comparison of stages. Thus, it is held that a respondent will always prefer stage 2 to stage 1 reasoning, stage 6 to stage 5 reasoning, etc. By suggesting that a bifurcation model is more appropriate than a linear model, we are questioning Kohlberg's stage-displacement hypothesis. Specifically, we are suggesting that the acquisition of stage 4 does not imply the displacement of stage 3. This argument is, of course, one particular manifestation of our general thesis concerning stage hierarchization which asserts that the acquisition of any moral structure need not imply the displacement of lower structures. The usage of any stage is partially contingent upon the "definition of the situation" constructed by the respondent, and respondents may define as more appropriate the utilization of less differentiated stages in certain circumstances.

The present investigation has concentrated upon the application of this stage hierarchization argument to the relationship existing between stages 3 and 4. One reason why a bifurcation model of conventional morality is being suggested stems from our successful manipulation of the proportion of stage 3 and 4 responses observed (see Appendix VI). Another reason why this model appears to be more appro-

priate follows from our recognition that the development of a stage 3 "good-boy/good-girl" moral orientation is dependent upon socialization factors which are different from those leading to a stage 4 orientation.

The stage 4 orientation has been labelled a "generalized-other" orientation in order to indicate that it represents a respondent's moral view of the normative expectations of his social environment. The acquisition of a stage 4 orientation appears to require, at minimum, the ability to generalize the normative expectations learned during early person-to-person interactions to society as a whole. In Mead's (1965) terminology, this process represents the attainment of a "generalized-other" definition of self acquired by the transition from the "play" to the "game" stage. It is this definition of self, Mead suggests, which provides the basis for the expectations we hold regarding the "appropriate behavior" of any social actor.

In contrast to stage 4 normative reasoning, the "concern for others" which mediates stage 3 reasoning, "develops much earlier in a child's life and does not require the same level of conceptual development to be operative" (Peters, 1971: 246). Wright (1971: 149) informs us that the major variables conditioning the child's concern for others are: (a) an affectionate relationship with parents, (b) parents providing the child with examples of altruistic behavior, (c) parents providing the child with justification of altruistic behaviors, and (d) parents providing the child with the rewards of pleasure and approval when he engages in altruistic behavior.

The work of Cooley (1962: 42) suggests that the ability to generalize to outsiders the altruism and sympathy learned within the context of the family, and, more generally, primary relationships, is a

task not easily accomplished. Wright (1971: 149) also recognizes this difficulty when he states that it is the responsibility of the parents to encourage the child to "extend his altruistic tendencies to people outside his immediate circle of family and friends." Finally, a similar idea is expressed by Piaget (1965) when he speaks of "equitable moral judgments" being mediated by the "special relations of affection" (283). (It will be recalled that an "equitable judgment" is a judgment which does not adhere to strict normative expectations.) Given these comments it may be easily seen why we have labelled the stage 3 moral orientation a "primary-other" orientation.

In support of the concept of bifurcation, then, the distinction being made is between a stage 4 "concern for responsibility" and a stage 3 "concern for the needs of others." The acquisition of stage 4 reasoning appears to be a function of the application of operational thought to the normative standards learned in specific interactions. It can be seen in Appendix I that the utilization of stage 4 reasoning attempts to construct an adequate generalization of societal expectations to all individuals and is motivated by an avoidance of guilt. Thus, because of its generalizing activity, it subordinates the specific individual implicated in the moral dilemma to normative sanctions applicable to all. In contrast, stage 3 reasoning appears to have its roots in early, affectively charged, interpersonal relationships and it is motivated by "shame." By definition, its role-taking standpoint consists of the "needs" of others and thus, it focuses primarily on these "needs" rather than upon generalized normative expectations.

There are, then, two characteristics which differentiate these two conventional moral orientations from one another. Stage 4 reasoning

is motivated by the avoidance of "guilt" and role-takes the "generalized-other standpoint." Stage 3 reasoning is motivated by the avoidance of "shame" and role-takes the "primary-other standpoint."

The concept of bifurcation, however, is used in the present work to imply something more than the recognition that stage 3 reasoning is "more appropriate" for judging "primary-others." What we also wish to convey by this concept of bifurcation is that respondents compartmentalize stage 3 and 4 reasoning because these reasoning processes are contradictory (i.e., the standpoints of "identification" and "depersonalized norm" present the respondent with a conflict between "primary-other" and "generalized-other" expectations, respectively). This assertion regarding comparmentalization appears to have been supported given the significant decrease noted earlier in the proportion of stage 4 responses within the two "primary-other" questionnaire treatments. It may be concluded that the respondents who took part in the present investigation felt that not only was stage 3 reasoning appropriate for judging dilemmas implicating their "best friends" or "mothers," but also that stage 4 reasoning was not appropriate for the same task (see Appendix VI).

The above discussion suggesting the necessity of employing a bifurcation model is important because it suffices as a more accurate description of moral development. It is also important because it suggests that moral training requires an emphasis not only upon cognitive maturation but also upon encouraging the child to generalize a concern for the needs of others to those with whom he is not personally involved.[2] However, given Cooley's (1962) analysis and the more recent research conducted by Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) which reported a low

incidence of stage 5 and 6 usage in the populations they studied, it can be concluded that our attempts to encourage children to reason maturely are often not successful. It may be that the goal of achieving the required synthesis of the rational and altruistic components of morality is inhibited by the institutionalized moral orientation of society. People may have difficulty maintaining a morally mature view of the world when the social organization in which they exist sanctions both the reasoning and behavior of a stage 4 orientation.[3]

C. The Nature of Mature Moral Judgments

The theoretical rationale underlying the present investigation has emphasized the role played by the factor of cognition in the making of moral judgments. It was argued that "mature" moral judgments were necessarily mediated by cognitive processes of greater complexity in comparison with those processes required to make conventional or pre-conventional judgments.

From the discussion concerning the "open and closed" mind it was concluded that having an open mind was a necessary though not sufficient condition for making "mature" or post-conventional moral responses. This conclusion was derived from the theoretical rationale which assumed that an open-mind was a cognitively complex mind. The conceptual analogy which was drawn between cognitive complexity and "multiple role-taking" led us to hypothesize an inverse relationship between post-conventional response rate and dogmatism. It will be recalled that this hypothesis was confirmed and thus our attempt to obtain a cognitively-based definition of a mature moral judgment appears to have been successful.

The outcome of this attempt to define the nature of a mature moral judgment is a significant one in that it offers support for Kohlberg's contention that post-conventional responses are, in fact, based upon more cognitively complex reasoning processes. It must be noted, however, that this manner of defining the nature of a mature moral judgment tells one very little, if anything at all, about what the content of such judgments should be. Kohlberg (1971: 223) has recently asserted, however, that the fact of universal stage progression provides us with the key for designating the "ought" of morality. He states:

> The scientific theory as to why people factually do move upward from stage to stage, and why they factually do prefer a higher stage to a lower, is broadly the same as a moral theory as to why people should prefer a higher stage to a lower.

What Kohlberg is suggesting is that the further one has moved along his six-stage sequence, the more moral one's judgments become. With this argument Kohlberg is making a leap from "is to ought"; a leap from the fact that mature moral judgments are more cognitively complex to the assertion that they are superior in the sense of being more moral. Alston (1971) has expressed disagreement with Kohlberg's reasoning. He suggests that Kohlberg's leap from "is to ought" commits the naturalistic fallacy of deriving prescriptions of value from statements of fact and thus fails to be a convincing argument. Alston accuses Kohlberg of choosing a definition of "moral" which is based upon personal preference. Alston does go on to suggest that there is nothing wrong with investigating the development of moral reasoning "according to some arbitrarily selected criterion of "moral" " (1971:277). What Alston does object to, however, is expressed in the following quotation:

> But if he (Kohlberg) wants to use the developmental approximations to the purely moral in his sense as a basis for pronouncements as to how people ought to reason in their action-guiding deliberations, that is another matter. If these pronouncements are to carry any weight he will have to show that this sense of 'moral' which is functioning as his standard has itself some recommendation other than congeniality to his predilections (1971: 277).

It may be concluded that though the observed relationship between dogmatism and post-conventional response rate lends support to the cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgment, it does not bring us any closer to deriving a universally acceptable scheme of normative ethics. As Alston states, Kohlberg's definition of the "form" of what is to be regarded as moral represents the opinion of one moral philosopher and moral philosophers "agree no more about what is distinctive about the moral than about anything else" (1971: 276).

II. CONCLUSION

This investigation has illustrated the utility of conceptualizating the process of making moral judgments within the context of the "on-going social act." It is believed that this theoretical approach to understanding the nature of moral judgments is a productive one in that it incorporates an awareness of the role played by situationally specific meanings and affect in the judgment process. Perhaps the most important contribution of this exercise has been its ability to synthesize into a meaningful theoretical perspective the polar expectations of stability and specificity.

In concluding, it should be emphasized that this investigation has been rather restrictive in that it has been concerned primarily with the phenomenon of moral judgment making. Earlier it was argued

that the concepts of "habit," "attitude," or "character" were not very useful to the study of moral judgment because of their procrustean search for stability as the defining characteristic of the judgment process.[4] We do not wish to imply, however, that these concepts are inapplicable to a more general concern with the subject of moral development. On the contrary, it is precisely for this purpose that the importance of these concepts becomes obvious. For example, one of the most vexing problems for those interested in moral development and, more specifically, moral education, has to do with the discrepancy between moral thought and moral behavior. In any attempt to explain the hiatus between thought and behavior one must turn to the concepts of "habit," "attitude," or "character" for guidance. It is these concepts which point to the important role played in moral development by the variables of external reinforcement and self-punitive controls such as guilt, shame, or self-condemnation.[5] A consideration of the impact of these variables as well as others is essential in order to formulate the perspective necessary to gain a fuller understanding of moral development. Hopefully, the present work explicating certain aspects of the moral judgment process makes a substantive contribution to this task.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Other bifurcation models of moral development have been suggested by Peck and Havighurst (1960) and Wright (1971). These models, however, are not specifically addressed to Kohlberg's stage typology.

[2]The importance of achieving this synthesis of cognitive and affective variables has been recognized by both Peck and Havighurst (1960) and Wright (1971) who have called their most mature character types "rational-altruistic" and "altruistic-autonomous", respectively. In the words of another author:

> True morality subordinates rules to persons. It involves all the orectic, non-cognitive sentiments that flow between persons. Hence the vital place in moral education of the shaping of attitudes towards others (Bull, 1969a: 126).

[3]It seems reasonable to assume that modern industrial society, or for that matter almost any society, maintains and encourages primarily a stage 4 moral ideology.

To this writers knowledge, there has not been any research conducted which has attempted to investigate the impact which a "stage 4 social organization" may have upon persons' attempts to maintain post-conventional moral orientations. Such a research endeavour would certainly provide a feasible test of Piaget's theory concerning the role played by the variables of constraint and cooperation in both moral development and the utilization of particular moral viewpoints.

Some evidence does exist, however, which suggests the importance of embarking upon such a research programme. We refer to Kohlberg's (1969: 358-359) research on the development of the subjective awareness of dreams. He reports that the stage sequence of this development is the same across all of the cultures which he has studied. He notes, however, that in the case of the Atayal (a Malaysian group on Formosa) the cultural beliefs concerning the <u>reality</u> of dreams functions to reverse the acquisition of the subjective awareness which has been attained by late childhood.

[4]We have contended that these concepts are not essential in formulating a perspective on the act of making moral judgments because they stand as the conceptual antithesis to the notion of the judgment as an active construction of meaning within the context of the social act. As Alston states:

> ... if you want to find out what sort of moral reasoning a subject does, you have to get him to do some, which means that you have to present him with a problem (real or imaginary) that calls for reasoning. ... Now there is no doubt that it is just situations of this kind (i.e., Kohlberg's moral dilemmas) in which reasoning looms largest, as over against affect and habitual response... (1971: 284).

[5]Alston (1971: 280) shows his agreement with our concern with these variables when he states:

> ... it may be the case that when one does not act in accordance with one's moral judgment, it is because the judgment lacks the extra push that comes from an association between violation of it and guilt-feelings.

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APPENDIX I

KOHLBERG'S STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

KOHLBERG'S STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT -- TWO BASIC ASPECTS

LEVELS	STAGES	MOTIVATION	VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE
1. Pre-conventional age. 4-10 conformist based on physical consequences exploits loopholes in power structure.	1. Orientation toward punishment -unquestioning defference to superior powers. -physical consequences determine goodness or badness of act.	Obey rules to avoid punishment.	Confusion of value of human life with value of physical objects or status. "Keep important people alive in a shipwreck."
	2. Satisfaction of one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others - marketing, pragmatic mentality.	Conform to obtain reward or have favors returned.	Human life valued as means of satisfying needs of its possessor or others. "Don't kill wife; husband needs her."
2. Conventional value placed on maintaining rules and expectations of others. Interested not only in conforming to social order, but in maintaining and justifying this order.	3. Good-boy/good-girl orientation. Good behavior is what pleases or helps others, and is approved by them. One seeks approval by being "nice." Behavior judged by good intention and "well-meaning."	Conform to avoid disapproval.	Value of human life based on empathy and affection of others. "Don't kill wife; husband loves her."

(continued)

KOHLBERG'S STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT -- TWO BASIC ASPECTS

LEVELS	STAGES	MOTIVATION	VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE
	4. Maintenance of social order, authority and fixed rules. Respectability comes from doing duty.	Conform to avoid censure by authorities followed by guilt feelings.	Life is sacred in terms of its place in a categorical moral or religious order. "Don't kill woman; no human has right to take a life."
3. Post-conventional. Thrust towards autonomous moral principles valid apart from authority and without identification with authority.	5. Contractual, legalistic orientation. Right action "is agreed upon by whole society." Awareness of relativeness of human values. Duty defined in terms of contract with others, particularly majority.	Conform to maintain respect of impartial spectator, judging in terms of community welfare.	Life is valued in terms of its relation to community welfare. "Don't kill woman not only because she has a right to live, but to do so would threaten the lives of all human beings."
	6. Orientation toward decisions of conscience and self-chosen ethical principles. Mutual respect and trust.	Conform to avoid self-condemnation.	Universal value and respect for worth of individual. "Don't let her die - life worth more than material."

APPENDIX II

KOHLBERG'S ORIGINAL MORAL DILEMMAS

KOHLBERG'S ORIGINAL MORAL DILEMMAS

Situation 1

Joe is a 14 year old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go if he saved up the money for it himself. So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved up the $40.00 it cost to go to camp and a little more besides. But just before camp was going to start, his father changed his mind. Some of his friends decided to go on a special fishing trip, and Joe's father was short of the money it would cost. So he told Joe to give him the money he had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thought of refusing to give his father the money.

Should Joe refuse to give his father the money? Why?

Situation 2

Joe wanted to go to camp but he was afraid to refuse to give his father the money. So he gave his father $10.00 and told him that was all he made. He took the other $40.00 and paid for camp with it. He told his father the head of the camp said he could pay later. So he went off to camp, and the father didn't go on the fishing trip.

Before Joe went to camp, told his older brother, Alexander, that he really made $50.00 and he lied to his father and said he'd made $10.00. Alexander wonders should tell his father or not.

Should Alexander, the older brother, tell their father that Joe had lied about the money or should he keep quiet about what Joe had done? Why?

Situation 3

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200.00 for the radium and charged $2,000.00 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000.00 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz have done that? Was it actually wrong or right? Why?

Situation 4

The drug didn't work, and there was no other treatment known to medicine which could save Heinz's wife, so the doctor knew that she had only about 6 months to live. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough ether to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and she was going to die in a few months anyway.

Should the doctor do what she asks and give her the drug that will make her die? Why?

Situation 5

In Korea a company of Marines was "way outnumbered and was retreating before the enemy. The company had crossed a bridge over a river, but the enemy were mostly still on the other side. If someone went back to the bridge and glew it up as the enemy were coming over it, it would weaken the enemy. With the head start the rest of the men in the company would have, they could probably then escape. But the man who stayed back to blow up the bridge would probably not be able to escape alive; there would be about a 4 to 1 chance he would be killed. The captain of the company has to decide who should go back and do the job. The captain himself is the man who knows best how to lead the retreat. He asks for volunteers, but no one will volunteer. If he goes himself, the men will probably not get back safely and he is the only one who knows how to lead the retreat.

Should the captain order a man to go on this very dangerous mission or should he go himself? Why?

Situation 6

The captain finally decided to order one of the men to stay behind. One of the men he thought of was one who had a lot of strength and courage but he was a bad trouble maker. He was always stealing things from the other men, beating them up and wouldn't do his work. The second man he thought of had gotten a bad disease in Korea and was likely to die in a short time anyway, though he was strong enough to do the job.

Should the captain send the trouble maker or the sick man? Why?

Situation 7

Several years later, the grown up brothers had gotten into serious trouble. They were secretly leaving town in a hurry and needed money. Alex the older one, broke into a store and stole $500.00. Joe, the younger one, went to a retired old man who was known to help people in town. Joe told the man that he was very sick and he needed $500.00

to pay for the operation. Really he wasn't sick at all, and he had no intention of paying the man back. Although the man didn't know Joe very well, he loaned him the money. So Joe and Alex skipped town, each with $500.00.

If you had to say who did worse, would you say Alex did worse to break into the store and steal the $500.00, or Joe did worse to borrow the $500.00 with no intention of paying it back? Why?

Situation 8

While all this was happening, Heinz was in jail for breaking in and trying to steal the medicine. He had been sentenced for 10 years. But after a couple of years, he escaped from the prison and went to live in another part of the country under a new name. He saved money and slowly built up a big factory. He gave his workers the highest wages and used most of his profits to build a hospital for work in curing cancer. Twenty years passed when a tailor recognized the factory owner as being Heinz, the escaped convict whom the police had been looking for back in his home town.

Should the tailor report Heinz to the police? Would it be right or wrong to keep it quiet? Why?

Situation 9

During the war in Europe, a city was often bombed by the enemy. So each man in the city was given a post he was to go to right after the bombing to help put out the fires the bombs started and to rescue people in the burning buildings. A man named Diesing was made the chief in charge of one fire engine post. The post was near where he worked so he could get there quickly during the day, but it was a long way from his home. One day there was a very heavy bombing and Diesing left the shelter in the place he worked and went toward his fire station. But when he saw how much of the city was burning he got worried about his family. So he decided he had to go home first to see if his family was safe, even though his home was a long way off and the station was nearby and there was somebody assigned to protect his family's area.

Was it right or wrong for Diesing to leave his station to protect his family? Why?

APPENDIX III

COLLECTION OF ATTRIBUTE INFORMATION

ATTRIBUTE INFORMATION

PLEASE FILL IN THE REQUIRED INFORMATION

I.D. Number: _____

Age: _____ years Sex: M____ F____

What was your high school graduation average? (Please report your answer in percentages) _____%

Is this your first year at university? Yes_____ No_____

(If no, how many years have you been attending? _____years.)

What is your religion?

_____ Anglican
_____ Baptist
_____ Greek Orthodox
_____ Jewish
_____ Lutheran
_____ Mennonite
_____ Pentecostal
_____ Presbyterian
_____ Roman Catholic
_____ Salvation Army
_____ Ukrainian Catholic
_____ United Church

Other; write here _____

How often do you attend your church or synagogue?

_____ Never
_____ Less than once a year
_____ About once a year
_____ Several times a year
_____ About once a month
_____ Two to three times a month
_____ Nearly every week
_____ Every week
_____ Several times a week

To what ethnic or cultural group did you or your ancestor (on the male side) belong on coming to this continent?

_____ English
_____ French
_____ German
_____ Irish
_____ Italian
_____ Native Indian (Band)
_____ Native Indian (Non-band)
_____ Netherlands
_____ Norwegian
_____ Jewish

Other; write here _____

What is the occupation of the head of your household? (Either parent.) (E.g., selling shoes, civil engineering, motor vehicle repairing, metal machining, clerical work, etc.)

_____

_____

What are his/her most important activities or duties?
(E.g., fitting shoes, building bridges, auto body work, operating lathe, posting invoices, etc.)

_____

_____

What is his/her job title?
(E.g., manager of shoe department, civil engineer, auto body mechanic, lathe operator, invoice clerk, etc.)

_____

_____

APPENDIX IV

CODING ASPECTS FOR MORAL JUDGMENT

CODING ASPECTS OF DEVELOPING MORAL JUDGMENT

CODE	DESCRIPTION	ASPECTS
1. Value	Locus of value - modes of attributing (moral) value to acts, persons, or events. Modes of assessing value consequences in a situation.	1. Considering motives in judging action. 2. Considering consequences in judging action. 3. Subjectivity vs. objectivity of values assessed. 4. Relation of obligation to wish. 5. Identification with actor or victims in judging the action. 6. Status of actor and victim as changing the moral worth of actions.
2. Choice	Mechanisms of resolving or denying awareness of conflicts.	7. Limiting actor's responsibility for consequences by shifting responsibility onto others. 8. Reliance on discussion and compromise, mainly unrealistically. 9. Distorting situation so that conforming behavior is seen as always maximizing the interests of the actor or of others involved.
3. Sanctions and Motives	The dominant motives and sanctions for moral or deviant action.	10. Punishment or negative reactions. 11. Disruption of personal relationship. 12. A concern by actor for welfare, for positive state of the other. 13. Self-condemnation.

CODE	DESCRIPTION	ASPECTS
4. Rules	The ways in which rules are conceptualized, applied, and generalized. The basis of the validity of a rule.	14. Definition of an act as deviant (Definition of moral rules and norms). 15. Generality and consistency of rules. 16. Waiving rules for personal relations (particularism).
5. Rights and Authority	Basis and limits of control over persons and property.	17. Non-motivational attributes ascribed to authority (knowledged, etc.). (Motivational attributes considered under sanctions and motives.) 18. Extent or scope of authority's rights. Rights of liberty. 19. Rights of possession or property.
6. Positive Justice	Reciprocity and equality.	20. Exchange and reciprocity as a motive for role conformity. 21. Reciprocity as a motive to deviate (e.g., revenge). 22. Distributive justice. Equality and impartiality. 23. Concepts of maintaining partner's expectations as a motive for conformity. Contract and trust.
7. Punitive Justice	Standards and functions of punishment.	24. Puni ive te dencies or expectations. (a) Notions of equating punishment and crime. 25. Functions or purpose of punishment.

Source: Kohlberg, 1969: 378-379.

APPENDIX V

COMPUTATION EXAMPLE FOR SCORING MORAL JUDGMENT

COMPUTATION EXAMPLE

CASE NUMBER

CODER I.D.

MORAL STAGE

101	SITUATION 1		SITUATION 3		SITUATION 4		SITUATION 7			
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	SUM	% RESPONSE
1										
2	x		xx	xx					5	25
3	xx	xxx			xx	xx	x	xx	12	60
4	x	x					x		3	15
5										
6										
N_1	4	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	= 20	

% RESPONSE BY SITUATION

N_2	8	4	4	4
1				
2	13	99		
3	62		99	75
4	25			25
5				
6				

APPENDIX VI

MEAN-PERCENT RESPONSE RATE BY MORAL STAGE
FOR THE SIX SUB-SAMPLES

MEAN-PERCENT RESPONSE RATE BY MORAL STAGE
FOR THE SIX SUB-SAMPLES

STAGE	TREATMENT ONE		TREATMENT TWO		TREATMENT THREE	
	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE
1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.34	0.22	0.00
2	7.82	4.96	4.36	5.68	4.48	3.14
3	36.56	48.10	64.56	53.46	53.70	59.82
4	38.84	35.84	18.22	29.56	28.78	28.64
5	16.28	10.90	11.22	10.74	11.92	8.14
6	0.05	0.20	1.64	0.22	0.90	0.26

APPENDIX VII

CELL MEANS FOR "DESIGN x DEPENDENT VARIABLE" COMBINATIONS

TABLE 1

CELL MEANS FOR POST-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE-RATE:
3-FACTOR REPEATED MEASURES DESIGN

	DILEMMA	T_1	T_2	T_3
MALE (n = 150)	1	18.75	15.42	16.26
	3	8.80	14.66	11.08
	4	20.20	12.64	14.34
	7	20.92	9.66	9.04
FEMALE (n = 150)	1	20.09	9.48	13.88
	3	11.12	15.98	7.24
	4	7.02	8.68	5.04
	7	6.16	9.78	8.32

TABLE 2

CELL MEANS FOR POST-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE-RATE:
3-FACTOR DESIGN

	ATTENDANCE	T_1	T_2	T_3
CATHOLICS	LOW	13.50 (12.37)* (4)**	17.00 (15.63) (10)	10.57 (10.75) (7)
	MEDIUM	24.75 (24.61) (8)	8.2 (9.17) (5)	10.73 (10.19) (11)
	HIGH	6.13 (6.59) (8)	15.00 (16.28) (13)	13.29 (11.93) (7)
PROTESTANTS	LOW	15.76 (15.43) (29)	14.11 (13.68) (27)	12.38 (12.09) (24)
	MEDIUM	9.5 (9.7) (12)	9.31 (10.08) (16)	5.17 (5.16) (18)
	HIGH	10.88 (11.19) (8)	6.0 (8.58) (6)	5.67 (6.52) (3)

*Means adjusted for covariate (dogmatism).

**Number of cases in cell.

TABLE 3

CELL MEANS FOR POST-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE-RATE:
2-FACTOR DESIGN

		T_1	T_2	T_3
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS	LOW	10.09 (9.86)* (31)**	7.89 (10.49) (28)	9.29 (9.61) (41)
	MEDIUM	14.38 (14.68) (31)	11.75 (11.58) (40)	12.86 (12.51) (30)
	HIGH	16.71 (15.51) (38)	15.63 (15.46) (32)	10.44 (9.44) (29)

*Means adjusted for covariate (dogmatism).

**Number of cases in cell.

TABLE 4

CELL MEANS FOR STAGE 4 RESPONSE-RATE:
3-FACTOR REPEATED MEASURES DESIGN

	DILEMMA	T_1	T_2	T_3
MALE (n = 150)	1	36.17	21.73	26.29
	3	34.73	11.36	27.73
	4	42.25	18.42	33.31
	7	35.95	27.29	27.48
FEMALE (n = 150)	1	25.88	28.30	17.12
	3	34.28	29.18	35.80
	4	40.92	35.02	37.40
	7	38.92	18.78	22.42

TABLE 5

CELL MEANS FOR STAGE 4 RESPONSE-RATE:
3-FACTOR DESIGN

	ATTENDANCE	T_1	T_2	T_3
CATHOLICS	LOW	41.50 (4)	18.60 (10)	27.29 (7)
	MEDIUM	36.25 (8)	17.80 (5)	26.64 (11)
	HIGH	37.38 (8)	26.39 (13)	32.14 (7)
PROTESTANTS	LOW	34.62 (29)	24.11 (27)	25.29 (24)
	MEDIUM	30.08 (12)	29.75 (16)	30.83 (18)
	HIGH	42.13 (8)	26.33 (6)	28.00 (3)

TABLE 6

CELL MEANS FOR STAGE 4 RESPONSE-RATE:
2-FACTOR DESIGN

		T_1	T_2	T_3
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS	LOW	36.77 (31)	26.54 (28)	29.24 (41)
	MEDIUM	41.97 (31)	21.08 (40)	25.47 (30)
	HIGH	34.03 (38)	25.06 (32)	31.31 (29)

TABLE 7

CELL MEANS FOR STAGE 3 RESPONSE-RATE:
3-FACTOR REPEATED MEASURES DESIGN

	DILEMMA	T_1	T_2	T_3
MALE (n = 150)	1	30.82	49.96	47.14
	3	51.64	73.40	55.82
	4	29.38	65.18	49.07
	7	41.38	61.78	61.32
FEMALE (n = 150)	1	45.30	53.58	62.53
	3	52.54	50.62	55.56
	4	45.52	50.20	54.36
	7	53.34	64.56	68.04

TABLE 8

CELL MEANS FOR STAGE 3 RESPONSE-RATE:
3-FACTOR DESIGN

	ATTENDANCE	T_1	T_2	T_3
CATHOLICS	LOW	41.00 (4)	60.70 (10)	57.86 (7)
	MEDIUM	35.50 (8)	72.20 (5)	58.36 (11)
	HIGH	52.75 (8)	53.77 (13)	51.00 (7)
PROTESTANTS	LOW	42.59 (29)	56.04 (27)	60.33 (24)
	MEDIUM	52.25 (12)	56.13 (16)	59.33 (18)
	HIGH	43.50 (8)	60.83 (6)	65.00 (3)

TABLE 9

CELL MEANS FOR STAGE 3 RESPONSE-RATE:
2-FACTOR DESIGN

		T_1	T_2	T_3
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS	LOW	46.87 (31)	61.07 (28)	57.10 (41)
	MEDIUM	35.77 (31)	61.28 (40)	58.47 (30)
	HIGH	43.97 (38)	54.38 (32)	54.52 (29)

TABLE 10

CELL MEANS FOR PRE-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE-RATE:
3-FACTOR REPEATED MEASURES DESIGN

	DILEMMA	T_1	T_2	T_3
MALE (n = 150)	1	13.82	12.42	9.96
	3	4.32	0.00	4.98
	4	7.74	3.48	2.98
	7	1.16	0.50	1.66
FEMALE (n = 150)	1	8.38	8.24	6.10
	3	1.74	3.96	1.08
	4	5.98	5.96	2.96
	7	1.00	6.32	0.66

TABLE 11

CELL MEANS FOR PRE-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE-RATE:
3-FACTOR DESIGN

	ATTENDANCE	T_1	T_2	T_3
CATHOLICS	LOW	4.00 (4)	3.70 (10)	4.29 (7)
	MEDIUM	3.5 (8)	1.8 (5)	4.27 (11)
	HIGH	3.75 (8)	4.77 (13)	3.57 (7)
PROTESTANTS	LOW	7.03 (29)	5.74 (27)	2.00 (24)
	MEDIUM	8.16 (12)	4.81 (16)	4.67 (18)
	HIGH	3.5 (8)	6.83 (6)	1.33 (3)

TABLE 12

CELL MEANS FOR PRE-CONVENTIONAL RESPONSE-RATE:
2-FACTOR DESIGN

		T_1	T_2	T_3
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS	LOW	6.26 (31)	4.43 (28)	4.37 (41)
	MEDIUM	7.87 (31)	5.9 (40)	3.2 (30)
	HIGH	5.29 (38)	4.94 (32)	4.03 (29)

APPENDIX VIII

TABLE 1: RESULTS OF TESTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE.

TABLE 2: RESULTS OF TESTS FOR REGRESSION SLOPE HOMOGENEITY.

Bartlett's tests for homogeneity of variance were computed for both the 3- and 2-factor designs, the results of which appear below.

TABLE 1

RESULTS OF BARTLETT'S TESTS FOR HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE

3-FACTOR DESIGN: RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION, FREQUENCY OF CHURCH ATTENDANCE, AND TREATMENT

STAGE	DF	X^2	P
5 and 6	17	35.76	<.001
4	17	22.03	NS
3	17	14.45	NS
1 and 2	17	16.77	NS

2-FACTOR DESIGN: SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND TREATMENT

STAGE	DF	X^2	P
5 and 6	8	29.33	<.001
4	8	12.94	NS
3	8	1.88	NS
1 and 2	8	20.01	<.01

As can be seen above, several of the tests were statistically significant indicating that homogeneity of variance cannot be assumed for certain categories of the dependent variable. This result suggests that caution must be exercised when interpreting any marginally significant results in the forthcoming analysis.

The legitimacy of making the assumption of slope equality is supported by the following data. The tests were computed for both the 3- and 2-factor designs by each of the four categories of the dependent variable. It can be seen in Table 2 that all the tests for differences between slopes were statistically insignificant, thus justifying the assumption.

TABLE 2

RESULTS OF TESTS FOR REGRESSION SLOPE EQUALITY

3-FACTOR DESIGN: RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION, FREQUENCY OF CHURCH ATTENDANCE, AND TREATMENT

STAGE	DF	F	P
5 and 6	17/180	1.51	NS
4	17/180	1.50	NS
3	17/180	1.33	NS
1 and 2	17/180	1.01	NS

2-FACTOR DESIGN: SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS AND TREATMENT

STAGE	DF	F	P
5 and 6	8/282	.93	NS
4	8/282	.45	NS
3	8/282	.95	NS
1 and 2	8/282	.79	NS